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ABSTRACT 
 
GERMANY AND TURKESTANIS  
DURING THE COURSE OF THE WORLD WAR II 
(1941-1945) 
 
Sakal, Halil Burak 
Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
 
July 2010 
 
 
 This thesis focuses on the debates about the nationalities issue in the Soviet 
Union with a special emphasis on the situation of the peoples living in the Soviet 
Central Asia during the World War II. The thesis traces the history of the Soviet 
Central Asia on the eve of the World War II and the patterns of behavior of the 
Turkestani soldiers in the Soviet Army during the war. This study also looks upon 
Hitler Germany and National Socialist movement within a framework of the 
German change of attitude towards the Asiatic and Turkic peoples of the Soviet 
Union before and during the World War II. Finally, it tries to find an answer to the 
question, why the Turkestani Muslim soldiers fought under German ranks and to 
which degree this contributed to the nationalism of the Central Asian peoples. 
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Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
 
Temmuz 2010 
 
   
  Bu çalışma, hususiyetle İkinci Dünya Savaşı esnasında Sovyet Merkezi 
Asya‟sında yaşayan halkların durumuna atıfta bulunarak, Sovyetler Birliği‟ndeki 
milliyetler meselesi tartışmalarına odaklanmaktadır. Tez, Sovyet Merkezi 
Asya‟sının İkinci Dünya Savaşı‟nın hemen öncesindeki tarihini ve Sovyet 
Ordusundaki Türkistanlı askerlerin savaş esnasındaki davranış kalıplarını 
incelemektedir. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda, Almanların İkinci Dünya Savaşı 
öncesinde ve sırasında Sovyetler Birliği‟nin Asyalı ve Türk halklarına karşı tutum 
değişikliği çerçevesinde, Hitler Almanya‟sı ve Nazi hareketine de göz atmaktadır. 
Nihayet çalışma, Türkistanlı Müslüman askerlerin neden Alman saflarında 
çarpıştığı ve bunun Merkezi Asya halklarının milliyetçiliğine ne derece katkıda 
bulunduğu sorularına cevap aramaktadır.        
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkezi Asya, İkinci Dünya Savaşı, Waffen-SS, Türkistan, 
Almanya. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Stalin and his regime had been subject to severe criticism both in the Soviet 
Union and abroad. Leon Trotsky, Lev Borisovich Kamenev and Grigory 
Yevseevich Zinoviev, leading ideologues and politicians after Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin, represented the first serious and public opposition to Stalin. Trotsky was sent 
into exile in 1929 to Prinkipo (Büyük Ada) to İstanbul. Zinoviev and Kamenev 
were brought to the “show trials.” Both were executed in 1936. Abroad, the White 
Russian emigrants and non-Russians, who fled from Russia after the Russian Civil 
War (1917-1923), formed various groups of opposition to the Soviet regime. 
European cities such as Warsaw, Berlin, and Paris became the main centers for 
these groups.  
When the World War II broke out, opposition of the émigré White Russian 
and non-Russian communities became a significant element. As the World War II 
progressed, some of the Nazi leaders wanted to make use of them. The opposition 
groups at first hesitated cooperating with Germans. But the rising numbers of the 
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prisoners-of-war at the hands of the German Army convinced them to join the 
German forces or collaborate with them. 
The World War II had a special place in the history of the Soviet Union, as it 
had in the history of the most of the world. In Soviet historiography and later in 
Russian historiography, this war was referred as Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 
(Great Patriotic War). It can be said that the World War II had resulted, to some 
degree, with the strengthening the unity among the Soviet people and the Stalinist 
regime thereafter. On the other hand, the regime witnessed an opposition at home 
and abroad during the war years, which was not seen before and after the          
World War II.     
A part of the discussion on the wartime opposition to the Stalinist regime in 
the literature has continued in a framework, whether or not the above-mentioned 
émigré dissidents were traitors. After the outbreak of the Russo-German battles in 
the World War II, members of the White Russian movement formed a group named 
Russkoe Osvoboditelnoe Dvijenie (Russian Liberation Movement). The defected 
former Red Army general Andrey Vlasov became the leader of the movement. The 
Russian Liberation Movement and Vlasov constituted the core of this ongoing 
discussion.
1
 But the story of the Russian Liberation Movement does not reflect the 
whole picture. The opposition of the non-Russians and Muslims to Stalin 
represented a different character.  
What was exclusive regarding the Muslims‟ dissidence and opposition to the 
regime can be summarized as follows: First, the pressure on religion applied by the 
                                                             
1 For more detail about Vlasov and Russian Liberation Movement, see Catherine Andreyev, Vlasov 
and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Emigre Theories (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in 
World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952); Joachim Hoffmann, Die Tragödie 
der “Russischen Befreiungsarmee” 1944/45: Wlassow gegen Stalin (Munich: Herbich Verlag, 
2003). 
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state throughout 1920s and 1930s was never assented by the Muslim peoples of the 
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Joseph Stalin loosened the 
pressure because of the imminent threat from Germany in 1940s, but it did not have 
a large impact on the masses. Second, the Soviet engineering on the national 
identities and efforts to create a homo-Sovieticus had different reflections on the 
non-Russian peoples than on the Russians in the Union. When the war began, it had 
not been passed long after the great purges against the Muslim intelligentsia who 
pioneered the sense of being a nation among the Turkic peoples. Third, the shadow 
of the famous Basmacı2 movement was still visible in Central Asia just before the 
World War II. The last of the Basmacıs Cüneyt Han died in Afghanistan in 1938. 
Finally, the status of the Turkestan in the eyes of the Russian governments had been 
different from the time it had been conquered by the Tsarist armies. The policy 
applied there by the Russian governments was colonialism of a special sort, unlike 
other non-Russian parts of the empire. The motives of the conquest of the Turkestan 
were primarily strategic, then economic and political.        
During the World War II, in the course of the battles between the Soviet 
Union and Germany (1941-1945), millions of soldiers of the Red Army fell at the 
hands of the Germans as prisoners-of-war (POWs).
3
 Later, nearly one million 
                                                             
2 The Basmacı (in Russian: Basmachestvo) movement was an uprising started in 1916 during the 
World War I in Central Asia against the Tsarist regime and Bolshevik rule therafter. Basmacı was 
the name given to the rebels by the Russians, meaning “raider.” Enver Pasha, the leader of the 
Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire led the movement from October 1921 to       
August 1922.   
3 There are many different figures on the numbers of the Soviet prisoners-of-war. According to 
George Fischer, prior to November 1941, total amount of the Soviet prisoners-of-war was 
2,053,000. However, Rosenberg speaks of 3,600,000 men in his letter. See, Fischer, p. 44. 
Alexander Dallin gives a number of 3,355,000 for the year 1941, 1,653,000 for the year 1942. 
Dallin‟s data is based on the OKW/Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt (General Armed Forces 
Department of the OKW). See, Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of 
Occupation Policies (New York: Palgrave, 1981), p. 427. The data by the Generalquartiermeister 
des Heeres (Quartermaster General of the Land Army) points to 3,350,639 Soviet soldiers as 
prisoners-of-war until December 20, 1941 (including also dead, fugitive and released). Christian 
Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945 
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Soviet citizens, conscripted from these POWs, fought on the German side against 
the Soviet Union.
4
   
The World War II was, in every respect, a total war. Furthermore, the clash 
of two ideologies of the time, Bolshevism in the Soviet Union and National 
Socialism in Germany, had enormous and irreversible effects on the peoples, which 
deserves a detailed examination. Both Soviet Union and Germany had authoritarian 
regimes with similar oppressive control methods. Also, both had expansionist aims 
with the immediate result of the partition of Poland between the two before the 
beginning of the German attack on the Soviet Union. The Russo-German battles in 
the World War II were not only a clash of ideologies, but also of propaganda and 
manipulation, as well as a bloody clash of two huge land armies of the world. 
On the state-level, in both Germany and the Soviet Union, the official state 
ideology and reality were in serious conflict. On German side, Hitler and Nazi 
Party‟s ideology was designed on anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik politics. On the 
nationality question, Hitler‟s views were obvious: German blood, and occasionally 
the “Nordic blood,” without doubt, ranked on top of the “hierarchy of races,” while 
the others were followed by it. What is more, this official ideology was made public 
without hesitation, since the Nazi ideologues found it coherent and rational. In some 
of the practices of this theory, however, as will be discussed in this study, things 
developed slightly different than the ideology.  
Opposite to any expectations, in the course of war, Nazis developed an 
interesting policy towards the non-German peoples, who were supposed to be at the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978), p 356.   
4 Joachim Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen 1941-1943 (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach Freiburg, 1986), p. 11; 
Gerhard von Mende, “Erfahrungen mit Ostfreiwilligen in der deutschen Wehrmacht während des 
zweiten Weltkrieges,” Vielvölkerheere und Koalitionskriege (Darmstadt: C.W. Leske Verlag, 
1952), p. 23. Fischer gives the total amount of the Soviet citizens as nearly half a million.       
See, Fischer, p. 45.  
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lower ranks than Germans in the Nazi “hierarchy of races.” In the instance of the 
creation of the first non-German units in the German Army and Schutzstaffeln 
(Protective Echelon, in short SS), German treatment of these people reflected some 
diversions from the theory. This became obvious in the German attitude towards the 
Asiatic peoples, who ranked last in the hierarchy with the Jews. Besides, on many 
occasions, the Asiatic peoples, including also the Central Asians, perceived 
Germans as friendly and “liberators” from the Russian and Bolshevik yoke. Again, 
German propaganda was an enormous element in this situation.  
On the other hand, Stalinist ideology did the opposite what the Nazis did on 
nationality issue. The Bolshevik publications of pre- and after 1917 had envisaged 
the self-determination of all minorities, living within the borders of Russia. This 
emerged as an indicator of the pragmatic politics of the Bolsheviks. Here, again the 
politics and practice were incongruous. Especially after Iosip Stalin had 
consolidated his power, all religious and ethnic minorities faced a totally different 
attitude than they were promised during the Russian Civil War. The “ordinary 
people,” the peasants, constituting the majority of the Soviet population, were not 
able to evaluate the Bolshevik ideology or politics, with which they were not much 
familiar. Thus, they definitely evaluated the practice.  
The World War II was especially important for the Turkic and Muslim 
peoples of the USSR. It can be said that these people fought a different war from 
those of the Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union. First of all, as made open by the 
Nazis, the Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union, namely Ukrainians, Belarusians and 
Russians were seen as direct targets of the Nazis and German invasion physically. 
Secondly, even then, many Slavic Soviet POWs at the German hands had preferred 
to fight a war under the German Army and in the SS uniform against the Soviets. 
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However, for the Turkic and Muslim peoples, Soviet (i.e. Russian) oppression (and 
before this, the Tsarist regime) had represented the imminent threat. That was 
probably why they had taken active part in the formation of the Waffen-SS and also 
why they could not have any better relations with the Slavic members in the SS 
uniform. And all these happened under dense propaganda from both Soviet and 
Nazi regimes.  
This study focuses on the problem of identities in the USSR and politics 
behind the Turkestani Waffen-SS formations. It could be rather called as a modest 
attempt to understand through which motivations the Turkestanis had accepted to 
fight on the side of another oppressive nation and how the members of this “lower 
ranking peoples” were welcomed by the Germans to fight on their side. This study 
mainly focuses on the question of the interrelationship between the joining of the 
Turkestanis to German Armies to fight against the Soviet State and Soviet policies 
towards Turkestanis before the war. Besides, this study tries to find a convincing 
answer to the questions, what were the main cultural and historical motivations of 
the Turkestanis for their opposition to the state and to what degree the opposition of 
the Turkestani peoples differed from the one of those living in the rest of the Soviet 
Union. 
In order to explain and understand all these, a literature review of the 
sources written in German, English, Russian and Turkish languages on the history 
of the Turkestani armed formations in the German Army will be used. Since very 
few direct historical sources appeared on the issue, some published and unpublished 
archival resources regarding the German military activities, memoirs of the 
German, Turkish, British officers, politicians and diplomats, as well as many Turkic 
POWs and émigré leaders are employed throughout the study.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE ERA OF REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA AND TURKESTAN 
 
 
 
The Soviet Union entered the World War II with the Bolshevik party at 
power. The party and state authority strengthened further by Stalin and Stalinist 
policies have been important elements on the “nationalities problem” in the USSR. 
A historical background of how and under which circumstances Bolsheviks took 
power in Russia and in Turkestan is necessary for understanding the situation of 
Turkic peoples in Russia on the eve of the World War II. 
 
2.1 Politics in Russia before the Era of Revolutions  
Roots of the Bolshevik takeover of government in 1917 dated back to late 
nineteenth century. The first political party founded in 1898 in Russia by Plekhanov 
was the Social-Democratic Labor Party, with the proletariat as the targeted class. 
This party was divided in 1903 forming the Bolshevik and Menshevik branches. 
The leadership of the Bolshevik party was taken over by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, 
or Lenin.  
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Founded in 1901, the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) sought the support of 
peasants. They used various instruments, including terror as a means of propaganda 
in order to undermine the authority of the Tsar and to awaken a popular uprising 
against the regime. Another political group was Constitutional Democrats, or 
Kadets. They favored constitutional monarchy, which would ensure the 
representation of the democratic rights of the people in the parliament.  
 
2.1.1 The February Revolution 
The events that began on February 23, 1917
5
 resulted with the abdication of 
the Tsar and re-opening of the Russian parliament, Duma,
6
 as the only authority for 
representation and government of the people in Russia. The Vremennoye 
Pravitelstvo Rossii (Russian Provisional Government) was founded under Georgy 
Lvov. Following the events of July 1917, Alexander Kerensky government was 
founded until the Bolshevik takeover in October.    
During the World War I, Russia was experiencing one of the most turbulent 
times in her political history. Centuries-long Tsarist government was overthrown 
under an atmosphere of military, social, economic and political crisis. The 
democratic revolution of February 1917 did not last long and the Bolshevik party 
took over the government on October 25, 1917.
7
 
                                                             
5 The “February Revolution” in 1917 took place on March 1917. This date corresponded to February 
1917 according to the Julian calendar. The “October Revolution” was an event in November 
1917. To avoid confusion, the old style Julian calendar will be used in this chapter exclusively.  
6 Russian parliament Duma was first opened in 1905.  
7 This date corresponded to November 7, 1917 according to the Gregorian calendar. For detailed 
information on Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1907, see Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 
(New York: Knopf, 1990).  
9 
 
 
2.1.2 The Bolshevik Takeover 
At first, the Bolshevik takeover was perceived as being temporary. The aide-
de-camp of Alexander Kerensky, the Chairman of the Russian Provisional 
Government, was reporting to the US-Ambassador to Russia, David Rowland 
Francis, that this movement would be “liquidated” within five days. He 
recommended the US-government not to recognize the new Soviet government.
8
  
For a long time, the whereabouts of Kerensky were unknown, while all 
ministers, except him, were arrested on October 25. Petrogradskiy soviet rabochih i 
soldatskih deputatov (Petrograd Soviet of Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Deputies) sent 
bulletins throughout Russia that “Soviet was in control and the government 
disposed.”9  
The Bolsheviks got their main support from the soldiers, whom they 
promised ending to the ongoing war. Apart from the soldiers, railroad workers and 
women supported them at very early crucial stages. On the other hand, they sought 
“ethnic support” from some of the non-Russian peoples by using the famous slogan 
of that time, the “self-determination.”10 
After the bloody Civil War (1917-1923), Bolsheviks consolidated their 
power and liquidated all other political parties and opposition groups. Figures to 
                                                             
8 “The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the US Secretary of State,” on November 7, 1917, 5 p.m., 
File No. 861.00/632, the Avalon Project. See http://avalon.law.yale.edu, accessed on      
November 23, 2009.  
9 “The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State,” on November 8, 1917, 5 p.m.,   
File No. 861.00/635; “The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State,” on 
November 10, 1917, 11 p.m., the Avalon Project. There was an uncertainty prevailed for days in 
Russia. It is understood that even the US-Ambassador did not know where Lenin and Trotsky 
were. See, “The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State,” on November 9, 
1917, 5 p.m., File No. 861.00/068, the Avalon Project. 
10 Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of 
Imperialism,” in Roland Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations: Empire and 
Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 68. 
10 
 
organize new political movements were labeled as revisionists or class enemies. 
Thus, the only opposition parties could be established by the émigrés abroad. It is 
worth mentioning here that opposition groups close to Nazi ideology, Konstantin 
Rodzaevski‟s “Russian Fascist Party,” founded in 1931 and based in Manchukuo, 
and Anastasy Vosyatsky‟s “Russian Fascist Organization,” founded in 1933 and 
tried to be merged with the Russian Fascist Party in 1934, proved ineffective.
11
  The 
politics in the USSR was difficult for the non-Russians as well. Like the Russian 
ones, some of the non-Russian politicians and intellectuals were liquidated, while 
some others emigrated and continued their opposition abroad.    
 
2.2 The Russian Central Asia 
2.2.1 Turkestan before the Revolution 
“Nothing can be more natural than the expansion of the Russian Empire over 
the mid-latitude plains east of Caspian.” So wrote one traveler into Turkestan just 
before the 1905 revolution. Except the desert, there were no real topographical 
barriers to hinder the Russian progress.
12
 The Imperial Russia‟s invasion of Central 
Asia was finalized in 1884 with the capture of the city Merv. Before that, Tashkent 
surrendered in 1865; the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate were defeated 
in 1868 and 1873, while Kokand Khanate was liquidated in 1876.
13
  
The methods of empire-building of the Russian Empire worked as follows: 
the officials of the Tsar contacted the nobility of the newly acquired land and forced 
                                                             
11 Werner Brockdorff, Kollaboration oder Widerstand in den Besetzten Ländern (Munich: Verlag 
Welsermühl, 1968), p. 186. 
12 W. M. Davis, “A Summer in Turkestan,” Bulletin of the American Geographical Society (Vol. 36, 
No. 4 (1904)), p.  217. 
13 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 199-
201. 
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them to cooperate with the Tsarist government. In Central Asia, this method was 
applied only partially. Russia did not try to integrate the nomadic and peasant 
populations. This helped the preservation of the “national and ethnic identities.”14 
Further, as mentioned shortly in the introduction chapter, the conquest of Central 
Asia had been a typical colonial expansion. It was set under military administration, 
was supposed to supply Russia for raw materials, while being a market for the final 
products of the Russian industry.
15
 The words of the Russian Statesman, Lobanov 
Rostovsky represented a good example reflecting the official view of the imperial 
Russia on Turkestan. He stated that “[i]t has remained an alien country governed by 
Russia and is much more a field for Russian enterprise and culture than for Russian 
colonization proper.”16  
As will be discussed below, the definitions and concepts of nation in the 
minds of the Turkestani intellectuals varied from time to time. The educated class in 
Turkestan was split into two: some of them, the kadimists,
17
 pursued the way of 
Islam and rejected the new methods in education, while others believed the 
European values and thoughts.
18
 In order to understand the Turkestani intelligentsia, 
a short historical background of the cedid movement is necessary.   
                                                             
14 Roland Grigor Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, „National‟ Identity, and Theories 
of Empire,” in Suny and Martin, p. 41. 
15 Soucek, pp. 200-203.  
16 Lobanov Rostovsky, “The Soviet Muslim Republics in Central Asia,” Journal of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (Vol. 7, No. 4 (Jul., 1928)), p. 242. 
17 Kadimists‟ name was derived from the originally Arabic word kadim, meaning “ancient, old.” 
They were mainly against the reform movements in the soceity and blamed cedids as being 
infidels. See, A. Ahat Andican, Turkestan Struggle Abroad: From Jadidism to Independence 
(Haarlem: Sota, 2007), p. 25.  
18 Suny, p. 52. 
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2.2.2 Politics in Central Asia and the Cedid Movement 
The name of the cedid movement stems from the usul-u cedid (new method) 
schools, first of which was founded by Münevver Qari in 1901. These schools were 
advocated by İsmail Bey Gaspıralı and had a significant role in the formation and 
motivation of the Turkestani intellectuals. In these schools, Turkic languages were 
used instead of Arabic as means of education. Mathematics, geography and history 
were taught as well.
19
 The new method schools helped emergence of a new trend 
among the Turkic intelligentsia reaching beyond education. Consequently, cedidism 
rose as a movement for cultural reform in the Turkic world.
20
  
After the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Tsar Nicholas II had to permit 
elections to be held in Russia. This resulted with a relatively more liberal political 
atmosphere, in which Turkestani nationalists established political bodies in Central 
Asia and organized conferences across Russia. Muslim and Turkic deputies 
supported some of the Russian parties in Duma, which they considered to be closer 
to their views. Also, some of them worked directly in the Russian Kadet party.
21
   
Few numbers of Turkestanis received modern education at the schools 
founded by Russians. Besides, cedids provided modern schooling in Turkestan. 
These cedids were either from the “older parts of the Russian Empire” such as 
Kazan, or were educated in the Russian institutions.
22
 Some members of the cedid 
                                                             
19 Andican, Turkestan Struggle Abroad, p. 25. 
20 Adeeb Khalid, “Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan,” Slavic Review (Vol. 
55, No. 2 (Summer, 1996)), pp. 274-275. 
21 A. Ahat Andican, Cedidizm’den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi (İstanbul: Emre, 
2003), p. 29 (will be cited as Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi hereafter). 
22 İsmail Bey Gaspıralı (1851-1914), a Crimean Tatar, led the usul-u cedid (new method) movement 
in the modern schooling in Central Asia. Soucek, p. 206. 
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movement went to the Ottoman Empire‟s capital,23 where they got familiar with 
nationalistic ideas “in forms of pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism.”24    
Intellectuals such as Mahmud Hoca Behbudi and Abdurrauf Fıtrat were 
active in Bukhara despite the suppression of the Bukharan Emir on the cedid 
movement. They thought that the way to enlightenment passes through the struggle 
against Tsarist imperialism and suppression, as well as religious fanaticism.
25
  
 
2.2.3 Revolt in Central Asia 
During the World War I, the situation was worsened for the population of 
Central Asia because of the taxes imposed on them and forced labor. The discontent 
heightened in 1916. On June 25, the Tsar ordered all Turkestani males between the 
ages of nineteen and forty three to be conscripted to the army.
26
 The Turkestani 
population was not seen as eligible for the military service before.
27
 Now, the 
Turkestanis were to be forced to work at the construction battalions of the Russian 
Army fighting against the Muslim Ottoman Empire.  
Further, the government intervened into the cotton production in Turkestan 
by fixing the price of this commodity.
28
 Turkestan had been dependent on Russia 
for foodstuff since its colonization. Food prices increased steadily in 1917. In the 
                                                             
23 Among them were Abdurrauf Fıtrat, Osman Hoca, Gülceli Abdülaziz and Sadık Aşuroğlu. They 
arrived in 1909 to Turkey and established relations with Young Turks. See, Andican, Turkestan 
Struggle Abroad, pp. 27-28. 
24 Soucek, p. 206. 
25 Andican, Turkestan Struggle Abroad, p. 27. 
26 Johannes Benzing, “Das turkestanische Volk im Kampf um seine Selbständigkeit,” Die Welt des 
Islams (vol. 19 (1937)), pp. 117-119. 
27 Soucek, p. 209; Martha B. Olcott, “The Basmachi or Freemen‟s Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24,” 
Soviet Studies (Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jul., 1981)), p. 353. 
28 Marco Buttino, “Study of the Economic Crisis and Depopulation in Turkestan, 1917-1920” 
Central Asian Survey (Vol.9, No.4, 1990), p. 60. 
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same year, with the contribution of unfavorable weather conditions, famine started. 
Russia stopped all the grain transports to Turkestan.
29
 
 
The events, which broke out in the Uzbek city Hojend on July 4, 1916, 
spread shortly and turned into a widespread revolt. Harshest measures were taken 
by the government to suppress the events, perishing thousands of people, burning 
entire villages and causing many Muslims to flee to China.
30
 In Semireche, the 
revolt was led by the Kazaks, while in Fergana Basmacı movement intervened into 
the conflict.
31
  
According to historian d‟Encausse, during the events, Kazaks‟ and Kirgizs‟ 
problem was mainly “land,” while for Uzbeks, “recognition of equal rights” was 
more important. Prominent figures of the turbulent times were, in Turkestan 
guberniia Mahmud Hoca Behbudi and Münevver Qari, in Kazakstan Tınışbay and 
Baytursun.
32
  
 
2.2.4 Political Activities of the Turkestanis from February to October 1917 
 The abolishment of the Tsarist monarchy in February 1917 caused a dual-
power in Tashkent, as it had been in Petrograd. The Gubernator of Turkestan at that 
time was Kropotkin. He announced full loyalty to Kerensky government in 
Petrograd, which abolished the Tsarist governmental system in Turkestan in March 
1917.
33
 Kropotkin was not alone on the political scene in Turkestan: there was the 
Turkestan Committee, composed of former Tsarist officers and supporters (five 
                                                             
29 Buttino, p. 61. 
30 Hèléne Carrère d‟Encausse, “The Fall of the Czarist Empire,” in Central Asia: 130 Years of 
Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview, Third Edition (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1994), pp. 210-213 
31 Buttino, p. 61. 
32 d‟Encausse, pp. 212-213.  
33 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi , p. 39. 
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Russians, and four Muslims) of Provisional Government against the Tashkent 
Soviet of Soldiers‟, Workers‟ and Peasants‟ Deputies (Tashkent Soviet). Feyzullah 
Hocayev and Münevver Qari were members of this body.34  
Turkestan Committee was appointed by the Provisional Government. In 
practice, this body had no political power. The actual power was at the hands of the 
Tashkent Soviet. It was dominated by SRs and Mensheviks. Bolsheviks had no 
separate organization in Tashkent until December 1917. They had a distinct faction 
in the Tashkent Soviet only. 
Turkestanis found the chance to establish their national and religious bodies, 
publish their own journals for a short while after the abolishment of the Tsarist 
regime in February 1917.
35
 In April 1917, the Muslim group in Russian Duma held 
a special conference, deciding to call for an All-Russian Muslim Congress in 
Moscow. Muslims in Russia held regional conferences and elected their deputies to 
be sent to Moscow.
36
 The Congress convened on May 1, 1917 in Moscow.  
On the “nationality question,” two groups emerged among the Muslims of 
Russia. One group advocated the integrity of the Empire and favored cultural 
autonomy. Volga Tatars dominated this group. Another group led by Mehmed Emin 
Resulzade favored federalism and national self-determination. The Congress voted 
for the latter.
37 
The Congress also elected a Milli Merkezi Şura (National Central Council). 
It was known among the people as the Milli Merkez (National Center), Mustafa 
                                                             
34 Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917 – 1921 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1957), pp. 9-10. 
35 Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im Herzen Euroasiens (Köln: Studienverlag, 1980), p. 95. 
36 Pipes, p. 76. 
37 Pipes, pp. 77-78. 
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Çokay (January 1890- December 1941) being its chairman.38 The aim of the Milli 
Merkez was to represent Muslims in the capital and prepare proposals, which 
appeared as the result of the Congress. These proposals were to be presented to the 
All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
39
 Conservatives of Turkestan, who thought that 
they were not represented in Milli Merkez, founded in June 1917 the Ulema 
Cemiyeti (Society of Ulema) under the leadership of Şir Ali Lapin.40 By the summer 
of 1917, the Turkestan Committee, the Tashkent Soviet, the Milli Merkez, and the 
Ulema Cemiyeti were on the scene for the bid of power in Turkestan.  
Milli Merkez tried to establish a program for the formation of an 
autonomous Turkestan as part of the Russian Democratic Republic, which was 
accepted in September 1917 in Tashkent. But the power struggle in this city 
between the Turkestan Committee and the Tashkent Soviet led to the establishment 
of the military dictatorship of General Korovichenko. He was sent to Turkestan 
with punitive troops from Petrograd.
41
 On November 19, 1917 a Soviet 
Commissariat, composed of thirty six Russian commissars, was established in 
Tashkent.
42
 
 
2.2.5 The Civil War in Turkestan 
In the autumn of 1917, Orenburg was surrounded by the Cossack military 
forces loyal to the Tsar, blocking communication and transport between European 
Russia and Turkestan. Semireche was also in control of the Cossacks for a while. 
                                                             
38 Ertürk, “Mustafa Coqaj,” Millij Türkistan (year 2(5), January 15, 1950, vol 65), p. 12. 
39 Pipes, pp. 77-78. 
40 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, p. 40.  
41 Nadira A. Abdurrakhimova, “The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies (Vol. 34, No. 2, Special Issue: Nationalism, 2002), pp. 257-258. 
42 Hayit, Turkestan im Herzen Euroasiens, p. 95.  
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Fergana Valley was the scene of riots and disorders. The tension between Russian 
settlers and native population rose sharply. The natives sought support from 
Basmacıs.43 The famine of 1917 followed by an epidemic in Turkestan made the 
situation worse. Furthermore, Orenburg blockade hindered food transportation to 
Turkestan.
44
 From 1919 on, the Russian revolutionaries in Turkestan had the 
monopoly over the food distribution in the region. Later, in search for allies against 
the Whites, they had to accept to share power with the natives during the conflict.
45
   
The situation in Bukhara was in favor of the Emir, since his independence 
was recognized de facto by the Tashkent Soviet. The cedids, who were hopeful for 
reforms in Bukhara after the February revolution, were seen as “traitors to Islam” 
by the Emir. A clash took place between them in April 1917. The Bukharan cedids 
fled to the Russian enclave Kagan and turned the “Young Bukharan” group into a 
political party. They saw that the Emir could not realize the reforms they demanded, 
so they came closer to the Soviets.
46
 Some cedids choose to side with the 
Bolsheviks, who made public the secret treaties signed by the Tsarist Empire at the 
expense of the Ottoman Empire and whose rhetoric was anti-imperialistic.
47
  
The Narodniy kommissariat po delam natsionalnostei (People‟s 
Commissariat for Nationality Affairs) sent a delegation in February 1918 to 
Turkestan. The mission became successful in terms of awakening interest in the 
                                                             
43 Adeeb Khalid, “Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia: The Transformation of Jadidism 
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45 Buttino, p. 63. 
46 Khalid, “Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia: The Transformation of Jadidism 1917-
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Soviet government. Cedids became members of the Bolshevik party organs in 
Central Asia, which adopted new names. For instance, the “Samarkand Labor 
Union” became “Muslim Soviet of Workers‟ and Peasants‟ Deputies.”48 
Meanwhile, the Soviet troops first marched on Kokand in February 1918, where an 
autonomous national republic was proclaimed in December 1917 by Mustafa 
Çokay, then on Bukhara in March 1918.49 They had to withdraw from Bukhara after 
a short while, recognizing the sovereignty rights of Bukhara. In May 1918, 
Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was proclaimed under 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
50
 The cedids helped the Red Army, 
when it attacked on Khiva and Bukhara in 1920.  
At the “Fifth Regional Conference” of the Communist Party of Turkestan, 
the name of the newly founded “Turkestan Republic” became “Turk Republic,” 
while the name of the Party was changed to “Communist Party of the Turkic 
Peoples.”51 For the cedids, the lands where the Chagatai language was spoken, 
constituted the historical homeland of the Turkic peoples, who should be united as a 
single political entity. After a while, however, the Chagatai was replaced by 
“Uzbek.” Some Muslim intellectuals claimed that the language was “Uzbek 
language,” while the population of Turkestan was “Uzbek” as a whole. Therefore, 
the Uzbek nationalism became widespread and dominated all others, long before the 
                                                             
48 The commission was composed of P.A. Kobozev, Y. İbrahimov and Arif Klevleev. See, Khalid, 
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“official emergence” of the Uzbek nation as a result of the national territorial 
delimitation in 1924.
52
  
While in early 1920s, the cedids wrote in newspapers and welcomed the 
common awareness of “Turkestan nationalism,” the Soviet authorities were trying 
to divide the nation into parts, which could be “defined and demarcated.”53 All the 
discussions ended with the national territorial delimitation of Turkestan, or 
razmezhevanie in 1924. Uzbek nationalists played a great role in this process.
54
 In 
September, People‟s Republic of Khorezm and Bukhara were abolished, which 
were followed by the Turkestan ASSR in October 1924.
55
     
 
2.2.6 The Nationalities Question and Bolshevik Ideology 
The nationalities issue and its perception by the political groups had crucial 
effects on the political choices of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union. The 
political parties in Russia had different positions on the issue. For instance, the SRs 
were favoring a federative system, in which rights were to be given to all the 
nationalities of the Empire. They supported the self-determination of all nations. 
After a while they changed their view and argued that for each region and nation, a 
separate solution should be found. Kadet Party was against the federal structure. 
They favored a fully integrated Russia. But the nations could preserve their cultural 
and educational rights within the state.
56
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Before taking power in 1917, Bolshevik party leader Lenin gave the 
definition of its most famous slogan, the “right of self determination” by stating that 
it meant “the political separation of the ... nations from alien national bodies, and 
the formation of an independent state.”57 He pursued a policy against “separation” 
from the Soviet Union. He stated that the Bolsheviks “... do not at all want the 
peasant in Khiva to live under the Khan of Khiva. By developing [the] revolution, 
[they] shall influence the oppressed masses.”58 
The nations, according to Lenin, which were “not able” to get separated 
from Russia, should not given any cultural rights, federalism, or autonomy. The 
only choice for a nation in Russia was being completely independent and 
establishing a new state.
59 Federalism and “extraterritorial cultural autonomy” 
would therefore be not accepted.
60
 Lenin repeatedly stated that “Marxists [were] ... 
opposed to federation and decentralization, for the simple reason that capitalism 
requires for its development the largest and most centralized possible states.”61 
Educational or cultural autonomy, according to Lenin would lead to segregation and 
growth of chauvinism, whereas they were trying to unite all the proletariat of the 
oppressed nations.
62
 
The Bolsheviks‟ views on the nationalities issue were not homogenous. 
Lenin‟s discussions with Nikolai Bukharin and Georgii Piatakov at the “Eighth 
Party Congress” in March 1919 reflected this point. According to Piatakov, only 
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class was relevant, not the self-determination right of the nations. Bukharin‟s views 
were similar: he thought that the “national will” was “fictitious.”63 Lenin answered 
them stating if “national identity was given proper respect,” the “politically 
dominant social identity” would become class.64 
The communists, Lenin thought, “inherited the psychology of Great Power 
chauvinism” of the imperial regime. Lenin denounced this attitude in 1922, and 
blamed Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze of being “chauvinists.” He openly 
put that the nationalism of the “oppressor” and the “oppressed” should be 
distinguished from each other.
65
 Stalin supported Lenin‟s attitude until December 
1932. On the other hand, Lenin thought that the “decolonization” in Russia was 
inevitable. Lenin and Bolsheviks aimed to manage this process, while preserving 
the centrality and “territorial integrity of the old Russian Empire” in a socialist 
manner.
66
 When Bolsheviks took government, they did not have a proper 
“nationalities policy.”67 The only instrument Bolsheviks had in hand was their 
reference to the “self-determination” rights of the nations.68 
Though Bolsheviks tried to “intervene” as early as 1918 in the government 
of Central Asia, their power could not reach to Turkestan up until 1920.
69
 By 1919, 
however, Turkestan Nationalities Commissariat had branches for dealing with the 
nationalities questions of Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tadjik, Dungan, Russian, Armenian and 
Jewish peoples. Definitions of Kara Kirgiz and Kaisak Kirgiz were made by then, 
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which led to the establishment of Kirgizstan and Kazakstan as separate political 
domains within the USSR.
70
 
Until the end of the Civil War in Russia, the nationalities issue was debated 
at the Bolshevik party conferences. In April 1923, at the Twelfth Party Congress 
and in June the same year, at the Central Committee Conference on Nationalities 
Policy, two decisions were taken. These became the basic principles of the 
nationality policy of the Bolshevik party. The issue had no more been discussed 
openly after that. According to these, national languages and national elites were to 
be encouraged “in national territories.”71 Furthermore, symbolic indicators of 
identity, such as dressing, folklore, art and history of each of the nations were either 
invented or re-emerged by the Soviet Union.
72
  
 
2.2.7 The Creation of Nations in Central Asia 
Until 1924, there existed Turkestan ASSR, Kirghiz (read Kazak) ASSR, the 
People‟s Soviet Republic of Bukhara and the People‟s Soviet Republic of Khorezm  
(Khiva) in Central Asia. In 1924, in cooperation with the local Bolshevik leaders, 
the Soviet government drew new political boundaries of Central Asia. This was 
named razmezhevanie (delimitation).
73
 
Previously, the drawing of the boundaries defining a greater Turkestan, it is 
understood, was the project of not only some of the local Bolsheviks such as Turar 
Ryskulov, but also the Turkestani nationalist Mustafa Çokay and the national 
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communist Mir Said Sultan Galiyev.
74
 Bolshevik Turar Ryskulov had also planned 
to demarcate Turkestan, establishing a united Turkestan under the name of Turk-
Republic.
75
 Neither of these plans was turned into reality. The plan of Feyzullah 
Hocayev, a former Young Bukharan, however, gained support from the Soviet 
government, which foresaw to divide the region in accordance with linguistic 
differences.
76
   
 With the razmezhevanie, six nations in the region were created. Bolsheviks 
then started to “define” these newly created nations “through difference” from each 
other.
77
 First, language was employed. The Persian-speaking Tajik population was 
easy to differentiate from the remaining of the Turkic population. Then, minor 
cultural differences and variations in daily life brought to foreground by the 
Bolsheviks. According to Northrop, the Turkestani women were the main subject of 
all the newly made definitions.
78
 Alphabet and literature of the “new” Turkestani 
nations were differentiated as well, accompanied with systematic anthropological 
and biomedical studies. The sources of all these definitions went back before the 
razmezhevanie, to the year 1921.
79
  
In March 1924, following the orders of the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Party, Khorezm was sub-divided into autonomous regions. At 
the same time, the Fifth All-Khorezmian Congress decided the joining of the 
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“Turkmen, Uzbek and Karakalpakh-Kazak people” of the Khorezm Republic to the 
“newly created republics and regions.”80 
Feyzullah Hocayev was included in this process of demarcation, since he 
aimed to gain the “best and most delicious” regions in Central Asia, in the newly 
established Uzbekistan. This had been at the expense of the two oldest Muslim 
states in the region, Bukhara and Khorezm.
81
 This reflects the last stage of the 
change of the identity of the Turkestani intelligentsia from Muslim to Uzbek. 
 
2.3 Bolshevik Culture Policies in Central Asia 
One of the most important reasons why Central Asian cedids cooperated 
with the Bolsheviks was that Bolsheviks favored cultural development and 
enlightenment in the backward regions of Russia. This was what exactly cedids 
were trying to realize.  
From 1921 on, modern primary schools were founded in Central Asia. These 
schools used Arabic alphabet as the means of instruction. Essentially, Bolsheviks 
could not take control of the education in Central Asia until 1924.
82
 The schools 
prepared their curriculum and programs individually.
83
 The Arabic alphabet was 
used in Central Asia until 1928-1929, when Latin was introduced.
84
   
At the times of the “great purges” in 1937, nearly all of the national cadres 
of the Muslim intelligentsia, who had cedid past, were purged. This precisely ended 
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the potential nationalist opposition to the regime. Until 1937, the majority of the 
Bureau Secretaries of the Party Committee at the rayon level and city level 
(raykoms and gorkoms, respectively) were Turkestanis. They became minority after 
the 1937 purges of Stalin.
85
 
After March 1938, Soviet Narodnykh Kommissarov (Council of the People‟s 
Commissars) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party 
decreed Russian language to be compulsory at the primary schools.
86
 Again after 
this date, all the textbooks began to be written by the center, which were prepared 
by the Union Republics previously. A comprehensive Russian history was taught in 
primary schools, while the history of Central Asia only little mentioned in it.
87
   
The schools built over the usul-u cedid schools after the revolution 
continued education until being closed in early 1930s. The publications, such as Yaş 
Turkistan journal, were popular among the politically active students in large cities, 
like Tashkent. This journal became the target of Stalin on the Sixteenth Party 
Congress of the All-Union Communist Party held during 26 June - 13 July 1930 in 
Moscow.
88
   
The Bolshevik ideology was also aiming to “regulate” Islam, as a matter of 
private lives of the citizens, instead of being in the center of political and social life. 
In long term, Islam might be abolished completely.
89
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2.4 The Nationalities Issue during the World War II and the Cedidism 
According to historian Roland Grigor Suny, Russian colonization in 
Turkestan was justified by “developmentalism” from the time it had begun. This 
meant that the colonizer justified its presence there by its claims of modernizing and 
developing the colony. Suny claims that the Russian Empire “achieved their stated 
task too well,” that the population of the colony in the USSR “no longer required 
empire in the way colonizers claimed.”90 After a century, the development Suny 
talks about helped the emergence of a “national” intelligentsia in Turkestan.  
The story of the cedid movement reflects, in summary, the emergence of an 
intellectual class in Turkestan, the exploration of its identity first as being a Muslim, 
politically inspired by the Ottoman Empire, and then a shift in this identity towards 
“Turk[ic]” and finally to “Uzbek” through the first quarter of the twentieth 
century.
91
 Especially in the era of revolutions (1905-1917) in Russia, the Muslim 
intelligentsia found the chance to be politically active. Historian Richard Pipes 
categorizes them in three main groups in terms of their political views. First was the 
rightist religious group, ulema, composed of the orthodox Muslim clergy and 
relatively wealthier Muslims in Turkestan. They politically favored religious 
conservatism. In Turkestan, where the religious leaders enjoyed great respect, this 
rightist group had an important influence. The second group, liberals, lied in the 
center of the political spectrum. They were westerners, and politically associated 
with the Russian Kadets. It was the liberals, who led an “All-Russian Muslim 
Movement” in Russia, which was more or less a reform movement, with the aim of 
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“democratization and secularization” of the Muslims‟ life in Russia.92 The third 
group was the leftists. In addition to the westerners‟ thoughts and secularism of the 
liberals, they also embraced socialism. Their type of socialism was the Russian 
“Socialist Revolutionary” type.93 Indeed, by 1917 most cedids would rally to the 
autonomist movement. Some of them would support the cihad (holy war) for 
national liberation, with clearly religious tones, until the final extinction of the 
Basmacı movement.94 
Cedidism is important to understand the background of the nationalities 
issue emerged in the World War II. The usul-u cedid schools had a significant role 
in the formations and motivations of the Turkestani prisoners-of-war and the so 
called “Turkestan legion” during the World War II, especially through its leading 
figure Mustafa Çokay, who was from the cedid tradition. It was the cedid 
movement that surfaced the nationalism and the debates on the nationalities issues 
in Central Asia during the revolutionary era.  
It should be emphasized that during the World War II, the émigré Turkestani 
nationalists, such as Baymirza Hayit and Veli Kayyum Han defended a single and 
united Turkestan.
95
 One should understand, along with the changes in the Russian 
politics, the roots and progress of the reform movement in Turkestan, cedidism, and 
its definition of its identity well, in order to understand its crucial contribution to the 
nationality affairs during the World War II.  
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The issue of alphabet and language of literature of Central Asian peoples 
were also important, since they would have their reflections on the publications of 
the Turkestanis in the Waffen-SS years later. These will be discussed in the 
following chapters in detail.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
GERMANY  
AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST RACE IDEOLOGY 
 
 
 
The Central Asians in the German Army fought in both German Army and 
Waffen-SS (Armed SS). However, these two were different bodies with completely 
distinct backgrounds and organization. It is necessary to remember shortly the 
emergence of the SS in Germany as a “rival” to the Army and its commanders in 
order to understand how and under which circumstances the Turkestanis were 
recruited by Germans.  
 
3.1 The Guards of the National Socialist Party  
The active cadres of the National Socialist (Nazi) movement in Germany 
were the Sturmabteilung (storm department), or in short, SA. The story of the SA 
went back to early 1920s. During the turbulent times in Germany, when bloody 
fights between political groups to control the streets were commonplace, the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German 
30 
 
Worker‟s Party, NSDAP), organized meetings in beer halls. The group of Nazi 
Party, which involved in the street clashes named itself as “gymnastics department” 
and “sports department” of the party. In November 1921, it took the name 
Sturmabteilung officially. The SA, led by Hermann Göring, and the NSDAP were 
outlawed after organizing the unsuccessful coup against Hitler in November 1923.
96
  
The Nazi Party was re-organized in February 1925, with the SA integrated 
into it. From then on, they began wearing the famous brown shirts with swastika. 
Hitler himself became the leader of the organization in 1929. They marched in the 
streets, their numbers rose sharply in a few months, reaching to sixty thousand in 
1930 in two hundred local associations. In 1931, Hitler nominated Ernst Röhm as 
the leader of SA. In this year, the number of the members reached to two hundred 
sixty thousand.
97
 This group of mostly unemployed youth was not loyal to Hitler in 
person. Besides, they were not disciplined enough to provide the service, which 
Hitler desired.
98
  
Among the physically superior members of the SA, two hundred men were 
selected as personal bodyguards of Hitler. This group of bodyguards began to be 
known first as Stabswache (headquarter guards), then Stosstrupp Adolf Hitler 
(shock troop Adolf Hitler), and finally as Schutzstaffeln (protective echelon), or in 
short, SS. When Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany in 1933, the number of 
the members of the SS increased to fifty two thousand men, while SA got three 
hundred thousand. Heinrich Himmler, appointed by Hitler as the Reichsführer SS 
(Head of the SS), established the Sicherheitsdienst (security service), or SD, as the 
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unofficial security service of the SS in 1931. Later on, the SD became the official 
intelligence and counterespionage unit of the NSDAP.
99
  
By February 22, 1933, after the Reichstag fire, fifteen thousand members of 
the SS and twenty five thousand members of the SA were appointed as auxiliary 
police forces. Their official task was to help the regular police in Germany. 
However, unofficially and unlawfully, they were used to crush the anti-Nazi 
elements in Germany and to manipulate elections. They broke into houses, arrested 
people and brought them to the Konzentrationslagers (concentration camps). The 
relatively better organized and disciplined SS groups were more “efficient” in this 
task.
100
  
When Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany in 1933, the NSDAP was 
the most well-organized political party in Germany. The SA and the SS were 
controlling the streets. But it was not sufficient for Hitler. Paul von Hindenburg was 
still president; the police forces and the Reichswehr (Reich Defense, Wehrmacht 
after 1935) were not under Nazi control. Hitler‟s concerns about his safety were 
continuing. In case of a possible army coup, he felt himself unprotected.  
On March 17, 1933, third time in a ten-year period, Hitler ordered the 
formation of a personal bodyguard group directly set under his order. Josef “Sepp” 
Dietrich established a group of conscientiously selected 120 men among the SS. 
This group would be known as SS Stabswache Berlin (SS Staff Guard Berlin), and 
become the nucleus of the future Waffen-SS.
101
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As Hitler‟s political power increased, he felt the need of the support of the 
Wehrmacht (lit. “Defense Force,” German Armed Forces). With the impact of some 
military commanders, Hitler abolished the SA. Its members were liquidated between 
June 30 and July 2, 1934.
102
 Meanwhile, on July 20, Hitler elevated the SS “to the 
standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP.”103 The Reichsführer 
SS would be “directly subordinate to the highest SS Führer.”104  
 
3.1.1 Hitler’s Personal Bodyguards 
The SS was essentially established to protect Hitler. Until 1932, the 
Allgemeine SS (General SS) remained as a relatively small and elite branch of the 
SA organization. Furthermore, the members of the SS were employed part-time and 
the guards were recruited on a voluntary basis. Hitler needed full-time and 
physically powerful able bodyguards for exclusive protection.  
In September 1933, Hitler officially named his bodyguards Leibstandarte SS 
“Adolf Hitler” (SS Guard Regiment “Adolf Hitler”). A turning point in the history 
of the Waffen-SS was when these newly founded guards took oath on November 9, 
1933, and bounded themselves unconditionally to the Führer. The importance of 
this event stems from the fact that from this date on, the Waffen-SS was deprived 
from the control of the Reichsführer SS (Himmler) and NSDAP. What is more 
important was that Hitler‟s guards were coming out as independent armed forces: 
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independent from the Wehrmacht and police.
105
 This newly established force was 
above the state and party, directly bound to Hitler.  
The high command of the Wehrmacht did not welcome the events leading to 
the formation of an independent armed force out of their reach. The tension between 
the Reichsführer SS and the army high command remained high. Hitler played a 
“conciliatory” role between the two parties by managing the crisis. Up until the 
outbreak of the war, no official armed military SS division was formed. On the other 
hand, the commanders of the Wehrmacht were not that much pleased to observe the 
slow but steady expansion of the Waffen-SS until the war, and afterwards as well.
106
 
In 1936, the Waffen-SS was divided into two: the SS Verfügungstruppe (SS 
Dispositional Troops) with the Leibstandarte included in this branch, and the SS 
Totenkopfverbände (Death‟s Head Formations).107 According to Heinrich 
Himmler‟s description, the Wehrmacht would protect Germany from the exterior 
and the SS from interior. However, the task of the fully independent Waffen-SS was 
not announced to the public. On the background, because the army and its personnel 
were far from the national socialist ideology, it was foreseen by the Nazis that the 
Waffen-SS would play a decisive role in the penetration of the Nazi ideology in the 
army.
108
 From 1933 to 1937, Himmler expelled tens of thousands of people from 
the SS, who “proved unsuitable.”109 In 1937, the total strength of the SS was 
210,000 men.
110
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After the Reichskriegminister (Minister of War) Werner von Blomberg had 
resigned from his post on January 27, 1938, Hitler declared that no successor would 
be appointed for the Ministry of War, and he would command all the armed forces. 
The former Wehrmachtsamt (Armed Forces Office) in the Ministry of War would 
become the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or in short, OKW (High Command of 
the Armed Forces) and put under the command of Hitler.
111
  
Hitler set the common tasks of the German Army and the SS with a top-
secret decree on August 17, 1938. According to this, the Allgemeine SS (General 
SS) would be unarmed and remain in the political sphere only. Himmler also stated 
in 1937 that the Allgemeine SS was “entirely civilian in nature except for the higher 
officer corps”112 On the other hand, the SS Vefügungstruppe, SS Junkerschulen 
(officer schools of the SS), and the SS Totenkopfverbände would be armed and 
organized as military units. The SS Verfügungstruppe was given a two-dimensional 
mission: either it might serve under Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of 
the Army, or in short, OKH),
113
 or in case of necessity, it can be put under 
Reichsführer SS to provide internal security.114 In September 1938, four Totenkopf 
(Death‟s Head) battalions and the entire SS Verfügungstruppe were put under 
command of the Wehrmacht with Hitler‟s orders.115 With the outbreak of the war, 
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the three SS Verfügungstruppe regiments, Deutschland, Germania and Adolf Hitler 
unified and established a division.
116
  
After the World War II began, in 1940, the wartime status of the Waffen-SS 
needed to be defined clearly. After months of negotiations, OKW accepted that the 
SS could maintain an independent reserve under the common command of the SS 
and OKW. Consequently, on March 2, 1940, the Waffen-SS gained its official 
status.
117
     
 
3.2 Germany’s Politics for the East  
It is necessary to shortly summarize the dynamics of German politics 
regarding the “East” in order to understand the roots of the anti-Bolshevism and the 
enmity against Russia. This was dominant in the German domestic politics before 
the World War II and directly affected the German attitude towards the peoples of 
the Soviet Union in the course of war.   
In the German pre-World War II rhetoric, Ost (East) generally referred to 
Germany‟s eastern neighbor, Russia. Both pro-Russian and anti-Russian elements 
had their roots in the historical background of Germany‟s foreign policy, dating 
back to times of Prussia. Especially after the World War I, during the 1920s, there 
was a dominance of the pro-Russians in the foreign policy of Germany. This was 
rather a “utilitarian” and economic design caused by the isolations imposed by the 
Versailles Treaty of 1919. This policy was justified by the idea that the “West” had 
been in decline, while Russia would emerge as a powerful nation in the future.
118
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On the other hand, the anti-Russian foreign policy tendency in Germany 
referred to the motto of “expand to the East”119 of the German Reich.120 The World 
War I and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, signed on March 3, 1918, were important 
turning points, which created the base of justification of their policies. After the 
Russian Civil War, Bolshevism began to be the leading enemy of the anti-Russian 
group. Though these people had no real influence in the German foreign policy 
during 1920s, they came to foreground after National Socialist ideology‟s 
emergence in Germany.
121
 According to the National Socialist idea, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia should be erased from the map of Europe. The Nazis also planned 
the foundation of a small Polish remnant-state (polnische Reststaat) after the war, as 
a compensation for future peace talks.
122
  
The Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) and the Army constituted the 
mainstream dissent to the Nazi conception of the “East.” Also, the pro-Russians, 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Göbbels and Erich Koch, were the important statesmen 
in Germany, who carried weight after the coming to power of the Nazis.
123
  
Though not pro-Russian, social democratic and leftist movements were also 
strong in Germany before the accession of Hitler to power. Rosa Luxemburg‟s 
“Spartacist movement” was the most well-known of the leftist groups.124 
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Luxemburg severely criticized the October Revolution and Bolsheviks, especially 
about the nationalities issue. She criticized Lenin and Bolshevik party for being in 
contradiction between their “self-determination” policy and strong centralism in 
practice.
125
 Nevertheless, Luxemburg could not avoid being an open target of the 
anti-Bolshevik movement. 
3.2.1 The Ministry for the East and Alfred Rosenberg  
Just before the beginning of the German attack on the Soviet Union, on June 
17, 1941, the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (Reich Ministry for the 
Occupied Eastern Regions, hereafter Ostministerium (Ministry for the East)) was 
established. After a month, on June 17, 1941, Hitler appointed Alfred Rosenberg to 
the post of the Ministry.
126
  
Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic German,
127
 and Adolf Hitler himself mainly 
designated Germany‟s wartime Eastern politics. But as will be seen below, their 
views regarding the Ostpolitik rarely coincided. Also, the policy of the 
Ostministerium and Auswärtiges Amt of Germany regarding the occupied Soviet 
territories differed.   
Germans planned to divide the occupied parts of the Soviet territory into 
three. These would be the regions to be annexed by the “western neighbors,” 
civilian administrated regions, and military zone.
128
 What was important here was 
that parts of the “East” were subsequently put under the civilian administration of 
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the Ostministerium. But the larger parts of the occupied East were to be put under 
military rule.
129
 The public order would be provided by the SS and German police 
forces in the newly acquired Eastern territories.
130
  
In accordance with the instructions of Hitler, Rosenberg planned to establish 
four regions in the occupied East.
131
 These would be the Ukraine, the Ostland, 
Muscovy and Caucasus. Accordingly, departments were set up in the 
Ostministerium. The Political Branch of the Ministry was planned to be led by 
Georg Leibbrandt,
132
 who envisaged five departments under this branch: General 
Politics, with Otto Bräutigam at the head; Ostland, with Ewald von Kleist at the 
head; Ukraine, with Wilhelm Kinklein at the head; Turkestan and Caucasus, with 
Prof. Gerhard von Mende at the head.
133
 From all these people, von Mende was of 
special importance for the Turkic and Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union. He was 
closely following the nationality issues in the USSR and had academic works on 
Turks in the Soviet Union.
134
 It is important to note here that after Germans 
attacked on the Soviet Union, among the planned regions, only Ukraine and Ostland 
could be established. Muscovy and Caucasus, however, remained on paper.
135
 
The Minister for the East, Alfred Rosenberg‟s opinion was in a direction that 
the occupied Soviet territories would remain under German rule. However, at a 
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discussion with Hitler on December 14, 1941, he could not express his ideas to the 
Führer and proposed only that the newly captured eastern lands would remain “in 
German protection.”136 Hitler was of opinion that it would be enough, if these lands 
not again ruled by communism and Germany “appeared secured” from its eastern 
side.
137
   
According to Rosenberg, as a wartime strategy, Germany should treat the 
non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union, as well as those in the German POW 
camps, different than the Russian nationals. He tried to persuade Hitler, that “the 
Ukrainians, White Russians, Caucasians should be divided from Russia, and 
colonized by Germany, or at least, brought under German influence,” so that a 
“buffer” can be established against the Russians. He also planned to divide Russia 
into five parts. These five parts were to be named as Reichskommissariats of 
Ukraine, Moscow, Caucasus, Ostland (Baltic lands) and Turkestan.
138
 His plan was 
tried to be realized during the German occupation of the Soviet Union. 
The planned Reichskommissariats were divided into “general 
commissariats” and the general commissariats into “regional commissariats”.139 
When Rosenberg completed his plans by April 1941 on the Eastern Front, all the 
other official posts in Germany related to the Ostpolitik had concluded their 
projections about their “future colonies.”140  
The Ukraine was planned by Rosenberg to be widened towards east in order 
to include the planned Deutsche Wolgarepublik (German Volga Republic) in the 
                                                             
136 Document No. 1517-PS. “Top Secret Memorandum about Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the 
Fuehrer,” 14 December 1941, the Avalon Project. 
137 Document No. 1517-PS, the Avalon Project.  
138 Jürgen Thorwald, Die Illusion, pp. 32-41.   
139 Otto Bräutigam, So Hat Es Sich Zugetragen: Ein Leben als Soldat und Diplomat (Würzburg: 
Holzner Verlag, 1968), p 302. 
140 Patrick von zur Mühlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında: İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Sovyet 
Doğu Halklarının Milliyetçiliği (Ankara: Mavi Yayınlar, 1984), p. 38. 
40 
 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The Caucasus in Rosenberg‟s mind was also much 
broader than the accustomed total of Transcaucasia and Caucasus. Moreover, 
Germans planned to give the peoples of the Caucasus extensive autonomy, in order 
to use their traditional hostility towards Russians. As for the Reichskommissariat 
Turkestan, it would contain the land populated by the Turkic peoples. It was 
planned to reach towards northwest towards Moscow to cover the landmass, where 
groups like Chuvash and Mordvins lived. There was a little but very important 
detail regarding these plans of Rosenberg that Hitler did not approve them.
141
 
 Thus, one can say that there was no reconciliation on the Ostpolitik in the 
governmental circles of Germany. The confusion was more obvious when it came 
to Turkestan issue, even before the invasion of the Soviet Union began. This 
situation would make itself felt better, when the issue of the Turkestani POWs and 
Turkestan Legion occurred.  
Werner Otto von Hentig from the Foreign Ministry also confessed the 
disagreement about the Ostpolitik between the Auswärtiges Amt and 
Ostministerium. He stated that the Ministry for the East wanted to govern the 
occupied Soviet territories by itself and as a whole. The underlying factor of this 
view was the perception by the Ministry for the East that the “peoples of the newly 
gained lands” had no educated and available men to govern these lands. The 
Foreign Ministry thought that they did. According to the perception of Müstecib 
Ülküsal, the Foreign Ministry wanted to temporarily establish autonomous 
governments under German administration compatible with the characteristics and 
majorities of the people living there. After the war, permanent administrations could 
                                                             
141 Bräutigam, pp. 301-302. See appendix, Map 4, for the planned German administration in the East.  
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be founded according to the will of the peoples.
142
 Also, as Gerhard von Mende 
stated, the future position of the Crimea was unclear.
143
 Hüsrev Gerede, the Turkish 
Ambassador to Berlin at that time, also confirmed this disagreement.
144
 
Hitler and the Foreign Ministry were also in disagreement on the Ostpolitik. 
According to Hitler, the Foreign Ministry should not give assurances, which could 
not be realized regarding the Caucasus region.
145
 Since Rosenberg did not have 
enough effect on the Nazi Party, his ideas had not been much influential. Rosenberg 
himself wrote in his memoirs that his demands on the Ostpolitik “were turned 
down” because of Himmler, Koch and Bormann.146 
Rosenberg was not alone in his views regarding the Ostpolitik. The 
ideological criticism of the official Eastern policy of the Nazi Party was known as 
“Rosenberg conception.”147 Paul Joseph Göbbels was also not in the same view of 
the Nazi policies on the East. He thought that in the occupied zones of the Soviet 
Union, local governments should be established.
148
 Otto Bräutigam had also similar 
views. He proposed to win the hearts of the population in the occupied East in favor 
of Germany. He supported the freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and the 
abolition of the kolkhoz.
149
 The SS should be kept away from the occupied regions 
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143 Ülküsal, p. 294. 
144 Hüsrev Gerede began his mission on September 3, 1939, two days after the outbreak of the World 
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146 Alfred Rosenberg, Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publication, 1949), p. 280. 
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in order not to arise an impression of police state.
150
 In this regard, it is important to 
note that Bräutigam put a clear distinction between Jews and Soviet Citizens. 
Himmler and Hitler did however, not take this latter proposal of him seriously.  
 
3.3 Hitler’s Views on the Soviet Union  
Hitler wanted to “Europeanize” and, for this reason, to annex the Crimea 
together with the territories north of it, Volga region, and Baku to Germany. He 
desired that in the long term, Germans would populate these lands in accordance 
with his Lebensraum policy. Himmler made clear that he was also supporting 
Hitler‟s views on this issue at a speech delivered on June 9, 1942.151  
There were some problems with the plans of Hitler. For instance, the eastern 
borders for the Reichskommissariat Russia were ambiguous. Rosenberg foresaw 
borders reaching near Ural Mountains; while Hitler decided that the march of the 
armies should be until Archangelsk-Astrakhan line (AA-Linie).
152
 
In the short term, Hitler‟s leading enemies were Jews and Bolshevism. So, 
he intended to destroy the Slavic masses, and establish colonies in the best parts of 
the Soviet Union thereafter.
153
 Himmler further stated that he calculated to use the 
Soviet POWs as slave laborers in the industry district, planned to be constructed in 
Auschwitz.
154
 However, no such desire or policy was obviously declared by the 
Germans concerning the Central Asia. This would strengthen hands of the German 
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officers during the immediate foundation of the Turkestani troops, as well as the 
National Turkestan Union Committee.    
Hitler seemingly was planning to rule the people of the Soviet Union 
initially by force. However, he thought that force alone was not enough. 
Psychological factors should be included in the process, namely propaganda 
activities across the occupied east.
155
 With the help of the German propaganda, 
during the occupation of the Soviet Union by the Wehrmacht, German soldiers were 
greeted as “liberators” in some places of the occupied Soviet Union. However, as 
stated above, German authorities had different intentions. Soon after the 
Wehrmacht‟s march, SD, SS and Gestapo arrived to the occupied Soviet lands and 
established a “reign of terror.” As a result, power of the partisans against the 
German occupation increased.
156
  
 
3.3.1 National Socialist Race Politics and Turkic Peoples 
According to the official Nazi ideology and Hitler‟s own views, the Asiatic 
peoples were sub-humans, oriental and barbaric. Therefore they should not be 
permitted to carry weapons. He thought that the weapons in the non-German 
people‟s hands would turn to them sooner or later.157  
Hitler said on April 11, 1942 that it would be a great nonsense to give 
subordinated people weapons in the occupied eastern territories. According to him, 
the history showed that if the Herrenvölker (master peoples) gave their subordinates 
                                                             
155 Dallin, pp. 497-498. See also, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 30, The Harvard Project, p. 1. 
156 Chris Bishop, Hitler’s Foreign Divisions: Foreign Volunteers in the Waffen-SS (1940-1945) 
(London: Amber Books, 2005), p. 68. 
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weapons, they somehow perished.
158
 Himmler‟s pamphlet Der Untermensch also 
reflects the Nazi position on the peoples of the east.
159
 In contrast to the proposal of 
Otto Bräutigam, the head of the General Politics department of the Ostministerium, 
Himmler persuaded Hitler of the necessity of the SS deployment behind the front 
lines in the Soviet Union.
160
  
The instructions to be obeyed by the troops involving in the attack on the 
Soviet Union
161
 reflected more or less this view. According to this document, 
Bolshevism was the fatal enemy (Todfeind) of the German people. Against the 
members of the Red Army, the soldiers had to be, without hesitation, extremely 
careful. In the instructions, the German Army personnel were warned that the 
“Bolshevik Red Army soldier conducted sabotage, seditious propaganda, 
incendiarism, murder.” Therefore, they “lost all claims to treatment as an honorable 
opponent in accordance with the Geneva Convention.”162   
German military historian Hans Werner Neulen remarks that the Turkic 
peoples and the Cossacks were in some kind of “privileged” position in the eyes of 
the Nazis among other Soviet peoples. Hitler stated in a speech on December 12, 
1942 that the only people he trusted were the “pure Muslims,” the “real Turkic 
people (wirkliche Turkvölker).”163 Also, Wilhelm Keitel164 connoted on June 8, 
1943, that the Turkic peoples were exempted by the Germans [from the Russians], 
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since they were the “keen enemies” of the Bolshevism. They could not be subject of 
debate.
165
  
Here, it should be stated that both these speeches were held at least one and 
a half year after the German attacks on the Soviet Union. It can be said that these 
proclamations reflect a little modification in the Nazi ideology before the war, at 
least towards the Asiatic Turkic peoples. However, it should also be noted that 
those who diverged from the official Nazi racist policies regarding the Turkic 
peoples were very important German authorities and bureaucrats, even if they 
pursued pragmatic aims and had different motivations.  
 
3.4 The Foreign Volunteers in the Waffen-SS before the Operation Barbarossa 
There were non-Germans in the Waffen-SS before the German attack on the 
Soviet Union. The most important reason for this was the tension between the 
German Army and the Armed SS on the issue of recruitment.
166
 The SS followed a 
two-dimensional policy for expansion and to increase its number of personnel. 
Firstly, it endeavored to attract men from the younger population of Germany and 
secondly, the SS tried to gather volunteers from outside the Reich. The occupied 
lands outside of the German Reich were not under direct authority of the 
Wehrmacht.
167
 Thus, the German Army High Command, still objecting the 
expansion of the Waffen-SS, could not intervene this second unofficial way of 
recruitment.    
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The recruitment of the non-Germans began before the outbreak of World 
War II. In 1938, Himmler allowed the Germanics
168
 into the ranks of the Waffen-SS. 
However, the number of the volunteers in the Waffen-SS remained limited. By the 
end of 1938, only twenty such volunteers were included in it.
169
  
The occupation of the Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Holland by Germany 
brought another dimension to the foreign recruitment to the Waffen-SS. On April 30, 
1940, a decree was issued ordering the establishment of the SS Standarte 
“Nordland” (SS regiments “Northern lands”). The personnel of this regiment were 
to be consisted of volunteers from Denmark and Norway. This unit would become 
the 5
th
 SS Panzer Division “Wiking” in the late stages of the war.170    
The establishment of the first foreign volunteer divisions gave way to 
forming further divisions. On June 15, 1940, the SS Standarte “Westland” (SS 
regiments “Western lands”) was established from the peoples of Netherlands and 
the Flemish regions of Belgium. When it came to July, the Waffen-SS got enough 
men to form a second SS Standarte “Westland”. The volunteers of the foreign 
divisions of the Waffen-SS were brought to SS training centers.
171
   
Towards the end of 1940, OKW was aware that the SS had exceeded its 
authorized personnel quota. After the start of the recruiting campaign to the Waffen-
SS, Berger called fifteen thousand men to the ranks of the Totenkopfdivision. This 
number was eleven thousand more than actually authorized by Hitler.
172
   
                                                             
168 According to the official Nazi race ideology, ethnic Germans living outside of the boundaries of 
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From Norway to Great Britain, there was ever no nationality, which did not 
apply for volunteering in the Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS. In the Western Europe, 
volunteers from Holland, Flanders, Wallonia, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, 
Great Britain, and Ireland; in the North, volunteers from Denmark, Norway, 
Iceland, Sweden, and Finland joined to the ranks of Germans. People from 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy, Slovakia, Bohemia, Mähren and volunteers from 
the Baltic States and Poland fought on German side.
173
 At the time, when the 
Operation Barbarossa began on June 22, 1941, the number of the Germanic 
volunteers only in the SS-Wiking Division reached to nearly one thousand men.
174
 
The divisions of the Waffen-SS were employed in the German attack on the Soviet 
Union in three army groups.
175
   
It is understood from the memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg that he and Himmler 
were in disagreement on the volunteer battalions of the “Eastern peoples.” With the 
administration of those, who were “considered Germanic,” Rosenberg had no 
problems.
176
 But he regarded the “Asiatic” POWs, “with whom [he] was on very 
friendly terms,” as being in his own sphere of influence.177 However, Himmler 
influenced Hitler in favor of Russian General Vlasov and other non-Russians, who 
wanted to fight on the side of the German Army, without informing Rosenberg.
178
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3.4.1 The Nazi Ideology and the Foreign Volunteers  
The strict principles of the Nazi race ideology did not permit anyone who 
wanted to volunteer on its side. The Waffen-SS might accept auxiliaries from the 
Nordic people, but when it came to the Slavic and Asiatic “Eastern” peoples, it was 
unthinkable that the German Army would permit recruitments from them.  
The main factors, which determined the German attitude towards the non-
Germans within the ranks of the Wehrmacht, depended on some criteria. At first, 
the nationality of the soldier was important. This corresponded to “racial purity” in 
German documents. Second was the political goals pursued by the German military 
and political leadership in relation to a nation. Third defining criterion of the 
hierarchy was, rather pragmatic, to which branch of the Wehrmacht the volunteer 
soldier belonged. Finally, the German commanders looked to the fighting qualities 
of the foreign volunteer formations. In some cases, this criterion could “overlap” 
even the nationality of the personnel.
179
  
The political aims German authorities endeavored to reach by establishing 
legions from the peoples of the East could not easily be understood by the German 
officers. Under the influence of Nazi racism, they kept on insulting legionnaires, 
even after the official establishment of the Eastern Legions. Colonel Ralph von 
Heygendorff
180
 reported that some German battalion commanders declared in the 
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presence of Turkic officers, who understood German, that the mission of the Turk-
Battalions was to “save valuable German blood in the front.”181  
                                                             
181 Thorwald, Die Illusion, pp. 136-137. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
ON THE EVE OF THE WORLD WAR II 
 
 
 
Not only the domestic politics of Germany and the Soviet Union, but also 
the international relations between the states directly or indirectly involved in the 
pre-World War II diplomacy are important to better understand the background of 
the recruitment of the Turkestani POWs into the German Army ranks to fight 
against the Soviet Union. In this chapter, the diplomatic maneuvers of the Soviet 
Union, Germany and Turkey will be examined shortly before going into detailed 
analysis of the Turkestani troops on German side.   
 
4.1 General Atmosphere before the World War II  
Long before the war had begun, Hitler began to conduct an aggressive 
foreign policy, which was also targeted against the USSR. The tense atmosphere 
was felt also in the diplomatic circles in Europe. In his report to London, Nevile 
Henderson, British Ambassador to Berlin, stated that up until August 8, 1939, the 
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number one “public enemy” of the Germans was Great Britain and “the policy of 
encirclement.” But after that date, a policy change in German foreign policy 
occurred and Poles took the “leading place.”182  
Before the outbreak of the war, Germans brought up the Danzig and 
Corridor issues.
183
 In the publications of that time, comments appeared that this 
question would result with a war and Germany‟s territorial “disintegrity” at that 
time was unsustainable.
184
 On this issue, Hitler openly criticized British with 
fledging an “unconditional support” to Poland. He raised the German concerns 
about the Germans living in Poland in this regard. Germany warned Britain that the 
British support to Poland would not affect Germany‟s determination “to solve these 
issues.”185 Thereby, Poland became the first item on the agenda of the European 
diplomacy. England tried to dissuade Hitler from attacking Poland, but Hitler did 
not change his mind on the “Polish question.”186 He stated at the Reichstag, on April 
28, 1939, the Polish government rejected his proposals on these subjects.
187
  
Until September, 3, 1939, Ambassadors of France and the Great Britain 
followed the events with concerns and ultimatums to German authorities. The 
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following day, the French and British Ambassadors respectively left Berlin.
188
  
At his speech held on October 6, 1939 in the Reichstag, in the presence of 
foreign representatives, Hitler praised mutual and continuous cooperation between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he stated that the USSR and Germany 
would do anything to preserve the peace in Europe and well-being of the peoples of 
Poland.
189
 Further, Hitler told to Henderson in an interview that Germany was 
determined not to “enter into conflict with Russia.”190 
  
4.2 The Soviet - German Relations before the World War II 
Hitler, for numerous times, repeated his intention to expand towards the east. 
He had written his most obvious statements about this in the Mein Kampf. 
According to Hitler, it is unavoidable that German territories would expand towards 
the east, at the expense of the Soviet Union. He saw England as the only ally in 
Europe in order to realize this policy.
191
  
One may think that Hitler wrote the Mein Kampf a very long time before the 
World War II began, and thus, his ideas and policies might have been changed in 
due course. Also, the statements about Russia can be evaluated as wishful thinking, 
nationalistic and unrealistic dreams of a German politician at that time being. 
However, Hitler‟s biographer Konrad Heiden also warned the world at that time 
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about Hitler‟s territorial expansion aims.192  
Stalin foresaw that another world war is about to break out long before the 
World War II. He repeatedly stated that the international environment “resembled 
the prelude of World War in 1917.”193 Stalin‟s foreign policy was based on, among 
others, a hostile encirclement of the Soviet Union by capitalist world powers.
194
 The 
opposition of Trotsky and his foreign policy conceptualization was also purged long 
before the World War II began, which meant the formula of “peaceful coexistence” 
between the Soviet Union and capitalism was no longer on the agenda of foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union.
195
   
Stalin also purged most of the former officers of the Red Army by the time 
the World War II started. Because of the imminent need, the Soviet government 
quickly graduated officers from the military schools in 1941. But the newly-
graduated officers were not informed about a possible German attack at all. They 
thought that Hitler would not act against an international agreement.
196
 Actually, the 
Red Army would train officers from the relatively educated privates in the army 
later on, during the course of Russo-German battles in the World War II.  
 
4.2.1 The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
There were two basic foreign policy conceptions in the USSR in the days 
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before the World War II. These lasted until the non-aggression pact between the 
Soviet Union and Germany was signed. The first was the “Comintern Policy,” 
represented by Georgi Mihov Dimitrov, favored “extreme Soviet pressure inside 
democratic countries.” The second was the “Litvinov Policy,” which favored 
sensible relations with the West.
197
 The German threat on the Soviet Union annulled 
these conceptions. Stalin sought alliances in the west, also including  Germany, to 
protect the borders of the country.    
It is not a secret that Stalin was aware of the German aims on the Soviet soil. 
This can also be seen clearly by the official documents and reports to Stalin.
198
 The 
British intelligence service, which infiltrated into German communication, warned 
the USSR against the German plans up until the Operation Barbarossa began.
199
 By 
the time, the Soviet Union reached a partial “cooperation agreement” with Britain, 
France, Poland and Romania on July 24, 1939. But this was not satisfactory for the 
Soviet Union, which demanded right-of-passage over Poland and Romania.  
On February 20, 1939, William Seeds,
200
 British Ambassador to Moscow, 
was reporting that the Soviet Union would follow a policy of “opportunism and 
realism,” omitting ideal and moral principles.201 The Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, 
Hüsrev Gerede also observed that since spring 1939, there was a desire for 
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rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Germany. Shortly afterwards, 
negotiations began between the USSR and Germany.
202
  
Because of the mutual distrust, the negotiations progressed in a slow 
manner.
203
 The telegram of the German Foreign Minister to the German 
Ambassador to Moscow just before the eve of the signing the pact had a clearly 
friendly tone about Russia. It stated that the only reason for mutual hostility was the 
differing ideologies of the states and recent developments showed “that differing 
world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two states, and 
the restoration of cooperation of a new and friendly type.”204  
Various issues were on the agenda during the talks. Firstly, the Soviet side 
was assured that the friendship between Germany and Japan was “not directed 
against the Soviet Union.”205 Secondly, Soviet side was informed about the 
intentions of Italy reaching beyond Albania. German Foreign Minister stated that 
Mussolini “welcomed” the friendly relations between the USSR and Germany.206 
Following these, the sides talked about England and France. Stalin stated that the 
world dominance of Britain should come to an end, since its military was weaker 
than it had been in the past. The number of annual recruits of France to army was 
less than Germany. Thus, Hitler was sure that France “would certainly be 
conquered,” if it “attempted to wage war with Germany.”207 Turkey was also an 
                                                             
202 Gerede, p. 20. 
203 Gerede, p. 20. 
204 Telegram from The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union 
(Schulenburg), on August 14, 1939, 10:53 p.m., received August 15, 1939, 4:40 a.m., No. 175, 
the Avalon Project. 
205 “Memorandum of a Conversation Held on the Night of August 23 to 24, between the Reich 
Foreign Minister, on the one hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of People‟s 
Commissars Molotov, on the other hand,” in Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, 
eds., Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign 
Office (Department of State Publications, 1948), p. 72.  
206 Sontag and Beddie, p. 73.  
207 Sontag and Beddie, p. 74. 
56 
 
important item on the agenda. This will be discussed in the following paragraphs.     
Consequently, a non-aggression pact, named after the ministers of foreign 
affairs of both countries as Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, between the Soviet Union and 
Germany was signed on August 23, 1939. Gerede stated that the signature of the 
Pact wiped out the hopes for peace. The coming to terms of the Nazis and 
Bolsheviks surprised the whole world.
208
 German and Soviet governments divided 
the Eastern Europe in spheres of influence. The regions from Baltic Sea to Black 
Sea, including Bessarabia, were “assigned” to the Soviet Union.209 Germany was 
more interested in economics, since it drew its economical sphere of influence in 
the Southeastern Europe, including İstanbul and the Straits as well.210  
After the war started, the British Prime Minister‟s radio broadcasted speech 
addressed to Germans living in Great Britain reflected the disappointment of the 
Western powers about Hitler‟s credibility. He stated that Hitler promised to respect 
the Locarno Treaties of 1925, not to annex Austria, Czechoslovakia and any Polish 
provinces, which he violated. He added, that Hitler “has sworn … for years that he 
was the mortal enemy of Bolshevism; he is now its ally.”211      
Obviously, both Germany and Russia were suspicious about their actions. 
They wanted to quell these suspicions by the signing of the Pact. Stalin, on his 
behalf, was trying to gain time before the possible German attacks. There was 
another reason for the signing of the pact as well. Both Russia and Germany were 
excluded from the European diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s.
212
 Thus, it can also 
                                                             
208 Gerede, p. 19.  
209 Harry N. Howard, “Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey during World War II,” The 
Department of State Bulletin (Vol. XIX, No 472, July, 1948), p. 63. 
210 Howard, p. 63. 
211 The British War Bluebook, “The Prime Minister's Broadcast Talk to the German People,”on 
September 4, 1939, No. 144, the Avalon Project. 
212 The Meridian Encyclopedia of the Second World War, p. 145. 
57 
 
be said that it had been a compulsory partnership. It was obvious that the non-
aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR would not secure a long lasting 
peace in the East. 
According to Gerede, Hitler‟s rapid successes in Poland forced Stalin to 
concern more about a possible forthcoming German attack. He ordered starting of 
the negotiations regarding the partition of Poland on September 20, 1939. Molotov 
contacted with Graf von Schulenburg, German Ambassador to Moscow in order to 
begin negotiations.
213
  
Germany already had defensive military buildups at its eastern borders and 
these were increased by the summer of 1940. By September 1940, the military 
buildup at the border was far from being defensive. A second treaty was signed 
between the USSR and Germany on January 10, 1941. But, Hitler‟s concerns about 
a possible Soviet advance towards Baltics and Romania were still on the ground.
214
 
Nearly five months later, Hitler would order the first attacks against his eastern 
neighbor.    
 
4.3 Diplomatic Ties between Turkey, Germany and Soviet Union 
Turkey‟s position and international relations before and during the World 
War II played a decisive role in the fate of the Turkestani formations in the 
Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS. It is necessary here to shortly summarize the relations 
of Turkey with Germany and the USSR, which are usually considered as balancing 
all sides to protect it from involving in the conflict.    
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In 1939, just months before the outbreak of the war, Turkey‟s policy can be 
summarized in three main points: Firstly, Turkey tried to preserve its interests and 
maintain peace parallel to the policies of United Kingdom and France. Secondly, 
Turkey sought assistance of world powers for the defense of the Turkish Straits in 
case of an attack. Finally, it endeavored, if possible, to penetrate into the policies of 
the Soviet Union and obtain the cooperation of this state.
215
 
On the proposal of Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany (in office 1938-1945), Franz von Papen 
was appointed as the German Ambassador to Ankara on April 18, 1939.
216
 On this 
date, the talks between Turkey and the Allies (France and the United Kingdom) 
were already underway. Papen arrived in Turkey on April 29, 1939, at the same day 
when Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Potemkin was 
visiting Ankara as well. Potemkin tried to persuade İnönü for cooperation between 
the Balkan states against Germany. Papen, on the other hand, inculcated that no 
fears from a German attack was necessary.
217
  
Papen‟s first mission in Turkey was to impede a rapprochement between 
Turkey and Germany. In essence, unaware of the negotiations of the Soviet Union 
with Germany and the Allies, Turkey was aiming to preserve the “friendship” with 
the Allies and the Soviet Union at the same time. Meanwhile, from the point of 
view of Britain, Turkey was perceived as being “very close to Britain” in early 
May, 1939.
218
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On October 19, 1939, Turkey, France and United Kingdom signed a 
tripartite treaty following the negotiations between these states. According to this 
treaty, if Italy entered the war, Turkey had to cooperate with the Allies, which 
obliged Turkey to declare war. During the war, however, Turkey remained neutral, 
relying on the Additional Protocol No. 2 of this tripartite treaty, which foresaw the 
shipment of necessary arms but especially motorized transport vehicles to Turkey 
by the Allies.
219
 Turkey found itself under strict pressure of Allies for joining the 
war immediately along with the pressure coming from Germany and Russia.  
During the talks of Russo-German non-aggression pact, Turkey had been an 
important item on the agenda: Stalin asked Ribbentrop what Germany‟s views 
about Turkey were. The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany expressed 
desires for friendly relations to Turkey. He further stated that Turkey‟s response to 
this became, being “one of the first countries to join the encirclement pact against 
Germany.” Stalin thereupon stated that “Soviet Union had also had a similar 
experience with the vacillating policy of the Turks.”220    
On German and Russian side, the bargains over Turkey were kept on, 
without any result. This meant that Germans could not draw Soviet Union into 
alliance against France and the United Kingdom. Shortly afterwards, Turkish 
Ambassador to Berlin Hüsrev Gerede was informed by Hitler about the bargains on 
Turkey.
221
 Because of the fears of being “another Poland” to be partitioned between 
Germany and Russia, Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union 
on March 25, 1941.  
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4.3.1 Stalin’s Demands from Turkey 
Foreign Minister of Turkey Şükrü Saraçoğlu (in office 1938-1942) visited 
Moscow from September 25 to October 17, 1939 in order to negotiate a possible 
non-aggression pact.
222
 The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union at the talks was some 
restorations on the “Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish 
Straits” of 1936 in favor of themselves, which Turkey objected. However, Molotov 
insisted on the restorations and laid them down as a requirement for Turco-Soviet 
cooperation.
223
  
While Saraçoğlu was in Moscow, Ribbentrop visited the Soviet Union once 
again to discuss the spheres of influence of Germany and Soviet Union in 
Europe.
224
 This, combined with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, was a 
considerable shift in the position of the USSR. Because of the visit of Ribbentrop, 
Saraçoğlu had to wait for three weeks for the Soviet Union, which did not want to 
reach any decision before the second visit of German Minister was completed. This, 
however, was not appreciated by the Turkish government at all.
225
 
Soviet position in talks with Turkey could be summarized in three points: 
firstly, the Soviet Union tried to ascertain Turkey‟s neutrality, like Germany did. 
Secondly, Molotov insisted on the necessity of a mutual aid in the Balkans for 
sustainable peace. Finally, they insisted on keeping the Turkish Straits closed.
226
 
Without any considerable result, Turkey‟s negotiations with the USSR were ended 
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on October 17, 1939. Two days later, Turkey signed a tripartite agreement with 
England and France. 
Stalin wanted to secure the Soviet Union from a possible attack through the 
Turkish Straits and demanded free access to the Mediterranean Sea. Hitler agreed 
with Stalin on this point. For this to be realized, a revision of the Montreux 
Convention was necessary. This was discussed by Molotov and Ribbentrop on 
November 13, 1939.
227
  
During the war, Turkey let some warships of the Axis forces through the 
straits. Though these ships passed under the banner of “merchant ships,” this had 
been an open violation of the Montreux Treaty of 1936.
228
  
 
4.3.2 Relations between Turkey and Germany  
Turkey was of considerable significance for Germany. First reason for this 
was the Turkish Straits controlled by Turkey, which was a crucial issue regarding a 
possible attack against the Soviet Union. Secondly, unlike other countries in the 
Balkans, Turkey was a Muslim country whose religion was not bound to any great 
power.
229
 Further, Hitler had romantic memoirs of the alliance between Germany 
and Turkey in the World War I in mind. After the end of the World War II, he was 
planning that Germany to be an unambiguous friend of Turkey.
230
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Between numerous Turkish and German diplomats and statesmen, there was 
mutual respect rooting to the alliance in the World War I. For instance, when 
Hüsrev Gerede was informed that von Papen was a former officer, who fought in 
the World War I, he expressed his pleasure and felt sympathy for him.
231
  
Just after the outbreak of the World War II, on September 27, 1939 (the very 
day when Poland surrendered) Hitler received Hüsrev Gerede in the presence of 
Ribbentrop and Staatssekretär (Secretary of State) Ernst von Weizsäcker. Gerede 
told Hitler and attendants that Turkey concluded an alliance with Britain because of 
its “fragile” geopolitical location. Yet, the only aim of Turkey was to preserve its 
“national unity,” and it would follow a policy of neutrality. Hitler replied Gerede 
that regarding the “Polish Question,” his peace endeavors were turned down by 
Britain. He added that he was acting like Atatürk, and abolished Treaty of 
Versailles, just as Atatürk did to Sèvres. While praising the Turkish race for being 
an ally of Germany during the World War I, Hitler also commented that Turkey was 
currently a “weak state.”232        
For Germans, the neutrality of Turkey was essential before the attack against 
the Soviet Union. This was the main reason behind the non-aggression pact between 
Ankara and Berlin, signed on June 18, 1941, just four days before the German 
attack on the Soviet Union.
233
 According to Hitler, Germany could provide Turkey 
with weapons in return for the closure of the Turkish Straits. By doing this, 
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Germans wanted to gain the advantage of not having to defend the Straits on their 
own.
234
    
To draw Turkey on its side, Germany followed a policy on three levels: first, 
Stalin‟s demands and the Soviet threat on Turkish Straits were to be brought to the 
agenda. Second, pan-Turkist (Turanian) movements were to be supported both 
politically and financially. Third, some of the Aegean Islands were to be offered to 
Turkey. Turkey proposed mediation in Iraq as well on May 6, 1941, which was 
refused.
235
 Hitler stated that von Papen should be cautious with the promises 
Germany was about to give to Turkey, even when Hitler had been ready to some 
concessions.
236
   
The German support to pan-Turkism would have some reflections on the 
visits of the Turkish generals, Ali Fuat Erden, and Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, to 
Germany, which was also important for the Turkic people in the German POW 
camps at that time. However, according to historian Eduard Abramian, while 
supporting Turanism in Turkey, Germans were negotiating at the same time with 
the Georgians and Armenians. The main agenda of those negotiations was a 
possible invasion of Turkey by the German-intended Armenian and Georgian states 
in the future with the help of a German led operation.
237
   
Rosenberg‟s notes also confirmed this point. At a discussion on May 8, 
1942, when Hitler asked Rosenberg about his views on Armenia, Rosenberg found 
the chance to express his thoughts. According to him, Armenia was a buffer 
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between Turkey and Azerbaijan, “and thus could stop a Pan-Turanian movement 
towards the East.”238   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE WORLD WAR II AND THE PRISONERS-OF-WAR 
 
 
 
5.1 The German Attack on the Soviet Union 
The plans for the massive German attack against the Soviet Union were 
codenamed Fall Barbarossa (Operation Barbarossa) by Germans. Hitler was 
planning to crush the Soviet Union in three to six months.
239
 He gained 
overconfidence in himself and the German Army after the rapid and crushing 
victory against France and Poland. On February 3, 1941, Hitler approved the final 
version of the Operation Barbarossa.
240
 
A plan, codenamed “Oldenburg” was prepared by Hermann Wilhelm 
Göring. This was the economic plan for the Operation Barbarossa. Accordingly, the 
continuation of the war on the Eastern Front was only possible, if by the third year 
of the campaign the German troops were to be fed by the agricultural activities on 
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the Soviet soil. Further, if Germans take the necessary resources out of the country 
to feed their armies, millions of people would starve to death.
241
 However, Hitler 
ordered in June 1941, “the immediate and highest possible exploitation of the 
occupied territories in favor of Germany” should be provided, especially “in the 
realm of food and mineral oil economy.”242 
On June 22, 1941, at 3 a.m., the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
began. The attack was planned to be conducted by three army groups.  First was the 
Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South), commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt, the 
oldest officer of the Wehrmacht in the World War II. Second army group was the 
Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center), led by Feodor von Bock. The third army 
group was Wilhelm von Leeb‟s Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North).243  
The formations of the Waffen-SS were also included in the vast invasion 
plan: The Leibstandarte SS “Adolf Hitler” and SS Division “Wiking” were 
marching into the Soviet soil with the Army Group South; the SS Division “Reich” 
joined to the Army Group Center; and the SS Totenkopfdivision and                        
SS Polizeidivision was together with Army Group North. In Finland, the                    
SS Kampfgruppe “Nord” and 9th SS Infantry Regiment were stationed under 
Norwegian Army Command, led by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst.
244
  
The attack was planned to be a surprise on the Red Army. Documents 
proved that the Wehrmacht achieved this aim at the earlier days of the attacks. The 
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Russians showed only a weak resistance on the first days of the battles, while 
Germans progressed four to five kilometers into the Soviet soil within hours.
245
 The 
German Army progressed with incredible speed in the first four weeks. The Army 
Group North reached to a point nearly 130 kilometers south of Leningrad by             
July 10. The Army Group Center was doing well too: it invaded Smolensk and 
came to 320 kilometers to the capital, Moscow. By the way, the Army Group 
Center took five hundred thousand Soviet soldiers as POWs. The Army Group 
South was the slowest among the three because of the strong resistance in the 
Ukraine.
246
 With the vast encirclement movements, the Wehrmacht captured 
enormous numbers of the Red Army soldiers.
247
  
Hitler set the Crimea as the “cornerstone” of the Eastern Front and attached 
this peninsula a special importance.
248
 When Germans arrived in the Crimea, the 
Reichsführer-SS (SS-High Command) ordered the evacuation of the Crimea in July 
2, 1942.
249
 Hitler wanted only Russians and Ukrainians to be evacuated. Tatars, 
Bulgars, Greeks, Armenians and other Turkic peoples were excluded from this 
order, as long as they did not belong to “active Bolshevik elements.”250   
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When Germans entered to the lands, where the Kalmuk people lived, “they 
permitted religious holidays and customs to be held publicly and festively.”251 The 
people also could “hold regional conferences on a religious basis.”252 The people 
hoped that Germans would abolish the kolkhoz system. However, they failed to 
divide the collective farms and work in the kolkhoz was as much as before. The 
products of the farms were to be returned to Germans.
253
  
When German Army arrived, the members of the NKVD and Bolshevik 
Party escaped from them. Most of them joined the partisan forces. The local 
population, on the other hand, remained.
254
  
 
5.1.1 The Situation in Central Asia  
Reactions to the German attacks could be observed in Turkestan beginning 
from the very day when German attacks on the Soviet Union began. On June 22-23, 
1941, meetings were held in major cities of Turkestan, such as Samarkand, 
Bukhara, Andijan, Namangan, Fergana, and Nukus. In the first days of the Russo-
German battles, several thousand people were conscripted to army.
255
 The numbers 
of the Turkestani peoples, who included in the war, were enormous. Only from 
Uzbekistan, nearly one and a half million people mobilized.
256
 According to 
Baymirza Hayit, the total number of the mobilized Turkestanis reached to nearly 
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two millions.
257
 Cebbar Ertürk, a POW from Azerbaijan, claimed that the Russians 
brought more than five million people from Turkestan under arms during the World 
War II.
258
  
In Uzbekistan, jewelry, money and other valuable material were collected 
from people in order to give material support to the Red Army.
259
 Compulsory 
service was imposed on the workers and civil servants. Working hours were 
extended to eleven hours a day and annual leaves canceled.
260
 The industry of 
Central Asia was subordinated to Red Army, leading to an increase in the number 
of the workers during the war.  
When Germans invaded the western territories of the Soviet Union, millions 
of people were forced to immigrate to the Central Asian republics, which were far 
from the German aggression. Uzbekistan alone received over a million emigrants.
261
        
The nationality issue in the Soviet Union had some reflections at the 
beginning of the World War II. Before the war, there were “national military units” 
in the Red Army. For instance, as Hüseyin İkram Han262 noted, there were military 
zones of “Turkestan” and “Central Asia.” At the beginning of the war, the “national 
units” fought under commanders from their own nationalities against the German 
armies in various fronts. After a few months Stalin disbanded them and established 
                                                             
257 Hayit, Turkestan im Herzen Euroasiens, p. 103. 
258 Cebbar Ertürk was responsible for the cultural affairs of the Azerbaijan National Committee. 
Cebbar Ertürk, Anayurtta Unutulan Türklük, 2nd ed., (Kayseri: Zafer, 1956), pp. 142-143. 
259 Uzbekistaning Yangi Tarihi, p. 437.  
260 Uzbekistaning Yangi Tarihi, p. 440. 
261 Uzbekistaning Yangi Tarihi, p. 454. 
262 İkram Han fulfilled his master‟s degree in Tashkent Law Institute and became director of the  
Law School there, at the same time giving Civil Law lectures before being called to military 
service. See İkram Han, p. 13. After joining to the Red Army, he was sent to Rostov for a three-
months officer training and made a member of the Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo 
Soyuza - KPSS (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union). He was graduated as second 
lieutenant from Rostov. See, İkram Han, p. 53. 
70 
 
mixed units.
263
 He might have thought that by doing this, a sense of “unity” would 
emerge among the soldiers of the Red Army.   
The units, according to the accounts of the soldiers fought in them, were 
poorly trained and armed. With the beginning of the war, students, who completed 
higher schools, sent to military schools in order to fulfill the need for officers. Many 
soldiers had no rifles at all. The national troops were set under Russian 
commanders.
264
   
 
5.2 Soviet Prisoners-of-War (POWs) 
As stated above, the poorly trained Red Army units could not resist against 
the attacking German Army and many soldiers of fell into German captivity. The 
enormous numbers of these POWs were sent to various POW camps, most of which 
were in Poland and the Ukraine.  
The POWs held by the Germans had a hierarchy. On top of this hierarchy 
were the British, the US and the Northern European POWs. Below came the 
Southeastern Europeans. Even those were sorted among themselves. For instance, 
there was an OKW order instructing that the Greek POWs had to be treated better, 
while the Serbs deliberately worse. On the bottom of the hierarchy laid the Jews, the 
Soviet citizens and the Poles. This hierarchy did not reflect only the “rank of the 
races” in German mind; it also had a pragmatic meaning. As an example, the British 
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simply had too many German POWs in hand, thus Germans had to treat them better 
because of the fear of reciprocity.
265
    
Germans divided the responsibility for the POWs during the war at the 
Eastern Front between OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) and OKH 
(High Command of the Army). In the operation areas, OKH held the responsibility, 
while in the homeland, Generalgouvernement and in the planned 
Reichskommissariats (Reich Commissariats), the OKW. For the Soviet POWs, the 
area of responsibility of the OKH was more significant. In the OKH area, “take-over 
(to OKW) centers” at the eastern border of the East Prussia and 
Generalgouvernement, admission camps in the inner parts of this area, and “POW – 
soldier admission camps”266 and “POW – officer admission camps”267 in the 
remaining nineteen areas were ordered to be established.
268
 These plans were of 
crucial importance for the fate of the Red Army POWs, both Russian and non-
Russian. Germans took much more POWs than they anticipated during the course 
of war. This contributed negatively to the difficult and inhumane conditions in these 
POW camps.  
The vast numbers of Soviet POWs captured during the Operation Barbarossa 
became especially important for the German politicians because of the official 
enmity between the ideologies of the Soviet Union and Germany. The special 
instructions, dating October 8, 1941, were issued regarding the Soviet POWs. 
According to these, when treating the Soviet soldiers, “any indulgence or even 
                                                             
265 Streit, pp. 69-70. 
266 Kriegsgefangenen-Mannschaftsstammlagers or Stalags. 
267 Kriegsgefangenen-Offizierlagers or Oflags 
268 For the officers, 30,000 – 50,000 places were foreseen. There were 790,000 places overall for the 
whole POWs for the former Red Army soldiers. See, Streit, p. 73. 
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friendly disposition” were strictly forbidden. With Soviet POWs, the “use of arms 
should be severe.”269    
The mortality rates at the POW camps were enormous. Dr. Werner 
Mansfeld, the Head of the Enterprise Group “Forced Labor” in Four-Year Plan,270 
stated at a seminar held in the Reichswirtschaftskammer (Reich Chamber of 
Commerce), by February 19, 1942, from 3.9 million Russians, only 1.1 million 
survived. From November 1941 until January 1942 alone, five hundred thousand 
Soviet POWs were already dead.
271
 Another specific example would be that from 
September 1941 until April 1942, in the Częstochowa272 POW camp in Poland from 
ninety thousand Soviet prisoners of war, only three thousand survived.
273
 General 
Karl Kitzinger
274
 reported to Rosenberg that in the first months of the German 
attack against the Soviet Union some 2,500 prisoners died daily in 
Reichskommisariat Ukraine.
275
  
 For the advance towards the East, the German Army High Command set 
three zones in accordance with the plans of Ostministerium: first was the “operation 
zone,” second the “Commissariats of Ostland, the Ukraine and 
Generalgouvernement” and third the Reichsgebiet (Reich Zone). In the first months 
of the Operation Barbarossa, in the “operation zone” under the responsibility of 
                                                             
269 Document No. 1519-PS, The National Socialist German Workers Party, Party Chancellery, Führer 
Headquarters, Circular No. 21/41. Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, the Avalon 
Project. 
270 Ministerialdirektor Mansfeld was the Leiter der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz im 
Vierjahresplan. 
271 Streit, p. 128. 
272 Częstochowa is a city in the South of today‟s Poland. 
273 G. N. Vzvarova, “Turkestanskie Legionery,” Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (vol. 2, 1995), p. 40. 
274 Karl Kitiznger was General der Flieger (lit. General of Flyers, a rank between Generaloberst and 
Generalleutnant) and Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine in the    
World War II.   
275 Document No. 1517-PS, the Avalon Project. The date of the document was December 14, 1941. 
Rosenberg, who cited from Kitzinger, should have been informed by Kitzinger before this date.   
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OKH, mortality rates were enormous.
276
 No exact data of total mortality in the 
“Commissariats of Ostland and the Ukraine” exists, which was under OKW 
responsibility. However, the numbers were estimated to be still very high, while the 
highest numbers were seen in the Generalgouvernement.
277
  
 The situation in the Reichsgebiet under OKW responsibility was a little 
different. A report concerning the Stalag 318 in Lamsdorf
278
 indicated that since the 
end of July, “the POWs dug holes in the earth, where they stay at night. The 
nutrition was not much but enough.”279 The POWs were given breakfast, lunch and 
dinner.
280
 However, it was stated in the report that “for these Untermenschen, it was 
far from enough. It could be observed that in the first weeks, they ate grass, flowers 
and raw potatoes like animals.”281 When the POWs could not find anything to eat 
on the field, according to the same report, they began eating humans.
282
 Since Stalin 
had not signed the Geneva Protocol, the prisoners were not aided by any 
international humanitarian organization.  
The instructions regarding the Soviet POWs required the separation of the 
“racial Germans, Ukrainians, White Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, 
Estonians, Rumanians, Finns, Georgians” from the ethnic Russians. Furthermore, 
the racial Germans, Ukrainians, White Russians, Latvians, Estonians, Rumanians, 
                                                             
276 In December 1941, in the whole Operationsgebiet (operation zone) 89,693 POWs were dead. 
This number corresponds to 15.4 per cent of the total POWs there. In the following months, 
respectively, 87,451 (19.4 per cent); 46,579 (13.2 per cent); 31,703 (9.4 per cent); 19,535 (5.8 per 
cent) of total POWs in the Operationsgebiet were dead. See Streit, p. 133. 
277 In the Generalgovuvernment, only for which exact numbers are in hand, 290,650 POWs in total 
were dead between June 1941 and April 1942. Nearly 85.7 per cent of the total POWs in this 
zone were killed or dead. This was the highest mortality rate observed in the Eastern Front.      
See, Streit, p. 134. 
278 Lamsdorf (Polish: Łambinowice) is a cith in the south-west of today‟s Poland.  
279 Streit, p. 135. 
280 At the breakfast, the POWs received hot coffee. At lunch, they got one-plate dishes, and for 
dinner Kommissbrot (one bread for five men). Streit, p. 135.   
281 Streit, p. 135. 
282 Streit, p. 135. 
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Lithuanians, Finns” were to be sent home as soon as possible.283 As early as 
September 1941, German authorities fulfilled these instructions and began releasing 
Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian POWs.
284
    
 
5.2.1 Mortality in the German Prisoners-of-War Camps 
 A general evaluation is necessary regarding the high mortality rates in the 
German POW camps. First of all, it can be said that the German Army High 
Command, parallel to the official race ideology of the Nazi party, officially ordered 
that the Soviet and Asiatic POWs to be treated deliberately bad. In practice, these 
orders were fulfilled. This was an important ingredient in the high mortality of the 
Soviet and Central Asian POWs.  
 Secondly, huge territories of the Soviet Union made transportation of the 
POWs incredibly troublesome. The POWs had to be transported, as mentioned 
above, to very long distances for take-over. Weeks-long walks exhausted them. 
Many POWs died during long walks.  However, insufficient nutrition, early winter 
and epidemic diseases increased the mortality numbers considerably.      
 
5.3 Turkic Prisoners-of-War 
While Germans treated the Soviet and Turkic POWs deliberately and 
systematically worse, the German high command was concerned about the German 
                                                             
283 Document No. 1519-PS, The National Socialist German Workers Party, Party Chancellery, Führer 
Headquarters, Circular No. 21/41. Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, the Avalon 
Project. 
284 Crane, p. 89. 
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propaganda in the occupied Soviet territory. The propaganda was regarded as a 
crucial element to win the residents‟ “hearts.”  
On November 10, 1942, the “Propaganda Department”285 of the German 
Army directed how propaganda in the areas near the front to be conducted. 
According to these, the propaganda should be that “it is not Germany‟s desire that 
the POWs die because of hunger, or they did not intend to force them work. All 
responsibility was held by Moscow. Stalin gave the criminal order that the food 
stock, production and transport material were to be destroyed in the occupied lands. 
The countrymen of the POWs fulfilled these orders.”286   
The stormy German attacks on the Red Army caused many Soviet troops 
lose most of their personnel. Desperate and without commanders, some officers and 
soldiers tried to save their lives and escape from the front. The Soviet High 
Command, thereafter, established special units, named zagryadytelny otryad 
(literally “loading squadron”), to cut the ways of the escaping soldiers and officers 
and force them to fight.
287
  
According to Ertürk, the weapons of the Germans threatened the Turkestani 
soldiers in front of them, while they were threatened from backward by the weapons 
of the Russians. Therefore, when they found a chance, the Turks (i.e. Turkestanis 
and Azerbaijanis) were killing their Russian officers and moving to the German 
side.
288
 Some Russian authors wrote that this was an overstatement. 
In some German POW camps, every day five to ten people were dying 
because of diseases or starvation. As one of the POWs, Musa Ramazan, wrote in his 
                                                             
285 Die Abteilung Wehrmactspropaganda im Wehrmachtsführungsstab.  
286 Streit, p. 128. 
287 İkram Han, p. 36. 
288 Ertürk, pp. 142-143. 
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memoirs, special units of nearly thousand prisoners were employed only for digging 
mass graves.
289
 Veli Kayyum Han also reports about the inhumane conditions in the 
POW camps. In his visit to Sudauen camp, he witnessed approximately thirty to 
forty thousand Turkestanis, between the ages of fifteen and sixty, who were 
unnourished and exhausted. They were dying of hunger and epidemic. He also went 
to Ebenrode and other POW camps, where the situation was worse.
290
 
Some soldiers, especially non-Russians, were hostile to their officers in the 
Red Army. After falling into German captivity, officers and privates of the Red 
Army were transported in the same carriage to another camp. Some of the privates 
found the chance to express their dislike to their former commanders and even 
fought with them.
291
  
Hitler did not only think of the propaganda opportunity he could achieve 
using the POWs against Stalin, but also the necessity of Germany‟s preservation of 
its good relations with Turkey. As will be discussed below, with the help of 
suggestions and pressures from Turkish authorities and diplomats, the conditions of 
the Turkic POWs became relatively better in the course of the war. Also, endeavors 
of some Germans saved many Turkic people‟s lives in the POW camps.   
Prof. Gerhard von Mende visited the Siedlce POW camp near Warsaw. He 
saw about seven hundred POWs, who were separated from the others for execution. 
These were educated Turkic people; most of them were teachers, engineers, doctors, 
                                                             
289 Musa Ramazan, Bir Kafkas Göçmeninin Anıları (Ankara: Kafkas Derneği, 2001), pp. 44-45. 
Musa Ramazan met with Ali Şahan, a member of North Caucasus National Committee from 
Berlin, in Proskurov POW camp in November 1942. Şahan helped him go out of the camp. Later 
on, he was sent to Proskurov for ideological education, but by then, the Germans had already lost 
the war. See, Ramazan, pp. 49-66. 
290 Veli Kayyum Han, “Mustafa Caqajni Eslas [Mustafa Çokaynı Eslaş] (Hatira Daftardan),” Millij 
Türkistan (March 1951, year 2(6), No: 70/71), p. 24. 
291 İkram Han, p. 84. 
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etc. Von Mende could only rescue these POWs from being murdered by contacting 
the Abwehr, the German Intelligence Service.
292
  
 
5.4 Turkey and the Turkic Prisoners-of War 
Hitler wanted the Auswärtiges Amt not to get into disagreement with 
Turkey. Besides, Berlin signed a treaty of friendship with Ankara, just before the 
German attack on the Soviet Union.
293
 For the German Foreign Ministry, the 
neutrality of Turkey during the war was crucial. Thus, the relations with Turkey in 
this period were tried to be conducted in a “soft” manner. The Germans planned no 
attack on Turkey. The visit of the Turkish generals Erkilet and Erden to Berlin 
influenced the German attitude towards the Turkic POWs in a positive manner. 
Some German diplomats and soldiers thought that they should treat the Turkic 
POWs better.   
In August 1941, when Hüsrev Gerede was introducing the new müsteşar 
(undersecretary) Kemal Nejat to Captain Richard von Weizsäcker, he expressed his 
pleasure of the German victories in the battles in the Soviet Union. In this meeting, 
Gerede briefed Weizsäcker about the Muslims in Russia using a map. Personally, he 
thought that Germans should benefit from the Muslim POWs. Also, the Caucasian 
states might be united to create a “buffer.” An independent Turkestan and a Mongol 
state could be established. Weizsäcker quoted about this interview to Ribbentrop in 
detail.
294
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At about the same days, when the first volunteer formations were coming 
into existence, a retired general and an army commander in duty from Turkey, Ali 
Fuat Erden and Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, respectively, were visiting the Eastern 
Front. Especially Emir Erkilet was overly sympathetic to Germans and to Hitler in 
person. In his memoirs, he admiringly tells about the German cities, German 
Wehrmacht and army movements. He found the chance to talk to the first 
Turkestani troops on October 26, 1941.
295
 As Ülküsal reports in his memoirs, Hitler 
told Erkilet that the aim of Russo-German battles was not only to destroy 
Bolshevism, but also the Russianness as whole.
296
 
Erkilet visited a Muslim battalion
297
 commanded by Russian officers. 
During his visit, the Turkestani soldiers complained to him about the tough living 
standards in the camps, about their poor health and about the beatings of the 
Russian superiors.
298
 They definitely disliked the presence of the Russian rank 
officers and wanted to get rid of them.  
 According to Gerhard von Mende, the visit of the Turkish generals had 
considerable influence on the German officials in the establishment of the first 
volunteer troops from the Soviet POWs (Osttruppen). Von Mende further stated in 
his accounts that the visitors proposed Germans to form a “Turco-Islamic Legion,” 
like they had done in the World War I in Wünsdorf. However, their demand was not 
fulfilled, since the Nazis were building separate regiments for each and every 
Caucasian and Turkic nation.
299
   
                                                             
295 H. Emir Erkilet, Şark Cebhesinde Gördüklerim (İstanbul: Hilmi, 1943), pp. 198-199. 
296 Ülküsal, pp. 292-293. 
297 This battalion was composed of 292 people. 
298 Erkilet, pp. 198-199. 
299 Mende, p. 25; Despite Mende‟s words, Erkilet does not mention anything in his memoirs about 
the formation of the Osttruppen, when writing about his talk with Adolf Hitler.               See 
Erkilet, pp. 216-228. 
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5.4.1 Conditions of the Turkic Prisoners-of-War 
Contrary to the common knowledge, most but not all of the Turkic POWs 
were living under inhumane conditions compared to other POWs held by Germans 
during the World War II. The conditions depended on time and the camps, where 
they stayed. Sometimes they could not find even water to drink, but sometimes they 
got chocolate after lunch. Examples from some of the few German POW camps are 
provided in the following paragraphs for a better understanding of the situation of 
the Turkic POWs.  
In the first months of the Operation Barbarossa, the SS units killed many 
Turkic Red Army soldiers, on the ground that they were “Jews”300 and “Asiatic 
peoples.” Furthermore, many of the Turkic POWs died because of hunger, diseases 
and exhaustion in the camps at the earlier stages of the Operation Barbarossa. With 
the proposal of the Ostministerium, special camps for the members of the minority 
peoples
301
 were established.
302
 The Turkic POWs were separated from the Russians 
and sent to these camps in various locations in the Ukraine and Poland.  
As İkram Han quotes, on June 30, 1942, there was no food in his first day at 
the camp near to Voroshilovgrad.
303
 The POWs got only water to drink, which was 
far from enough. Furthermore, they did not have enough food for days.  However, 
this was a small-sized camp, where the POWs were held only temporarily. Russian-
                                                             
300 Both Jews and Muslims were circumcised. During the examinations, Germans saw that some of 
the Turkestanis, who they believed to be Jews, were circumcised. Incidents had been told that 
German SS troops killed “mistakenly” many Muslims for this reason. See, for example, the 
memoirs of the Uzbek Isakjan Narzikul in Crane, p. 75 and of the Uzbek Ergash Shermat in 
Crane, p. 88.  
301 Sonderlager für Angehörige von Minderheitvölkern. 
302 Neulen, p. 325. 
303 Today‟s Luhansk in the eastern Ukraine. 
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speaking interpreters, being most probably POWs as well, ensured the 
communication between POWs and German officers.
304
  
At a larger camp in Svatová,305 to where POWs were brought from the other 
small-sized camps, the former Red Army soldiers were sorted according to their 
nationalities immediately. Afterwards, the non-Russians were divided into thirty-
man groups and were assigned a commander from their own nationalities. The task 
of the commander was the allocation of the food and reporting serious health 
problems to the camp management, if necessary. At the Svatová camp, the POWs 
received regular breakfast, lunch and dinner.
306
  
In the Józef Piłsudski camp307 in Poland in July 1942, tea was ready whole 
day for the POWs and the group commanders even got three cigarettes daily. At 
lunch, the soldiers got only boiled potatoes, which they called balanda (blurry). For 
dinner, they got 300-350 grams of bread with tea.
308
   
The healths of the POWs were not ignored completely as well. Medics and 
nurses handled wounded or sick ones, if possible. The ones suffering serious illness 
were sent to military hospitals. If the POWs were wounded during the battles, they 
were first examined and received medical attention before they sent to the camps.
309
  
After being separated from the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian POWs, 
some Turkic POWs could get chocolate, bread, water and cigarettes. They were 
                                                             
304 İkram Han, pp. 71-86. 
305 Svatová is in the East of today‟s Latvia.  
306 İkram Han, pp. 71-86. 
307 The camp had been a Polish military post before, named after Józef Klemens Piłsudski, the leader 
of the Second Polish Republic. 
308 İkram Han, pp. 71-86. 
309 İkram Han, p. 91; Crane, p. 76.  
81 
 
even permitted to have bath and given new German uniforms.
310
 These happened 
with endeavors of Veli Kayyum Han and POW commissions.  
However, it was the fact that as Thorwald notes, the Commission of Veli 
Kayyum Han saw that the German SD troops killed thousands of Turkic POWs 
because of their Asiatic appearance. Also, many of them died of hunger and 
typhus.
311
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
THE SOVIET LEGIONNAIRES IN THE GERMAN ARMY 
 
 
 
6.1 From POWs to Workers in the German Army  
The attack of Hitler on the Soviet Union brought together many Russian, 
Ukrainian, Caucasian, Turkish and Tatar émigrés‟ appeals for collaboration with 
Germans against their common enemy. From the beginning of the German invasion 
of the Soviet Union on they wanted to side with Germans against the Soviet Union. 
Despite numerous attempts, Germans did not accept them to fight under the 
Wehrmacht.
312
 The reason for this was, Germans thought, that the return of the 
émigrés to the Russian soil might cause disturbance among the Soviet citizens, 
which could possibly increase their zeal to resistance.
313
 General Ernst Köstring‟s 
words on the goals of Hitler‟s operation in the east are useful for better 
understanding of the Nazi policies concerning the Soviet people. He believed that 
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the “eastern campaign was being waged against both the Soviet Union as a political 
entity and the Soviet people.”314  
When the issue came to the POWs, various motivations involved in the issue 
and the Soviet POWs were treated in accordance with the national socialist politics. 
The instructions of October 8, 1941 regarding the Soviet POWs made this point 
clear. “Apart from directing [POWs] into camps according to their nationality,” the 
POWs, including also members of racial groups, and “any civilians in the camps are 
to be divided” in three groups. These were: “those politically undesirable, those 
politically harmless, and those especially reliable in the political sense.” The last 
group of POWs could be used in the construction and some other works in the 
occupied areas.
315
 
Some of the POWs worked in the service of the German military forces, 
while some of them worked in the fields and farms nearby. The working made it 
possible for them to see the Europe, about which they were told in the Soviet Union 
to be in misery. The Soviet propaganda claimed that the German farmers and 
peasants were exploited by the European bourgeoisie. Narzikul was one of the few, 
who changed his mind after seeing that the life conditions were better than 
imagined by Soviet citizens in the German farm he worked in.
316
       
                                                             
314 Samuel J. Newland, Cossacks in the German Army 1941-1945 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991), pp. 53-54. 
315 The chapter “Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable POWs taken during the Eastern 
campaign” in the Document No. 1519-PS, The National Socialist German Workers Party, Party 
Chancellery, Führer Headquarters, Circular No. 21/41. Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of 
War, the Avalon Project. 
316 Crane, p. 82. Isakjan Narzikul, born in Jizzakh in Central Asia in 1923, was educated in the 
Russian schools and graduated from the Tashkent Military School in June 1941. He was 
commissioned to the Baltic military region and sent to Riga just after graduation. At one of the 
first attacks of the German Army, he was captured wounded by the Germans, without any contact 
of and reinforcements from the Red Army headquarters. See, for his memoirs, Crane, pp. ix-71.  
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The first Soviet citizens in the German Army were known as Hilfswillige 
(volunteers). The Hilfswillige, or in short Hiwis, were serving in the German Army 
as cooks, drivers, medics, etc. The uniforms they wore were, in the early stages, 
their own Red Army uniforms with a distinguishing mark on them. After a while, 
they began wearing German Army‟s uniforms; they could only be distinguished 
with a badge, on which wrote “Im Dienst der Wehrmacht (In the service of the 
German Army).”317 The number of the auxiliary volunteers reached to nearly one 
hundred thousand people in a few months.
318
 German commanders used these 
people “on their own initiative” in various duties.319 The idea of using the former 
Red Army soldiers was not welcomed in the Wehrmacht. But the Ostministerium 
and the Abwehr supported it.
320
  
Along with the laborers, the former Red Army personnel were either used as 
guards for industrial complexes, little towns, railroads, etc., or as “self-defense 
units” against the partisan activities. The latter more sophisticated units were named 
Ordnungsdienst (order service), fulfilling police service
321
 in the occupied regions, 
and Schutzmannschafts (security teams), fighting against the local partisan forces.
322
   
                                                             
317 Carlos Caballero Jurado, Foreign Volunteers of the Wehrmacht 1941-45 (London: Osprey 
Publishing, 1985), pp. 12-13. See, for the Russian version, Carlos Caballero Jurado and Kevin 
Lyles, Inostrannie Dobrovoltsy v Vermahte 1941-1945 (Ast, 2005). 
318 In the spring of 1942, the number of the Hilfswillige in the German Army reached to 200,000 and 
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320 Mühlen, p. 53. 
321 The members of police forces got salaries as well. They received 30-40 Reichsmarks monthly. 
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By July 1941, with the influence of Gerhard von Mende, German authorities 
began detailed and comprehensive works for sorting the POWs according to their 
nationalities. For this task, special commissions were to be established. The 
operation was to be conducted under the auspices of the Ministry for the East.
323
  
For the sorting process of Turkestani POWs, Veli Kayyum Han and Mustafa 
Çokay324 were brought to Berlin. They were put into above-mentioned 
commissions. The head of the first commission was an SA commander, Paul Otto 
Geibel. The commission became known as Geibel Commission.
325
 The commission 
of Kayyum Han and Çokay first went to Oerbke and Bergen-Belsen camps on 
August 26, 1941.
326
 For the İdil-Ural Turks, Ahmet Temir; for the Azerbaijanis 
Mehmet Togay; and for the North Caucasians Alihan Kantemir were called by the 
Germans.  
The Geibel commission visited Thorn,
327
 Prostken,
328
 Sudauen,
329
 
Schirwindt,
330
 Metziken, Pogegen
331
 and Ebenrode
332
 POW camps between in 
September 1941.
333
 Major Mayer-Mader
334
 was also in the commission visiting 
                                                                                                                                                                          
See, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 30. 
322 Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 11. 
323 Veli Kayyum Han, “Mustafa Caqajni Eslas…”, p. 24; Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi , p. 
494; Jürgen Thorwald, Wen Sie Verderben Wollen: Bericht des grossen Verrats (Stuttgart: 
Steingrüben Verlag, 1952), p. 71.  
324
 See below for details.  
325 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, pp. 495-496. 
326 Abdulvahap Kara, Mustafa Çokay’ın Hayatı ve Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin Bağımsızlığı 
Yolundaki Mücadelesi, unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Mimar Sinan University (İstanbul, 2002), 
pp. 214-215. 
327 Thorn (Polish: Toruń) is a city in the North of today‟s Poland.   
328 Prostken (Polish: Prostki) is a city in the Northeast of today‟s Poland. 
329 Suwalken (Polish: Suwałki, bet. 1941-1945 named as Sudauen by Germans) is a city in the 
Northeast of today‟s Poland. 
330 The name of the city became Kudirkos Naumiestis, after the name of Lithuanian patriot, Vincas 
Kudirka, in 1934. Germans named the city Schirwindt. The city is in the West of today‟s 
Lithuania.  
331 Pogegen (Lithuanian: Pagėgiai) is a city in the West of today‟s Lithuania.   
332 Ebenrode (Russian Nesterov) is a town in today‟s Kaliningrad oblast of Russia.  
333 The date of the visits was from September 6 to September 25, 1941.  
334 Mayer-Mader was the commander of the first Turkestani units in the German Army. In October 
1941, he began to establish these units under auspices of Abteilung II des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr 
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Ebenrode. There, he addressed Turkestani POWs.
335
 The third visit of the 
commission was to the POW camps in Poland and the Ukraine, which were 
Lemberg,
336
 Jaroslau,
337
 Kochánov,338 Deba339 and Samoš.340 Çokay and Veli 
Kayyum demanded from the authorities to release Turkestani POWs and make them 
work for Germans.  
The Geibel Commission also visited Częstochowa POW camp with a 
slightly different cadre. Veli Kayyum and Çokay again represented the Turkestanis. 
Here, the members of the commission were quarantined because of the typhus 
disease found in the POW camp.
341
  
In the course of war, German armed forces had marched deep into the 
territories of the Soviet Union. Day by day, their need for combat troops increased. 
Furthermore, partisan resistance started against the Germans. This forced them to 
look for ways for using the POWs. Thus, despite the position of Hitler on the 
POWs, some divisions, regiments and even battalions started recruiting informally 
support and guard units from the Soviet POWs.
342
  
As time passed by, the realities of the war made it necessary to establish 
semi-official units from the prisoners of war. Oberkommando der 18. Armee (High 
                                                                                                                                                                          
im OKW (Office for Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Service in the OKW) for special 
intelligence purposes. See following paragraphs for details.   
335 Isakjan Narzikul quotes that Mayer-Mader told the Turkestani POWs in German that he knows 
that “the people of Turkestan suffer under dictatorship of Russia,” and he was working to make 
the lives of the Turkestanis better, “with improved facilities.” He repeated the same in Uzbek 
afterwards. Narzikul improved his German language skills in Ebenrode and commissioned 
therefore by the camp guard, named Max, for giving a report to the visiting commission. After 
Mayer-Mader, Veli Kayyum Han addressed the POWs, promising them to give “some good 
news” very soon. See, Crane, p. 90. 
336 Lemberg (Ukrainian: Lviv) is a city in the West of today‟s Ukraine.  
337 Jaroslau (Polish: Jarosław) is a town in the Southeast of today‟s Poland.   
338 Kochánov is a village in today‟s Czech Republic.  
339 Deba (Polish: Dęba) is a city in today‟s Poland.  
340 Samoš is a village in today‟s Serbia. Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, pp. 495-496. 
341 Veli Kayyum Han, “Mustafa Caqajni Eslas…” p. 25. 
342 Bishop, p. 69. 
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Command of the 18
th
 Army) suggested formation of special troops to fight against 
the above mentioned partisans in the occupied territories. Von Kleist was 
commissioned for the selection of reliable officers from the Don, Kuban and Terek 
Cossacks‟ camps. Finally, on October 6, 1941, a unit from Cossack prisoners on 
trial ordered to be established. This date is considered to be the birthday of the 
Osttruppen (Eastern troops).
343
  
By the end of November 1941, POWs in fifteen German POW camps were 
sorted in accordance with their nationality, age, occupation, education and ranks in 
the former Red Army.
344
 There were nearly thirty commissions to sort the prisoners. 
In total, five to six hundred people worked in these commissions,
345
 which were, it 
is understood, “mixed” commissions with members from various nationalities.  
The POWs of the Siedlce POW camp were sorted by their nationalities in 
mid-April, 1942. First, Russians and Ukrainians were separated from the others. 
Then, Ukrainians were separated from Russians too. The Kazaks, Uzbeks, Tadjiks, 
Tatars, Kirgizs, Kalmuks were not parted from each other and stayed in the barracks 
together.
346
 
 
6.1.1 Recruitment and Volunteering Question  
It is obvious that “volunteering” to fight or work in the German Army 
remained as an ambiguous issue. Officially, the “collaborators,” independent of 
their motives and voluntariness, were named as “volunteers” by Germans. 
However, it was not known, whether or not they were forced to work by German 
                                                             
343 Spezialtruppe zur Niederkämpfung der Sowjetrussischen Partisanen. Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, 
pp. 20-21.  
344 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, pp. 495-496. 
345 Mühlen, p. 53. 
346 G. N. Vzvarova, p. 41. 
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soldiers. What is clear was that, according to the memoirs of the various Turkic 
POWs, they were forced by the tough living standards in the POW camps, namely 
hunger, disease, weather conditions, etc. The attitude of the Soviet authorities 
towards the Red Army soldiers was so bad in some cases, that they had to escape 
and surrendered to Germans.
347
    
From the POWs in the German camps, only a few people had applied for 
being volunteers in the German Army. For instance, in the above-mentioned 
Częstochowa POW camp in Poland, only five out of all POWs became 
volunteers.
348
  
An interesting detail regarding the “volunteering question” was provided by 
Hüseyin İkram Han in his memoirs. Soviet troops, including İkram Han‟s unit were 
defeated by Germans in Donetsk on June 20, 1942 and lost communication with 
their commanders. After a period of hiding, the whole unit surrendered to Germans, 
when they understood that they did not have another chance.
349
 The soldiers were 
no “volunteers” in this respect, but they surrendered because of the circumstances 
which forced them to do. German wartime propaganda was also an important factor 
here. İkram Han reports in his memoirs that “German propaganda vehicles” 
announced its calls in Russian language and thereby tried to convince the Soviet 
soldiers that Germans would be victorious in the war and offered them directly to 
                                                             
347 Interview with a Soviet citizen. In his memoirs, this Red Army soldier stated that the NKVD 
arrived to their village and gathered all men from 18 to 50 years for conscription to the Red Army 
in 1943. They were “harshly beaten” and put into a “punitive regiment.” Because of the “physical 
interrogations” and punishment by the NKVD authorities, he switched to German side. Though it 
can not be clearly understood from the memoirs, this soldier was most probably recruited to the 
partisan forces by the NKVD, not to the Red Army. Also, it is not known whether or not he was a 
Russian or non-Russian. See, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 20, the Harvard Prıject, p. 2.  
348 G. N. Vzvarova, p. 40. 
349 İkram Han, p. 71.  
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come to German ranks voluntarily.
350
 Also, German propaganda leaflets appealed 
for surrender.
351
   
The order of Generaloberst (Colonel General) Franz Halder‟s directive on 
the Establishment of the Ostlegionen by the Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group 
South) on June 2, 1942 had been far from resolving this issue. But from the German 
military point of view, the “volunteering question” was solved, to some degree, by 
the order of Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, the commander of the 162
nd
 Infantry 
Division, on July 4, 1942.
352
 According to these, the Turco-Tatar and Caucasian 
POWs, which were separated from the rest, were to be sent to Legionssammellagers 
(Legion Concentration Camps) in Chorol (Khorol) and Lubny. Here, the POWs 
were to be sorted according their nationalities “with favored care” and medically 
examined.
353
  
The guidelines of July 4, 1942 instructed that all the healthy capable men 
until 28 years
354
 were to be categorized as Kategorie A. The older and unfit ones 
were to be sorted as Kategorie B. This second group was to be used as technical 
workers. They were to be put into reserve companies and work companies.
355
       
 
    
Vzvarova quotes, as an example of the application of the orders, three 
hundred and fifty people were selected from the non-Russian POWs and were sent 
to Legionowo with the stub code “Kategorie A.” The ones, who remained at the 
                                                             
350 İkram Han, p. 62. 
351 Interview with a former POW at a camp in the Chernihiv region. They were evaluated as “crude 
and naïve” by this POW. See, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 27, the Harvard Project, p. 3. 
352 The order carried the title “Grundlegende Befehl über die Aufstellung von Turk-Bataillonen 
(Fundamental Order on the Establishment of Turk-Battalions).” This order was valid for the area 
of 162nd Infantry Division. 
353 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 88. 
354 Since August 1, 1942, until 35 years. For the officers and NCOs, there was no age limit. 
355 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, pp. 88-89. 
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POW camp, were codenamed as “Kategorie B.” The latter were sent to Legionowo 
as well in the following days.
356
  
After being placed in the POW camps, some of the former Red Army 
soldiers were volunteered for the tasks such as harvesting sugar beets outside of the 
camps in summertime, however, they avoided from carrying coal and wood to the 
camp in the freezing winter. Most of them did not have any proper shoes and 
anything warm to wear.
357
 On the other hand, the POWs that worked in the baths, 
kitchens, etc. stayed in separate buildings. That was perceived as a sign of 
“privilege” by the soldiers and contributed to their application as workers under the 
German Army.
358
  
 
6.1.2 Turkestan National Prisoners-of-War Commissions  
For the special task of formation of a Turkestan Legion and a Caucasian - 
Muslim Legion, Aussonderungskommissions (Selection Commissions) were 
established from January 13, 1942 on. These were to work both under 
OKW/Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt (General Bureau of the Armed Forces) in OKW 
POW camps and under OKH/Generalquartiermeister (Quartermaster General
359
 of 
the Army) in the OKH POW camps. 
In a discussion, Rosenberg reported to Hitler that “for some time,” the 
Ostministerium‟s commissions had “picked out the best of the prisoners” and that 
the OKW established the “Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration” with his 
ministry. Rosenberg was informed by Otto Bräutigam, the head of the General 
                                                             
356 G. N. Vzvarova, p. 41. 
357 İkram Han, pp. 89-90. 
358 İkram Han, p. 103. 
359 Quartermaster General is the officer in charge of supplies for the army.  
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Politics department of the Ostministerium, that “the commander [of the Turkestan 
Legion] has learned the Turkestani language, and the [Turkestanis] have accepted 
German military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude.”360 
Veli Kayyum Han reported to Andican in an interview during his lifetime 
that he and Mustafa Çokay were not aware of the German plans to establish troops 
from the Turkic POWs until the end of 1941. According to Kayyum Han, von 
Mende called him when he was in Berlin. Von Mende wanted Veli Kayyum to call 
Mustafa Çokay. He was planning to use Çokay for propaganda in the radio and 
newspaper.
361
  
The Turkestani commissions were assigned to select the suitable-appearing 
soldiers. The selected ones were to be approved again in this “early stage” by 
Mayer-Mader or other officers for their suitability. The POWs, whose characters 
were suitable but not healthy enough, were sent, if possible, to work in service of 
the German Army. On the other hand, the “politically unreliable” ones were to be 
sent back to the POW camps.
362
  
After being separated from the former Red Army soldiers, Turkic POWs 
were sorted according to their nationalities. The members of the POW commissions 
asked them, whether or not they wanted to fight against Stalin, or work instead.
363
 
The sorting criteria were not only nationality. Germans and the POW commissions 
were picking the educated ones, or the ones who were officers in the Red Army 
                                                             
360 Document No. 1520-PS, “Notes about a discussion with the Führer at the Führer Headquarters,”  
May 8, 1942, the Avalon Project. 
361 Interview with A. Ahat Andican on January 25, 2010.  
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before.
364
 The latter ones were used mainly for propaganda purposes and for the 
publications of Turkestanis.  
The uniforms worn by the voluntary units and flags of the legions had 
become an important issue. However, the attempts to regulate the uniforms and 
badges could not be concluded fully, because these units were not stationed in a 
certain place. The personnel were derived from various places, therefore their 
uniforms varied. Rosenberg reported to Hitler on May 8, 1942, that a “new flag was 
created for the Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place 
put bow and arrow.”365 Rosenberg showed the symbols and flags to Hitler for the 
legions of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kuban Cossacks, and Kalmuks. 
Hitler raised no objections.
366
 
To make a regulation, three different types of collar patches (for Russians 
and Ukrainians, for Central Asians and Caucasians, and for the Cossacks) and two 
different types of shoulder straps (for Russians, Ukrainians and Cossacks, and for 
Central Asians and Caucasians) were planned to be carried by the “volunteers.” 
Furthermore, an arm-shield and a cockade were foreseen for each and every 
nationality in the German Army. These insignias were different from the German 
symbols, because “the honor to carry them” belonged only to the German nationals. 
Similarly, the medals and decorations designated to honor the soldiers were also 
                                                             
364 For instance, Veli Kayyum Han asked the POWs in his visit to Ebenrode, if anyone had a 
university degree. About a dozen people reported. They were given new clothes and then 
transported to a camp near Luckenwalde. The camp was newly-constructed and the POWs had 
individual beds and furniture there. See, Crane, p. 90. 
365 Document No. 1520-PS, “Notes about a discussion with the Führer at the Führer Headquarters,”  
May 8, 1942, the Avalon Project. 
366 Document No. 1520-PS, “Notes about a discussion with the Führer at the Führer Headquarters,”  
May 8, 1942, the Avalon Project. The notes were signed by Alfred Rosenberg, present at the 
discussion were Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Bormann and Rosenberg. 
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planned to be different. In practice, however, German medals were also given to 
non-Germans in the service of the German Army.
367
  
 
6.1.3 Cossack Volunteers 
Germans treated the Ukraine different than the rest of the Soviet Union. In 
the Ostministerium, a branch was opened just for this land. According to Rosenberg, 
the Ukraine would be most important dependency of Germany around Moscow. 
Furthermore, its grain stocks were crucial for the Germans. Therefore, it must be 
separated from Russia and set under strict control of Germany.
368
 Rosenberg 
established close contacts to Ukrainian and Caucasian émigrés in Europe. 
One of the first volunteer formations in the German Army were those 
consisted of the Cossacks in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian volunteers began 
contacting the Germans well before the Operation Barbarossa. During the Polish 
Campaign in the spring of 1939, while the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact still in force, 
the Abwehr contacted the Orhanizatsiya Ukrayinskikh Natsionalistiv (Organization 
of Ukrainian Nationalists, or in short, OUN).
369
 The OUN got the permission from 
the “Office for Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Service in the OKW”370 to 
collect west Ukrainian soldiers from the German POW camps.
371
  
German intelligence was aiming to provide the aid of the Ukrainian 
nationalists in their invasion of Poland by unofficially promising them an 
                                                             
367 Jurado, pp. 13-14. 
368 Dallin, p. 108.  
369 Orhanizatsiya Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv founded in 1929 in Poland to oppose the occupation 
of the Ukraine by Poland and Russia.  
370 Abteilung II des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr im OKW. 
371 The OUN was divided into two wings at the Second Congress on February 10, 1940 in Krakow. 
The more radical wing was under Stefan Bandera, while the other wing was led by Andrij 
Melnik. See Franz W. Seidler, Die Kollaboration 1939-1945 (Munich and Berlin: Herbig, 1995) 
for Stefan Bandera, see Seidler, pp. 55-61; for Andreas Melnik, see Seidler, pp. 371-375.  
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independent Galicia. The unit created for this end by the Germans was named 
Bergbauerhilfe (Help of Mountain Peasants). It was consisting of some five hundred 
to one thousand men. Their commander was a German, Colonel Erwin Stolze. He 
stated after the war that the Ukrainian volunteers did their jobs well. They 
underwent sabotage acts behind the front in Poland.
372
  
Works for a “Ukrainian Legion” also began before the Operation 
Barbarossa, at the beginning of 1941. This legion would have two battalions, whose 
names were Roland and Nachtigall. Training was undertaken by the Abwehr. 
German officers, including Oberländer, assigned to the command post.373  
 This was an exceptional situation when one bears in mind that the first 
volunteer formations of the Slavic peoples corresponded to the time period after the 
Operation Barbarossa. In the eyes of German political and military leaders, a myth 
about the courage and resilience of the Cossacks was prevailing. A legitimization 
according to Nazi ideology was found to overcome this exception: according to this, 
Cossacks were the descendants of the Germanic tribe of the Ostrogoths, who owned 
Black Sea region between the second and fifth centuries. Consequently after a 
while, the Cossack units were promoted to an equal status to the volunteer units 
formed by Volksdeutsche, the Germans living outside of Germany.
374
    
 
6.2 Vlasov Army and Legions 
Andrey Vlasov, a former general in the Soviet Army until being taken as 
POW by the Germans in July 1942, emerged as the main figure behind the 
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opposition movement of the Russian former Red Army soldiers to the Stalinist 
regime. However, his political activities, which began in March 1943 with the 
permission of German authorities, could only continue three months, until being 
forbidden by Hitler. After the situation at the Eastern Front deteriorated for the 
Germans in 1944, he was “re-discovered” and contacted by Germans.375   
Vlasov founded the Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armiya (Russian Liberation 
Army, or in short, ROA) and afterwards Komitet Osvobojdeniya Narodov Rossii 
(Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, or in short KONR), on 
November 14, 1944 with the “Prague Manifesto.” Vlasov regarded himself an anti-
Stalin and the representative of the whole peoples in the Soviet Union.
376
 
Vlasov wanted to gather all the legions from former Red Army soldiers 
under ROA flag. Also, he opposed the National Turkestan Union Committee in his 
articles at the newspaper Volia Naroda (Will of the People).
377
 Vlasov‟s views were 
in clear opposition to the Turkestan national movement led by Veli Kayyum Han at 
that time. He favored an absolute centralism.
378
 The views of Veli Kayyum Han 
about him were not very favorable. He thought that Vlasov was a “colonialist” and 
opposing only to the regime in Russia, not to the oppression of the non-Russians in 
the Soviet Union.
379
 
The SS foresaw the opposition of the non-Russian national representatives 
and tried to minimize their opposition to Vlasov. For this reason, the SS proposed to 
the national representatives the establishment of “Eastern Turkic” and “Caucasian” 
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councils.
380
 Further, the command of the legions and the national SS units were to 
be given to the committees. Germans were planning, in the long term, to connect 
these two proposed “councils” to KONR in a “federative structure.”381   
While Vlasov‟s ideas and plans were strongly opposed by the Turkestanis, 
the Caucasian leaders also protested his attempts to control all the national 
movements. Non-Russian leaders would only accept Vlasov as the leader of the 
fight against Stalin, if his authority was limited to Russian forces.
382
 
On November 18, 1944, four days after the establishment of the KONR, the 
representatives of the Tatars, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, North 
Caucasians, Crimean Tatars, Turkestanis and Ukrainians sent a letter to Alfred 
Rosenberg, presenting themselves as the representatives of their peoples in the 
Soviet Union. In the letter, the undersigned men stated that they represented more 
than ninety million people, who would be affected by the decisions of Vlasov.
383
 
They wrote that they fought against the Russian imperialism for hundreds of years 
and founded their independent states in 1918. They claimed that the most passive 
peoples in the fight against Bolshevism during the Civil War were the Russians, 
while their peoples welcomed the Russo-German battles and sided with Germans 
from the very first day on.
384
  
The “representatives” in Germany demanded that Vlasov should not be 
permitted to the candidature of the leadership of the non-Russian peoples‟ liberation 
                                                             
380 The establishment of a “Turkic council” was cancelled because of the tense relations between 
Olzscha and Veli Kayyum Han. The “Caucasian Council” was established, on the other hand,     
in October 1944. 
381 Mühlen, p. 161. 
382 Antonio J. Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims: Muslim Volunteers in Hitler’s Armies, 1941-1945 (Bayside: 
Europa Books, 2007), p. 57. 
383 Copy of the Letter to Mr. Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Reichsleiter Alfred 
Rosenberg, No. 2998, Berlin, November 18, 1944. From the personal archives of Dr. Hakan 
Kırımlı.  
384 Letter to Mr. Alfred Rosenberg, November 18, 1944. 
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movements. The reason for this was, according to these “representatives,” that 
Vlasov and the non-Russian people had different motivations and aims: Vlasov 
wanted to crush the Stalinist regime in Russia and establish a new “Russian” state 
within the same boundaries of the Soviet Union, which was unacceptable for them. 
They openly stated their agreement on not recognizing Vlasov‟s statements in the 
letter. The “representatives” added that the actions of Vlasov would not have any 
results for the volunteers, workers, and émigrés in Germany.385 
Vlasov had also non-Russians in his committee, whose aims were “freedom 
of the peoples of Russia.” In the letter, the “representatives” warned German 
authorities that they would not recognize them as representatives of the will of their 
peoples.
386
 Consequently, “representatives” demanded from Alfred Rosenberg three 
main things: first, they wanted Germans to hinder any attempts of Vlasov for the 
leadership of the non-Russian peoples. Second, they demanded Germans to 
recognize the rights of the non-Russian peoples on individual states and also 
recognize them as the only representatives of the non-Russians. Third, they wanted 
to get the permission of establishing their own national formations and take over the 
political leadership to themselves.
387
    
Vlasov could only find a small number of non-Russians to work with him. 
The only Turkestanis in his committee were the five opponents of Veli Kayyum 
Han. They joined to KONR under the leadership of Haris Kanatbay in April 1945 
and established the “Turkestan Council.”388   
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6.3 The Eastern Legions 
Beginning from November 15, 1941, formation of divisions from the 
Turkestani and Caucasian POWs were proposed. Quarter-Master General Ernst 
Wagner, commander of the Sicherheitsdivision No. 444 (444
th
 Security Division), 
was named to the commanding post of these units. They were to be brought to the 
zone of this division, Zaporizhia,
389
 by first lieutenant Baron von Taube. The first 
formations of Central Asian and Caucasian peoples in the German Army were 
officially proposed to be named as Turkestaner Bataillon No. 444 and Kaukasier 
Bataillon No. 444. The official name of these combined units, as used in the official 
German documents, was the “811th Infantry Division.”390  
As a general rule, the Eastern Battalions, including the Turk[estan]-
Battalion were directly attached to a corps using the number of the corps plus 400 
as their designated number. Therefore, it is understood that these 444
th
 Battalion 
had been 44
th
 Corps before. All of these battalions were generally named as 
Osttruppen (Eastern Troops).
391
 
Adiges, Avars, Azerbaijanis, Ossets, Bashkirs, Lezgins, Ingushs, Kabardays, 
Karachays, Georgians and Dagestanis were included into Caucasian troops, while 
Kalmuks, Mongols, Tatars, Turkmens, Turks, Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Estonians and 
Kazaks were included into Turkestani troops. They would have been armed, 
uniformed, put under German command and deployed between Dnieper Mouth and 
                                                             
389 Zaporizhia is a city in the center-south of today‟s Ukraine, resting on the banks of Dnieper River.  
390 Sergei Drobyazko and Andrei Karaschuk, Vostochnie Legioni i Kazachi Chasti v Vermakhte 
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Perekop in the Crimean Peninsula. Later on, they would be called as                  
Turk-Battalion 444.
392
  
The above mentioned first formations were not used at the front against the 
Red Army in action. Instead, they were made up as security teams for border and 
rear-area security. These armed groups were just “rudely formed” and differed from 
the Ostlegionen (Eastern Legions), which were to be established after a while. 
Since October 1941, “Office for Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Service 
in the OKW”393 had experiences with the Turkestanis and Caucasians. At about the 
same time, when the Turkestani troops were in formation, under auspices of this 
office, one Turco-Tatar and one Caucasian army group was formed for special 
defense purposes and put under the command of two commanders: the Turco-Tatar 
group was under the command of Major Andreas Mayer-Mader and the Caucasian 
group under First Lieutenant Oberländer.394 These two units were used for anti-
partisan warfare since 1942 under the name Turkestanisches Infantriebataillon 450 
(450
th
 Turkestani Infantry Battalion).
395
 First, in October 1941, 700 POWs were 
selected in Poltava. They were trained in Silesia. Afterwards, the number of the 
personnel in this unit became 2,900. In the spring of 1942, this unit was sent to front 
under the command of Theodor Oberländer.396  
Mayer-Mader was the military consultant of Chiang Kai-Sek.
397
 He knew 
Turkestan and some Turkestani languages well. His political stance was in favor to 
                                                             
392 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 26.    
393 Abteilung II des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr im OKW. 
394 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 26. 
395 Neulen, p. 324. This unit, founded in Skierniewice, was also known as Turkbataillon 450. It was 
included into Army Group South in early May 1942. Afterwards, the commanders of the unit 
changed on different dates. Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 136. 
396 Mühlen, p. 53.  
397 Chiang Kai-Sek was the Chinese military commander and the First Chairman (between 1928 and 
1931) of the “Nationalist Government of China.” In the framework of the Sino-German 
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the Turkestani nationalism: he was aiming to separate Central Asia from the rest of 
the Soviet Union and establish a state there. After the death of Mustafa Çokay in 
December 1941,
398
 Mayer-Mader cooperated with Veli Kayyum Han in the 
establishment of the troops, who would become the president of the Milli Türkistan 
Birlik Komitesi (National Turkestan Union Committee).
399
 Consequently, the 
Unternehmen Tiger B (Initiative Tiger B)
400
 was set under the responsibility of 
OKH instead of “Office for Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Service in the 
OKW” under the command of Mayer-Mader. These troops would serve as core for 
the future Turkestan Legion.
401
  
At the end of the year 1941, one Azerbaijani and six Turkestani divisions 
were under arms. Zielonka POW camp
402
 became one of the main centers to gather 
the newly recruits. As Mayer-Mader himself told the members of Zielonka camp, 
there were over one thousand and two hundred men, “all from Turkestan.”403 
Mayer-Mader brought to nearly all command posts of these divisions Turkestani 
officers. But the Turkestani officers had to report to a German liaison, even if the 
liaisons had lower ranks than the Turkestani officers.
404
 However, incidents were 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cooperation (1911-1941), Hans von Seeckt (between 1933 and 1935) and Alexander von 
Falkenhausen (between 1935 and 1938) were the military consultants of Chiang Kai-Sek. The 
cooperation officially continued until China declared war on Germany on December 9, 1941. For 
detailed information, see, Stefan Berleb, “For China’s Benefit” The Evolution and Devolution of 
German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919-1938, unpublished PhD. Dissertation, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 2005. See, pp. 171-265 especially.  
398 See below for details. 
399 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 30. 
400 See, “Special Purpose Units” below for Abwehrsunternehmen Tiger B. 
401 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 30. 
402 Zielonka was located in Poland, about thirteen kilometers form the Warsaw city center.  
403 Crane, p. 93. 
404 Isakjan Narzikul was one of the Turkestani commanding officers of the seven companies, 
established under “Tiger Battalion” (most probably the Unternehmen Tiger B) in Zielonka. 
Master Sergeant (later promoted to Lieutenant by the Wehrmacht) Narzikul‟s company was 
composed of 240 men. His liaison, Schneider‟s rank was sergeant. See, Crane, p. 93.   
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seen, at which this procedure was reversed in favor of higher-ranking Turkestani 
officers after receiving complaints from them.
405
  
Germans had released some political prisoners held in the Soviet prisons, 
when they occupied parts of Russia. They included these into the newly founded 
companies. Some of the former prisoners were accused of practicing Islam openly. 
They got no military training before and had difficulties in understanding military 
commands.
406
 
The Eastern troops got their German military uniforms, “two weeks before 
Christmas, 1941” with the patch on their arms “Alla Biz Bilen (God with us).” 
Former Red Army lieutenant Baymirza Hayit,
407
 who had been an officer in the 
Turkestan Legion after being captured, sometimes visited the Turkestani battalions 
and delivered speeches.
408
 
It is necessary to remind that the head of SS, Heinrich Himmler and Alfred 
Rosenberg were in disagreement about the responsibilities of the volunteer legions. 
Rosenberg considered the citizens of the Soviet Union under his sphere of authority. 
He stated in his memoirs that “Himmler knew nothing about the East,”409 while 
regarding himself as being “on very friendly terms” with the “Asiatic” 
volunteers.
410
  
                                                             
405 Narzikul‟s hierarchical situation was changed by Mayer-Mader himself after his complaints, who 
was a friend of Narzikul. Thus, it is strongly possible that this had been an individual incident 
and was not widespread among all the Turkestani troops. See, Crane, p. 106.  
406 Crane, p. 94. 
407 Baymirza Hayit was born in Namangan, Uzbekistan in 1917. He graduated from the Tashkent 
University in 1939. He was called to Red Army and stationed in Poland as a squadron tank 
commander. He was captured by the Germans in 1941.  
408 Crane, p. 95. See, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, 
National Archives, Microcopy, T-175/162/2695249; T-175/162/2695369; T-175/162/2695393. 
For some of the sample drawings of Germans for the badges of different Muslim and Turkic 
units, see the appendices. 
409 Rosenberg, p. 280. 
410 Rosenberg, p. 280.  
102 
 
It is necessary to mention here that these two types of units were different 
from each other: the Ost-Bataillone (East Battalions) and the Turk-Bataillone 
(Turk[estan] Battalions). The East Battalions‟ personnel were derived from the 
ethnic Russians, Byelorussians, and a few Ukrainians, while the personnel of 
Turkestan Battalions were from Turkic and some non-Turkic peoples of Central 
Asia and Caucasus. These battalions were “directly attached to a corps staff.”411  
According to Wagner, Hitler evaluated the people of the Caucasus as 
“politically harmless.”412 On the other hand, he was cautious and abstained from 
granting them any powers or authorities. Hitler also restrained the size of the units: 
their size could never exceed battalion size. Further, the units should be together 
with the German units, as much as possible.
413
  
By the establishment of the legions, the above-mentioned POW 
commissions employed by the Ostministerium played a decisive role.
414
 Rosenberg 
found Caucasian people “acceptable” for using to realize their aims in the East.415 
Wagner thought that the chance to draw the Turkestani and Caucasian peoples to 
the German side would be very beneficial.
416
    
                                                             
411 Bishop, p. 70.  
412 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 122. 
413 Littlejohn, p. 251. 
414 Mühlen, p. 53. 
415 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 122. 
416 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 123. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
THE TURKESTAN LEGION  
AND TURKESTANIS IN THE WAFFEN-SS 
 
 
 
7.1 The Establishment of the Turkestan Legion   
The German Army objected the establishment of the fighting units 
composed of different nationalities from the very early stages on. This tough 
resistance was eliminated finally by the end 1941. By the early December 1941, 
Rosenberg presented a memorandum to Hitler, which pointed out the necessity of 
the establishment of the “Turk[ic]” legions. On December 14, 1941, Hitler approved 
this plan and on December 22, 1941, the OKW officially ordered one Turkestani, 
one Armenian, one Georgian and one Muslim-Caucasian
417
 legion to be formed by 
December 30, 1941.
418
 On January 13, 1942, the Chief of the Equipment Army and 
Commander of the Auxiliary Army
419
 ordered the establishment of the Turkestani 
and Caucasian-Muslim troops under the command of Mayer-Mader. He was to 
                                                             
417 This was divided into two as the Azerbaijani and the North Caucasian Legions later on. 
418 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 48. 
419 Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres. 
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select soldiers from the above-mentioned seven divisions and put into the 
“Turkestan Legion.”420 
From February 18, 1942 on, the administrative organ for the training of the 
Turkestan Legion in Rembertów421 (and from summer 1942, in Radom422) was the 
Aufstellungsstab der Ostlegionen (Formation Staff of the Eastern Legions). Though 
this name was changed to Stab (Staff) after a short while, and to Kommando der 
Ostlegionen (Command of Eastern Legions), from January 23 onwards.
423
 
Recruiting from the POWs and from the population of Caucasus and Central Asia 
was conducted under a special unit “Organizational Staff K.” Also, a special unit 
was formed within the responsibility of “Staff K” for propaganda works among the 
POWs in the camps. This unit had organizational duties too: it began to separate the 
ethnic Russians from the Caucasians.
424
  
From February 19, 1942 on, Mayer-Mader, the commander of the Turkestan 
Legion was employed for the preparation of the “450th Turkestani Infantry 
Battalion” out of the 1st Battalion in Skierniewice.425 He was to train and prepare 
the newly founded legion for battle. Also, he was commissioned for the 
strengthening of the 2
nd
 Battalion in that city. Under the name Stab, in early March, 
the 450
th
 Infantry Battalion was composed of the following units: 1
st 
Kirgiz 
Company, 2
nd
 Uzbek Company, 3
rd
 Kazak Company, 4
th
 Turkmen Company, a 
Tajik Platoon, an Eastern Tatar Platoon, a machine-gun platoon composed of 
                                                             
420 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 30. 
421 Rembertów is in today‟s Poland, a borough of Warsaw.  
422 Radom is a city in the center regions of today‟s Poland. 
423 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 31-32. 
424 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 49. 
425 Skierniewice is a town in the center of today‟s Poland. 
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Kirgiz, Uzbek and Kazak soldiers, and a mixed anti-tank, pioneer and heavy-
grenade launcher platoon.
426
 
In March 1942, parallel formations were established in the occupied Soviet 
territories. In addition to these, in the Crimea and Kalmuk steppes, militia and 
special troops armed by the German Army were present. These were under the 
command of the Waffen-SS or the OKW and were used primarily against the 
partisan warfare in the rear zones.
427
   
By the way, the 3
rd
 Battalion in Paprotnia
428
 became the Kaukasisch-
Mohammedanische Legion (Caucasian-Muslim Legion) under the command of 
Major Riedel. The Georgian and Armenian Legions were given headquarters in 
Wesoła.429 Since the Georgian Legion‟s composition was heterogeneous, the North 
Caucasian peoples in this unit were separated into a North Caucasian Legion on 
August 2, 1942 under Captain Housselle. On August 15, 1942, the “Chief of the 
Equipment Army and Commander of the Auxiliary Army”430 ordered the 
establishment of a Volga Tatar Legion under the responsibility of Major Freiherr 
von Seckendorff in Jedlina.
431
  
 
7.2 The Legionnaires under German Ranks  
7.2.1 Legionnaires in Poland 
After all the re-groupings and changes of headquarters, the final forms of the 
legions came into being. There were six national legions in different regions of the 
                                                             
426 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 31-32. 
427 Mühlen, p. 54. 
428 Paprotnia is in the center of today‟s Poland. 
429 Wesoła is a district of today‟s Warsaw.  
430 Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber der Ersatzheeres.  
431 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 32. 
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occupied Poland (or Generalgouvernement in Poland) from the peoples of 
Turkestan, the Caucasus, and Upper-Volga Regions in August 1942. These were set 
under the authority of Kommando der Ostlegionen (Command of the Eastern 
Legions) in Rembertow.
432
 
The Turkestanische Legion (Turkestan Legion) was established in 
Legionowo
433
 from the Karakalpakhs, Kazaks, Kirgizs, Tadjiks, Turkmens, Uzbeks, 
and other minor nations or clans like Dungans, Iranians, Kashgars, Taranchis, 
Kurama clan, and Osttataren (Eastern Tatars).
434
 The Kaukasisch-
Mohammedanische Legion (after August 2, 1942 named as Azerbaijdzansische 
Legion) was formed in Jedlina.
435
 As for the Nordkaukasische Legion in Wesoła, its 
personnel were derived from a variety of nationalities such as Abkhazs, Adiges, 
Circassians, Kabardins, Balkars, Karachays, Chechens, Ingushs, Kumuks, Nogays, 
Avars, Dargins, Laks, Lezgins, Kurds, and the North Ossetians. The Georgische 
Legion established by the Georgians, Adjaras, Imeretis, Lazs, Mingrelians, Svans 
and the South Ossetians, was stationed in Kruszyna.
436
 The Armenische Legion, 
established primarily by the Armenians of Karabakh, founded in Puławy.437 Finally, 
the Volgatatarische Legion was established on August 15, 1942 and deployed in 
Jedlina. Its personnel were derived from Kazantatars, Tatars of Ufa (Bashkiria), 
Bashkirs, Mordvians, Maris and Tatar-speaking Chuvash and Udmurt people.
438
  
                                                             
432 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 33. 
433 Legionowo is a town in the center of today‟s Poland.  
434 In the German source (Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 33), the names of the peoples and clans in 
the Turkestan Legion are as follows (in German): “Karakalpaken, Kazachen, Kirgizen, Tadziken, 
Turkmenen, Uzbeken, … , Beludzen, Dunganen, Iraner, Kasgaren, Kuraminen, Sugnanen, 
Tarancen und Osttataren.”   
435 Jedlina is a district in the center-east of today‟s Poland.  
436 Kruszyna is a voivodeship in today‟s Poland.  
437 Puławy is a town in today‟s eastern Poland.  
438 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 33; Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu 
Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 50. 
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One can understand that the high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht first 
saw the establishment of the legions as a political decision and propaganda 
instrument for the war against the Soviet Union. Only on April 24, 1942, first 
instructions on the formation of the Ostlegionen and their internal affairs were 
published.  
7.2.2 Legionnaires in the Ukraine 
A high-ranking officer of the German Army, who played a crucial role in the 
organization of the legions, Major Graf von Stauffenberg, had a political 
conceptualization regarding the formations of the legions. He was planning the 
“resurrection” of Caucasian and Turkestani national states with the help of his 
forces. He found the National Turkestan Union Committee the most suitable for his 
aims, compared to the other national committees.
439
   
Stauffenberg was not alone when he dealt with the organization of the 
legions. He managed to bring like-minded officers such as Ernst-August Köstring, 
to some of the key positions too.
440
 As the Inspector General of Turkic and 
Caucasian Forces, Köstring visited the legions in Poland and the Ukraine for 
investigation and positively reported on the legions to the Chef des Generalstabes 
des Heeres (Head of the General Staff of the Army).
441
  
The Kommando der 162. Infantriedivision (Command of the 162
nd
 Infantry 
Division), led by Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, was one of the core units when it 
                                                             
439 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 125.  
440 Köstring was appointed to this post in August 1942. Littlejohn, p. 252. 
441 Stauffenberg was the Gruppenleiter der Organizationsabteilung II (Group Manager of 
Organisation Dvision II) in the General Staff of the Land Army (OKH). Köstring was the General 
of the Cavalry. He was an expert on Russia and had been military attaché to the Soviet Union 
(1932-1941). See, Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, pp. 51-52. On August 10, 1942, Köstring was 
named for “Authorized General for Caucasus” in the Army Group A of OKH. Thorwald, Die 
Illusion, p. 122.  
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came to the legions in the Ukraine. Niedermayer was balancing his lack of 
commanding-skills in war with his knowledge in the social sciences.
442
 The order in 
May 1942 required his unit to serve as the main unit for the formation and training 
of the volunteers from the POWs across the region between Kiev and Poltava. In 
addition to the political reasons, the rising number of the causalities at the front 
made it necessary to increase the number of the units composed of the 
Turkestanis.
443
    
The POW camp Dulag
444
127 in Lokhvytsia
445
 was designated to be a 
concentration lager for Armenians, Dulag 137 in Romny
446
 for the Turkestanis and 
Dulag 200 in Pryluky
447
 for Azerbaijanis, Dulag 120 in Mirgorod
448
 for Northern 
Caucasians, where also the Aufstellungsstab (Formation Staff) of the legions and 
courses for the translators took place.
449
 The Formation Staff established twenty 
five field battalions, two reinforced half-battalions, seven construction-battalions 
and three reserve battalions from May 1942 until May 1943.
450
 On December 12, 
                                                             
442 Niedermayer (November 1885, Freising – September 1948 Vladimir, Soviet Union) was a more 
academic and political character than a military officer. He was an expert of war geography and 
war politics, the Director of the Institut für allgemeine Wehrlehre (Institute for General Defense 
Studies) at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin. He had intimate knowledge on the 
political behavior in the Soviet Union as well as the Near East and the Middle East. Niedermayer 
spoke Russian, Persian and Turkish. Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 61. Littlejohn claims that he 
was converted to Islam. See Littlejohn, p. 252.     
443 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 7. 
444 Dulag was the short form of German word Durchgangslager referring to the POW camps, where 
prisoners-of-war were temporarily concentrated to be transported to main POW camps.  
445 Lokhvytsia is a city in the Poltava oblast of today‟s Ukraine.   
446 Romny is a city in the northern oblast Sumy of today‟s Ukraine.  
447 Pryluky is a city on the Udai River in the north-central oblast Cherniviv of today‟s Ukraine. 
448 Mirgorod is a city in the Poltava oblast of today‟s Ukraine. 
449 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 62; Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 7. 
450 Neulen, p. 325. The field battalions in the Ukraine by May 1943 were: 12 Turkestani (I/29, I/44, 
I/76, I/94, I/100, I/295, I/297, I/305, I/370, I/371, I/384, I/389), 6 Azerbaijani (I/4, I/73, I/97, 
I/101, I/111, II/73) 4 Georgian (I/1, I/9, II/4, II/198), and 3 Armenian (I/125, I/198, II/9), and 2 
strengthened North Caucasian sub-battalions (842 and 843), 7 construction and 2 reserve 
battalions. See, Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8.  
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1942, in the headquarters of the 162
nd
 Infantry Division in the Ukraine, there were 
about 35,000 men in total.
451
  
In the spring of 1942, the center for the formation of the Eastern Legions in 
the Ukraine became the headquarters of 162
nd
 Infantry Division. The personnel of 
this division were sent to Świętoszów452 for training and continuation of the 
formation. The division got an organization of two regiments: the 303
rd
 Turkestani 
and the 314
th
 Azerbaijani infantry regiments. The recruitment was fifty per cent 
Germans (Volksdeutsche, if possible), and fifty per cent non-Germans, namely the 
legionnaires, as a principle for this unit.
453
    
The General of the Infantry, Friedrich Olbricht‟s instructions defined the 
legions as “units of volunteer warriors, who fight for the liberation of their 
motherland from Bolshevism and for the liberation of their faiths.”454 On the top of 
the legion-command and field battalions, according to these instructions, had to be a 
German commander. On the other hand, the instructions coming from the OKH 
were in a direction that the section and platoon command positions had to be given 
to the legionnaires. Also, the command positions had to be given to the legionnaires 
according to their “characteristic as well as military adequacy and qualification”455 
regardless of the former position in the Red Army.
456
 However, in practice, these 
orders were obeyed only in part and the authority of the legionnaire commanders 
remained at lower levels.
457
  
                                                             
451 Neulen, pp. 331-332.    
452 German: Neuhammer. A city in the occupied Poland. Today in the Southwest of Poland.  
453 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8; Neulen, p. 331.  
454 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 35. 
455 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 35. 
456 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 35. 
457 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 34. 
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Simultaneously, further units, which were not formal Legions, were 
established in the Crimea in the first half of 1942.
458
 The Einsatzgruppe D (Task 
Force D) established volunteer formations for fighting against partisan forces in the 
beginning of 1942.
459
 These units were first organized as Selbstschutzkompanien 
(Self-Defense Companies).
460
 By the end of November 1942, these established eight 
Schutzmannschaftbattalions (defense-team battalions).
461
 The total strength of these 
battalions was nearly 20,000 men.
462
 These were not counted among the Eastern 
Legions and classified as volunteer units, mostly used against partisan forces and 
for paramilitary purposes behind the front line or in the occupied cities.     
 
7.2.3 Special Purpose Units  
The Caucasus had been an overly tough territory for the Imperial and Soviet 
Russia to fully penetrate their authorities. The struggle for independence of the 
peoples inhabiting the Caucasus region engaged Russian governments and armies; 
the region could not be integrated into Russia completely. This fact drew the 
attention of the Germans before the invasion of the Soviet Russia and they wanted 
                                                             
458 On January 3, 1942, Tatar-Muslim Commitee convened in Simferopol for the first time. The 
cahirman was Abdurreşidova. Two days later, a “recruitment center” was opened in Simferopol to 
recruit volunteers from local Tatar population. In January, 9,255 volunteers were gathered, of 
which 8,684 were sent to the German 11th Army. The rest was evaluated as “unfit” for battle and 
sent back home. See, Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German 
Service, 1941-1945,” pp. 71-72. 
459 The Einsatzgruppe D recruited 1,632 men in January 1942. See, Romanko, “The East Came 
West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 72. 
460 The personnel of the Self-Defense Companies wore dark blue uniforms. There were some 
members of these units, who were clearly anti-German, but they could not express their feelings. 
See, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 7, The Harvard Project, p. 1. 
461 The 147th and 154th Battalions in the Crimea were stationed in Simferopol [Aqmescit], the 148th 
Battalion in Karasubazar [Qarasuvbazar, today‟s Bilohirsk], the 149th Battalion in Bakhchisaray 
[Bağçasaray], the 150th Battalion in Yalta, the 151st Battalion in Alushta [Aluşta], the 152nd 
Battalion in Dzhankoy [Canköy], the 153rd Battalion in Feodosiya [Kefe]. See, Romanko, “The 
East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 73.    
462 Neulen, p. 325; Chief of the OKH, Colonel General Halder instructed in August 1942 that the 
“local auxiliary forces in the East” are to be used against the partisan forces. See, Romanko, “The 
East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 73.  
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to make use of it. Here, to mention shortly the legions created by the Germans for 
special aims before the beginning of the attacks on the Soviet Union is necessary.  
Hitler personally suggested the creation of the “Free Caucasus” movement 
in order to strengthen his hand politically by attracting the Caucasian people to 
German side before the planned invasion of the region and the oil rich territories 
nearby. After the Operation Barbarossa, “Free Committees” of Armenia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and other Caucasus nations were formed. After April 15, 1942, Germans 
declared these as “governments in forming.” Also, Germans discussed plans for the 
creation of the so-called “Confederation of the Caucasus” from 1942 until 1943.463     
Though most of their members were liquidated by the agents of the People‟s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) throughout 1920s and 1930s, Caucasus 
peoples kept on their guerilla warfare.
464
 During the World War II, some of these 
groups served under German intelligence before the formation of the above-
mentioned “special forces.” The official order to establish these units was signed by 
Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris in 1940, the head of the Abwehr. These formations 
were, as propagandized by the Germans, planned to be used in all over the Europe, 
including Turkey.
465
  
In June 1941, just before the Operation Barbarossa, a special unit under 
Major Wilhelm Braun was established in Poland named Walli I by the Secret 
Service department of the Abwehr. The Germans‟ plans were that Walli I would be 
used in special operations, such as sabotage and reconnaissance, in the Soviet 
Union. The formation of Walli II and Walli III followed in the following days by 
                                                             
463 Abramian, pp. 9-12. 
464 These groups were Armenian Dashnaks, Georgian Mensheviks, and Azerbaijani Musavat. 
465 Abramian, pp. 16-17; Littlejohn, p. 251. 
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other departments of the Abwehr, again for the special operations to be conducted 
during the invasion of the Soviet Union.
466
   
Like it had been by the Turkestani POWs, the Caucasian POWs were first 
served as volunteer laborers in the German Army, then constituted the Ostbataillons 
and finally joined the Wehrmacht in German uniforms. Similar to all Soviet POWs, 
two categories of the Caucasian POWs could be distinguished: first were the POWs, 
who had no ideological motivations to fight against the Soviet Union. They fought 
for surviving the tough living standards in the camps. On the other hand, POWs in 
the second category were composed of idealists fighting for their independence. 
Those in the second category were either those, who were in contact with the 
German Abwehr II
467
 before the war; or those, who were distinguished from the first 
category and selected into special units.
468
       
Beginning from October 18, 1941, under Mayer-Mader‟s Unternehmen 
Tiger B, a special unit was set up for sabotage and diversion.
469
 This army group 
was established as a special forces unit and set under the responsibility of both 
Abwehr and the Foreign Office. Its personnel were derived from the Brandenburg 
Regiment z.b.V 800 (Special Employment Regiment 800), a commando unit, and 
Caucasian peoples, who were POWs before.
470
  
The battalion of Theodor Oberländer, the Bergmann (Mountaineer) or the 
Sonderverband Bergmann (Special Troops of Mountaineers) belonged to the 
Caucasian special forces units. It was formed in Mittenwald. This unit included 
                                                             
466 Abramian, pp. 16-17. 
467 Abwehr II is the short of Abteilung II des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr im OKW (Office for Foreign 
Affairs and the Intelligence Service in the OKW). 
468 Brockdorff, p. 247.  
469 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 27; Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 12. By the spring of 1942, 
Mayer-Mader was deprived from the post to be replaced by Bergen. 
470 Johnatan Trigg, Hitler’s Jihadis: Muslim Volunteers of the SS (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 
2008), pp. 41-42; Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 12.  
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former Tsarist officers, who were émigrés in Paris, members of intelligentsia from 
the Caucasian POWs, personnel from division Brandenburg, and personnel from the 
Abwehr II.
471
 This was a unique unit in every respect, including also in terms of its 
oath. They did not swear for loyalty to Hitler in person, but the Wehrmacht itself.
472
   
 
7.3 Legionnaires in Duty 
7.3.1 Leaving the Legion Camps 
Based on the official numbers of the POWs in the German camps, the 
establishment of the first wave of fifteen strengthened field battalions began in 
1942. The Stab was trying to carry out the orders of the OKH as soon as possible. It 
was reporting, however, on September 11, 1942, that these battalions were ready for 
use and their need for weapons and equipment was satisfied. This enabled the 
dispatching of the first wave of these field battalions to the front until the end of the 
autumn 1942, though in unprepared condition.
473
  
First, the 450
th
 Battalion, whose personnel came from the Turkestan Legion, 
became “ready for service.” Its commander was Major Mayer-Mader, who 
commanded the above-mentioned 444
th
 Turkestani Battalion before. The 450
th
 and 
452
nd
 Turkestani Infantry Battalions and a part of the Turkestan Legion departed 
from Poland in the spring of 1942 for front. In the autumn of that year, more 
battalions were dispatched to the Eastern Front.
474
 These were the 781
st
, 782
nd
, 
783
rd
, and 784
th
 Turkestani Infantry Battalions. Also, two Azerbaijani Infantry 
                                                             
471 Brockdorff, p. 248; Littlejohn, p. 251. 
472 Neulen, p. 324.  
473 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 38. 
474 Jurado, p. 18; Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German 
Service, 1941-1945,” p. 53. 
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Battalions, 804 and 805;
475
 three North Caucasian Infantry Battalions, 800 
(Circassians), 801 (Dagestanis), 802 (Ossetians); two Georgian Infantry Battalions, 
795 and 796; and two Armenian Infantry Battalions 808 and 809 were sent to the 
front in the spring of 1942.
476
  
On September 22, 1942, Colonel Ralph von Heygendorff was named for the 
“Commander of the Deployment Staff of the Eastern Legions” in Rembertów.477 He 
had units from various nationalities in his army group area before.
478
  
The progress of the second wave of dispatches continued until spring 1943. 
Twenty one field battalions left Poland: the Turkestani Infantry Battalions 785, 786, 
787, 788, 789; the Azerbaijani Infantry Battalions 806, 807, 817, 818; the North 
Caucasus Infantry Battalion 803; the Georgian Infantry Battalions 797, 798, 799, 
822; the Armenian Infantry Battalions 810, 811, 812, 813; and the Volga Tatar 
Infantry Battalions 825, 826, 827.  
The second half of 1943 witnessed the third wave of dispatches. This time 
seventeen battalions were dispatched: the Turkestani Infantry Battalions 790, 791, 
792; the Azerbaijani Infantry Battalions 819, 820; the North Caucasus Infantry 
Battalions 835, 836, 837; the Georgian Infantry Battalions 823, 824; the Armenian 
Infantry Battalions 814, 815, 816; and the Volga Tatar Infantry Battalions 828, 829, 
830. 
The Stab, and later on Kommando der Ostlegionen in Poland established no 
less than fifty three
479
 battalions and rendered them to the field army. The total 
                                                             
475 These units were sent to Caucasus front. Schedule B / Vol. 8, Case 160, The Harvard Project, p. 
21. 
476 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 38. 
477 Kommandeur des Aufstellungssabes der Ostlegionen. Heygendorff was the commander of an 
infantry regiment in the Army Group Center.  
478 Thorwald, Die Illussion, p. 135. 
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strength of these formations was nearly fifty three thousand men.
480
 Battalions got 
three rifle companies, a machinegun and a staff company. Each company was 
composed of 130-200 men. Within the rifle company, there were three rifle platoons 
and a machine gun platoon, while within the staff company there were anti-tank, 
engineer and communications platoons.
481
 
Battalions had 800-1000 soldiers and officers, including Germans. However, 
the number of Germans in these units was about 60 men. German officers got non-
German deputy officers. Below-company level commanding was national.
482
  
 
7.3.2 Legions in Combat  
The fighting capabilities and preparedness for battle of the legionnaires 
differed and depended on many different factors. For example the 825
th
 and 827
th
 
Volga Tatar Battalion failed because of a disease during its times of establishment 
and infiltration of Soviet agents. Also, the German command was poor and the 
armament and equipment inadequate. The latter was the consequence of the fact 
that the Germans did not regard the legionnaires as their counterparts, at least until 
1944.
483
  
First Turkestani battalions were sent to the front near Stalingrad in the 
autumn of 1942, while the German Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South) was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
479 Though Drobyazko and Karaschuk stated that a total of 52 field battalions were formed. Among 
these were: 14 Turkestani, 8 Azerbaijani, 7 North Caucasian, 8 Georgian, 8 Armenian, 7 Volga 
Tatar units. See, Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 5.  
480 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, pp. 38-39. Neulen, p. 325.    
481 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 5.  
482 The German Rahmenpersonal in the battalions were composed of 4 officers, 1 clerk, 32 NCOs 
and 23 privates. See, Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 5.  
483 The German trains carried signs, with “Polen, Juden und Legionäre letzter Wagen! (Poles, Jews 
and legionnaires last waggon!)” See, Neulen, p. 329.  
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conducting the Fall Blau (Operation Blue).
484
 This Army Group was split into two 
for the operation as Army Group A and Army Group B.
485
 In the rear-front of both 
Army Groups, the battalions conducted “security operations” between September 
1942 and January 1943.
486
 The 162
nd
 Infantry Division of Turkestanis conducted 
front line duties in the front for a short time. Afterwards, it dispatched to 
Yugoslavia in September 1943 and then to Italy to fight against the partisans.
487
 
Between September 1942 and January 1943, the 452
nd
 and 781
st
 Turkestani 
Battalions, 796
th
 Georgian, 808
th
 Armenian and 800
th
 North Caucasian Battalions 
were sent to the front to participate at the German attack in Tuapse.
488
 In the same 
period, the 804
th
 Azerbaijani Battalion was organized in four mountain divisions 
and attacked with the German 49
th
 Mountain Corps towards Sukhumi.
489
 In 
Nalchik
490
 and Mozdok,
491
 the 805
th
, 806
th
 and I/111
th
 Azerbaijani,
492
 801
st
 and 
802
nd
 North Caucasian, 795
th
 Georgian, 809
th
 Armenian and I/370
th
 Turkestani 
Battalions joined Germans in the Operations.
493
 In the direction to Astrakhan, 450
th
, 
782
nd
 and 811
th
 Turkestani Battalions were stationed under the command of the 16
th
 
Panzer Grenadier Division for a possible march into Central Asia.
494
  
                                                             
484
 Fall Blau was a continuation of Operation Barbarossa, conducted in the South of Eastern Front 
between June 28, 1942 until November 1942. German Army faced the strongest Russian 
resistance in Stalingrad and the Axis forces retreated from Caucasus.   
485 S.P. MacKenzie, The Second World War in Europe, 2nd edition (Harlow: Pearson Education, 
2009), pp. 66-67. 
486 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 55.  
487 Littlejohn, p. 252; Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8.  
488 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8. Tuapse is on the northeastern shore of the Black Sea, North of 
Sochi. 
489 Sukhumi is the capital of today‟s Abkhazia. See, Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8.  
490 Nalchik is the capital of today‟s Kabardino-Balkar Republic.  
491 Mozdok is a city in the North of today‟s Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. 
492 The Roman numbers refer to serial number, and the Arabic numbers refer to division number. 
See, Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8. 
493 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8.  
494 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 8. 
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From the accounts of Baymirza Hayit and legionnaires, who were sent to 
Caucasian front in November 1942 and April 1943, it is also understood that they 
were actively involved in the operations. These operations were both anti-partisan 
and regular army operations. Some of the legionnaires were heavily wounded while 
some others were killed in the front. For those died, ceremonies were held in the 
legion headquarters, during which also the anthem of Turkestan was played.
495
 The 
wounded soldiers were awarded with medals.
496
  
The special purpose units of Caucasian peoples, on the other hand, had two 
duties: first group of them set up in Caucasus as fighting units. Second group was 
parachuted behind the Red Army lines to organize diversion and sabotage 
operations.
497
 By doing this, Germans aimed to provoke at least some of the 
Caucasian peoples‟ uprising against the Soviet Union.  
Other special commando units were those of First Lieutenant Heinz Lange 
and Lieutenant Moritz. Their commandos were dropped with parachutes over 
Chechnya. The operation was named as Unternehmen Schamil, continued between 
August and December 1942. For three months, they fought against the Red Army as 
partisans. They had been so successful in the fighting that the Soviets had to 
dispatch a full army corps to the region. Many Chechens joined them, but a full-
fledged uprising could not be triggered.
498
 On the other hand, the above-mentioned 
                                                             
495 See appendix for the anthem.   
496 Hayit wrote in his article that this ceremony was held in April 16, 1943, in the presence of Veli 
Kayyum Han and the legion commanders (Hauptmann Ernicke) at the headquarters of the 789th 
Turkestani Battalion. Hayit quoted in his article about the memoirs of Q. Qolıq, Tacıbay, 
Xalıakbar B. Oğlı, Marufcan, Abcalıl Rustam, Ataxan, Pişpekli Alımbek oğlı (names as in the 
original article). See, Baymirza Hayit, “Başlığımız Legionçılar Arasıda: Milliy Legion – Milliy 
häräkätdä,” Millij Türkistan (May 15, 1943, Vol. 19-20), pp. 9-29. 
497 Littlejohn, p. 251. 
498 Brockdorff, p. 248.  
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land-fighting units of the Caucasian formations suffered heavy losses against the 
Red Army, especially in the battles along the Terek River.
499
    
The Caucasian peoples proved themselves as distinguished fighters.
500
 As an 
example, the Sonderverband Bergmann defeated 800 men strong Georgian Red 
Army division in the Caucasus front in the summer of 1942. After that, some 
Georgian Red Army soldiers switched to the German side.
501
 After the German 
retreat from the Caucasus in January 1943, they were reorganized into three 
battalions. The Wehrmacht sent the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Battalions to defend the Crimea on 
November 17, 1943. The 2
nd
 Azerbaijani battalion contributed to the suppression of 
the uprising in Warsaw as late as in August 1944.
502
 
After Hitler ordered the transfer of the Eastern Legions from the Eastern 
Front, most of them were sent to France.
503
 The Turkestani soldiers on the German 
side were seriously tested against the Allied Forces in January 1944. The 162
nd
 
Infantry Division met the enemy on the battlefield between Trieste, Pola and Fiume 
in Italy on the shore of the Adriatic Sea. The unit could not meet the 
expectations.
504
 
As the administrative center of five regiments of Eastern Troops at the 
Western Front, on February 1, 1944, the Freiwilligen-Ost Stamm Division 
(Volunteer-East Cadre Division) was formed in Lyonnais, France. Regiments were 
composed of three battalions each. These regiments were designated to supply the 
battalions of the Eastern Legions at the front.
505
 The Freiwilligen Stamm Regiment 
                                                             
499 Littlejohn, p. 251. 
500 Brockdorff, p. 248. 
501 Neulen, p. 324. 
502 Neulen, p. 324. 
503 See below for the reasons of the transfer.   
504 Neulen, pp. 330-331.  
505 Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 24.  
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Nr. 1, composed of Turkestani, Georgian, North Caucasian legionnaires, was 
stationed in Castres. In Macon, the Freiwilligen Stamm Regiment Nr. 3 was 
stationed, which “supplied replacements for the 162nd Infantry Division.”506   
The Turkestani troops in Europe took active part in the combats against the 
Allied Forces during Normandy landings in mid-1944. For the defense of Lorient in 
France, the Eastern troops were used as coast guards and for other services.
507
       
 
7.4 Daily Life in the Legions 
The Turkestanis constituted the strongest contingent of all Eastern Peoples 
in the German Army with more than one hundred and eighty thousand men in 132 
units by 1944.
508
 This required an overwhelming organization of a propaganda 
department, led by twenty seven leading propagandists. Hoffmann states that a 
minimum number of 653 propagandists worked under them. For propaganda in the 
legions, three newspapers, thirteen political manuscripts were published. 
Furthermore, 705 instructions booklets and guidelines for propaganda were issued, 
52 propaganda lessons were held, and 118 different flyers were composed.
509
   
Not only German, but also Russian propaganda prevailed in the daily life of 
the legionnaires. In some of the publications of the Muslims, some authors openly 
stated that their nationality policy was close to the Bolshevik ideology, rather than 
                                                             
506 After June 1944, this regiment supplied only Ukrainian volunteers. Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern 
Legions, p. 24. The other regiments and their locations in France were: Divisional headquarters in 
Lyonnais (various nationalities), military school for the volunteer units in Lyonnais (various 
nationalities), Freiwilligen Stamm Regiment Nr. 2 in Mende (Volga Tatars, Azerbaijanis, 
Armenians; after April 1944 only Russian and Ukrainian volunteers; after June 1944 only 
Ukrainian volunteers), Freiwilligen Stamm Regiment Nr. 4 in Namur (Russian and Ukrainian; 
after June 1944 only Ukrainian volunteers), Freiwilligen Stamm Regiment Nr. 5 in Langres 
(Cossacks). See, Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 24.   
507 Neulen, p. 331.  
508 Hayit gives the number as 181,402. See Hayit, Turkestan im Herzen Euroasiens, p. 103.  
509 Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, pp. 134-135; Neulen, p. 328. 
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the German one. Germans did not tolerate these ideas and liquidated these elements 
immediately.
510
    
The procedure followed by Germans to prepare the legioonaires to fight on 
their side worked as follows: Before gaining the official legionnaire status, the 
POWs in the camps were prepared for battles. Hüseyin İkram Han, a former officer 
of the Red Army in a German POW camp near Kraków reported that early in the 
morning they got physical training, then cleaning of the barracks. The latter was not 
a regular duty. Afterwards, they got military training on the barracks‟ yard for one 
to two hours. They did not use genuine rifles at the training, but sticks, with which 
they attacked on hides filled with straw. The candidates for legionnaires got a rest 
and then football game after lunch. At the camps, no continuous political 
propaganda was applied on them like at the Soviet barracks.
511
  The training in the 
legions was more complicated. 
Separate camps were established for the educated and former officers of Red 
Army. Lectures were given them by Germans living in the USSR and also “native 
Germans who had learned Russian.”512 The POWs got German language classes 
early in the morning. They were introduced German weapons and taught how to use 
them, after a while. The POWs were lectured politically, taking courses of the 
                                                             
510 One example had been published in the 3rd volume of the journal Türk Birliği (Union of Turks) by 
Şamaliyev. See the document from the Kampfbund der Turk-Tataren und Idel-Urals to SS-
Hauptamt Herrn Dr. Olzscha, January 3, 1945. NA, T-354/161/3807012; for the translation of the 
article in the journal, see, T-354/161/3807013; T-354/161/3807030; T-354/161/3807031;            
T-354/161/3807015; T-354/161/3807009; T-354/161/3807010; T-354/161/3807011. See appendix 
for a list of Muslims in the publishing business. 
511 The POW camp İkram Han reports of was called by the Turkestanis Kumlager because of the 
sand (kum, in Turkish) on the ground of the camp. He did not know the exact place of it. The 
POWs were transferred to a larger camp in Kraków afterwards. It is predictable that a training 
took place, at least in the most of the POW camps, before the Turkestanis became legionnaires. 
See, İkram Han, p. 113-114. 
512 Crane, p. 91. 
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history of Central Asia. Sometimes, Veli Kayyum Han also appeared at the 
lectures.
513
   
The religious commitments of the legionnaires were taken into consideration 
by the Germans as well. They got an imam in the military units. In some of them, 
imams fulfilled the position of platoon leader (Zugführer) at the same time.514 
Legionnaires paid Imams ten Reichmarks “every ten days.”515 Muhammed Emin el-
Hüseyni, Mufti of Jerusalem,516 visited the camps of the Muslims and encouraged 
them for the holy war against the “infidel.” Unlike in the POW camps, the 
legionnaires got political training as well at the legion barracks, at the end of which 
they received their “national banner.”517 An oath was sworn by the legionnaires, in 
which they openly said that the legionnaires were fighting against Bolshevism, and 
would be loyal to Adolf Hitler.
518
  
Like it had been by the first volunteer formations or Hiwis, the uniforms of 
the legionnaires became a specific issue for the German high command. Since the 
legions were more complicated official bodies, the issue went beyond uniforms: the 
soldiers had to be equipped, armed and trained in order to fight against the Soviet 
Union under the ranks of the Wehrmacht. However, the official plans of the German 
authorities and practice differed from each other considerably. The legionnaires 
                                                             
513 Crane, p. 92. 
514 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 52; Crane, pp 100-101.  
515 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 52. 
516 El-Hüseyni had became the head of the Islamisches Zentral-Institut zu Berlin e.V. (Islamic 
Central-Institute in Berlin), which was established on December 12, 1942. He introduced himself 
to Göbbels as being the leader of 400 million Arabs and an enemy of Jews, English and 
Bolsheviks. He was paid by the Foreign Office 90,000 Reichsmarks monthly. Seidler, p. 266.    
517 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 53. 
518 Baymirza Hayit states in one of his articles that the Turkestani legionnaires swore on Hitler and 
German people as well. Hayit, “Türkistan Legionında Milliy Propağandamız,” in Milli Türkistan 
Hürriyet Davası: “Milli Türkistan” Mecmuasında Bildirilgan Fikirler (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür 
Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004), p. 18. See appendix for the oath. Williamson, p. 59. 
122 
 
used both originally German weapons and the captured equipment from the Red 
Army during the war. The uniforms they wore were worse in quality than the ones 
worn by the German soldiers. Also, like it had been by the Hiwis, they carried a 
special insignia on the uniforms.
519
  
In the above-mentioned instructions of the April 24, 1942, it was foreseen 
that the legionnaires should wear the famous “field gray,” the official German 
uniform. However, the practice again diverged from this. Although the non-Russian 
legionnaires were given German uniforms, a difference from the regular ones could 
clearly be seen. Nevertheless, one can say that the ethnically non-Russians were 
higher in the hierarchy than the Russians, Byelorussians and the Ukrainians, in the 
eyes of the German officers. This is because they were given the right to carry the 
Hoheitsabzeichen (emblem) on their shoulders, like the Cossacks in the Wehrmacht.   
The issue of the badges of the ranks was another issue that engaged the 
German commanders. The badges and the chevrons of the legionnaires were drawn 
in such a manner that it was impossible to compare the ranks with the ones of the 
Wehrmacht. The ranks of the legionnaire officers did not give them place among the 
official ranks (Dienstrang) of the Wehrmacht. These ranks were only for official 
positions (Dienststellung).
520
 The authority of the legionnaire officers and NCOs 
were weakened. They had no commanding rights over the German officers ranking 
below them. This resulted with common severe strives.
521
     
                                                             
519 Mühlen, p. 54. See appendix for illustrations.  
520 The ranks carried by the legionnaire officers were: Stellvertretende Gruppenführer, 
Gruppenführer, Stellvertretende Zugführer, Zugführer, and (from June 2, 1942 onwards) 
Kompanieführer. An exact comparison with the US, British or even today‟s German Army ranks 
is almost impossible, therefore the ranks are given in original German categorization. Hoffmann, 
Die Ostlegionen, p. 35. 
521 Mende, “Erfahrungen...”, pp. 28-29. 
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Also, all legionnaires were carrying on their right shoulders their national 
legion insignias. On the first version of Turkestan Legion‟s insignia, taking into 
account the wishes of the volunteers, the Shah-i Zinda mosque was portrayed with 
“Biz Alla Bilen (We are with God)” and “Turkistan” scripts on it. On another 
version of the Turkestan Legion‟s insignia, again over the Shah-i Zinda mosque, 
wrote “Tanri Biz Menen! (God with us!)” and “Turkistan.”522 
The personnel in the Eastern Legions were ordered to be composed of seven 
to twenty five per cent German soldiers. In practice, the ratio reached to maximum 
fifteen per cent. The legionnaire officers were planned to be trained in German war 
academies. Here, again the practice and plans differed: only five Caucasian 
volunteers of the Sonderverband Bergmann graduated from the War Academy in 
Dresden. This effort was not to be repeated again. Instead, to train officers and 
NCOs, the German authorities strove for the creation of the seminars special for the 
“volunteers.” These efforts had been subject for severe criticism, on the ground that 
they were tentative, conducted with a hesitation and based on German appraisal 
methods.
523
  
While their counterparts in the Red Army considerably lacked arms and 
equipment, each of the armed Eastern Legion Battalions possessed three anti-tank 
guns (45 millimeters), fifteen light and heavy mortars, fifty two light and heavy 
machine guns, rifles and sub-machine guns.
524
   
The battalions of the Turkestan Legion in Legionowo was preparing for 
battle by marching and physical training every day. The legionnaires got rations 
                                                             
522 The version of the insignia with the script “Tanri biz menen!” was published in German journal 
Signal, in December 1943. See, Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 7. See appendices for the insignias 
of Turkestan, Azerbaijani and Caucasian Legions and Turkestani Waffen-SS units.  
523 Mende, “Erfahrungen...”, p. 29. 
524 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 5 
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much more than they did in the POW camps. They received salaries too: during 
their stay in Poland, they were paid 24 Zlots per month. During the departure to the 
front, the soldiers got 12.5 Reichsmarks per ten days.
525
  
At the end of June 1942, when the 452
nd
 Turkestan Battalion was sent from 
Legionowo to Jedlina, its personnel were dressed like German soldiers. They were 
in dark green uniforms, black boots, and field caps. In order to be distinguished 
from the German soldiers, however, on their blouses they carried dark blue 
buttonholes. Their shoulder straps were also colored, and bordered with white 
materials.
526
 
In Jedlina, tactical exercises were conducted by the legionnaires. Every day, 
shooting practices with rifles were done.
527
 The legionnaires sometimes participated 
in sports events, such as running, sprint and other athletic events. The legion teams 
of different nationalities played football against each other as well.
528
     
For the wounded and disabled legionnaires, a medical centre was established 
in Kielce. However, there were no German doctors and no instruments for 
treatment. Turkic doctors worked there. Their demands for implants were turned 
down by the German authorities on the ground that they were preserved for the 
German soldiers exclusively.
529
      
The religious rituals and needs of Turkic legionnaires in the German Army 
and the Waffen-SS were not omitted by the German authorities. For instance, a 
                                                             
525 G. N. Vzvarova, p. 41. 
526 Vzvarova, p. 41. 
527 The shooting practies were done with two to five rifle cartridges per training. See, Vzvarova,      
p. 41. 
528 Hayit, “Türkistan Legionında Milliy Propağandamız,” p. 19. 
529 Even wood was not provided for the legionnaires to cut implants from them, on the ground that 
the wood was necessary for the building airplanes. Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 137.   
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report of the “SS and Police High Command” in Eastern Krakow530 to the SS Main 
Office in Berlin stated that the Muslims in the Turkic units could sacrifice 
animals.
531
  
In Dresden, a religious seminar was opened on November 26, 1944.
532
 
German propaganda claimed that the only great power on the world, which did not 
oppress Muslims, was Germany.
533
 Mehmet Emin Resulzade decided to come from 
Wien to work as a teacher at the religious seminar, after consulting with                     
Prof. von Mende.
534
   
 
7.5 The National Turkestan Union Committee and Veli Kayyum Han 
Along with the establishment of the Eastern Legions, national committees of 
the various nationalities came into being. In practice, these committees had no 
authority over the non-Russian peoples and POWs. They were mainly founded for 
propaganda purposes. But as time went by, these institutions became “semi-
autonomous.” Some of them even behaved as “provisional governments,” although 
they got no such permission in theory.
535
    
When the World War II began, Veli Kayyum Han was in Berlin and Mustafa 
Çokay in Paris. Gestapo arrested both on June 22, 1941, the very day when the first 
                                                             
530 Höhere SS und Polizeiführer Ost Krakau. 
531 Miscellaneous SS Records: The Einwandererzentralstelle, Waffen-SS, and SS-Oberabschnitte. 
Washington: NA, Microcopy, T-354/161/3806954. 
532 Document of Amtsgruppe-D, Oststelle, “Zusammenfassung der Ansprache von SS-Brigadeführer 
Schellenberg.” Berlin, November 29, 1944. NA, T-175/162/2695610. 
533 Speech of SS-Brigadier Schellenberg for “Eastern Turkic Newspaper.” NA, T-175/162/2695609.  
Full speech delivered in the opening ceremony on November 26, 1944. NA, T-175/162/1695611; 
T-175/162/1695612; T-175/162/1695613; T-175/162/1695614; T-175/162/1695615. 
534 Document of Der Reichsführer-SS, SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office) – Amtsgruppe D, 
“Rücksprache mit Professor von Mende,” Berlin, October 12, 1944. NA, T-175/162/2695662. 
535 Littlejohn, p. 250.  
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guns fired at the Eastern Front. Also, all the non-Russian émigrés were arrested at 
the same day.
536
  
After Veli Kayyum Han was released, he received a letter from Maria 
Çokayeva.537 Thereupon, he contacted Gerhard von Mende, reached to Paris and 
facilitated the release of Çokay.538 In July 1941, Veli Kayyum and Çokay went to 
Berlin. It would be a mistake to say that there was a “sense of togetherness” among 
the émigré Turks at the time being. For instance, a Turkestan nationalist, Çokay was 
not in good terms with the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin Hüsrev Gerede and 
Ahmet Temir.
539
 However, one can say that many of the Turks and Turkestan 
nationalists became hopeful about the fate of Turkestan and its independence.  
Çokay and Veli Kayyum learned in mid-August that Germans held the 
Turkestanis as POWs. With the Caucasians, they got permission to visit the POW 
camps at the end of August. Çokay went to Hannover with the Caucasians, while 
Veli Kayyum went to Suwałki, Poland with a German officer.540 In December 1941, 
Mustafa Çokay caught typhus in one of the POW camps and died shortly 
afterwards.
541
 Here, it should be added that there was not enough evidence to say 
that Çokay was willing to work with Germans. Though he joined the works in the 
POW commissions, it should be remembered that he was arrested by the Germans 
and “forced” for collaboration. After two visits to the POW camps, he died.   
                                                             
536 Veli Kayyum Han, “Mustafa Caqajni Eslas,” p. 22 
537 Maria J. Çokayeva, Mustafa Çokay’ın Hatıraları (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı, 2000),              
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540 Veli Kayyum Han, “Mustafa Caqajni Eslas…” p. 23. 
541 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, p. 529. The report of the Viktoria Hospital in 
Schönenberg, Berlin reported that Mustafa Çokay died of typhus on December 27, 1941. For a 
copy of the document, See, Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, p. 504. 
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With the help of Rosenberg‟s “goodwill,” Veli Kayyum Han achieved the 
leadership of the Turkestani nationalists and the Turkestanis on the German side. 
He also got the support of the Gerhard von Mende at the Ostministerium for his 
political aims, which were unification and independence of Turkestanis. Obviously, 
he got a special place among the non-Russians and eastern émigrés, since he got the 
permission to found the first “National Union Committee” under the auspices of 
German authorities.
542
 Also, in July 1941, Georg Leibbrandt, who was on good 
terms with Veli Kayyum Han, was brought to the head of Political Branch at the 
newly founded Ostministerium. This, combined with his good relations with Prof. 
von Mende, provided Kayyum Han for a privileged place among other national 
representatives.
543
    
Veli Kayyum Han gained the permission for the foundation of a 
Turkestanische Mittelstelle (Turkestan Center) from Gerhard von Mende after long 
negotiations since the beginning of 1942. The Milli Türkistan Birlik Komitesi or 
Nationalturkestanische Einheitskomitee (National Turkestan Union Committee) was 
founded in August 1942, as a result of these undertakings of Veli Kayyum Han. The 
Committee was composed of the former soldiers of the Red Army and had the claim 
to represent the five nations of Central Asia, which were: Uzbeks, Kazaks, Kirgizs, 
and Turkmens. The Ostministerium financially supported it.  
The headquarters of the Committee was in the “residential section of 
Berlin,” in an apartment, with some other “liberation organizations and exile 
governments.”544 The Committee also possessed a broadcasting department in 
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another part of Berlin,
545
 as well as a war department and an academic department. 
Hayit stated that the Committee was planned to be the future Turkestani 
government.
546
  
What needs especially to be stated here was that the independence plans of 
Turkestan did not bother the German Lebensraum. Also, the overly anti-Russian 
attitude of the Milli Türkistan Birlik Komitesi could be set as a good example for 
other nations of the Soviet Union in favor of Germany.
547
 On the other hand, the 
Committee was not given an independent status despite the endeavors of Veli 
Kayyum Han.  
The preparations for the Kurultay (General Assembly) of the Milli Türkistan 
Birlik Komitesi began by May 1944. Members from the Committee were sent to all 
Turkestani troops and workers‟ battalions. Delegates were selected from among 
them.
548
 On June 8, 1944, all delegates convened in Wien. Personnel from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Germany, Ministry for the East, and high-ranking 
officers were also present at the Assembly.
549
 
The poem named Gözel Fergana (Beautiful Fergana) of the Turkestani poet 
Çolpan was adopted as Gözel Türkistan (Beautiful Turkestan) to Turkestan as 
whole. This was read at the beginning of the Assembly by the delegates. According 
to the will of the legionnaires, the Gözel Türkistan poem was accepted as the 
national anthem of Turkestan.
550
  
                                                             
545 Crane, p. 119.  
546 Hayit, “Biznin Istıqlal,” pp. 7-12. 
547 Seidler, p. 278. 
548 İkram Han, p. 129. 
549 İkram Han, p. 133. 
550 See Appendix for the full text of the poem Gözel Türkistan. İkram Han, p. 133. 
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Hitler sent congratulatory message to the Kurultay with a telegraph to Veli 
Kayyum Han. The Assembly ended on June 8, 1944. It elected seventy 
representatives to the “National Parliament.” With the end of the Assembly, 
German government recognized Milli Türkistan Birlik Komitesi and Türkistan Milli 
Vakitli Hükümeti (Turkestan National Provisional Government). The Turkestan 
Legion became the official Army of Turkestan according to German authorities.
551
  
 
7.5.1 Adlon Conference 
A conference, convened in the Adlon Hotel in Berlin in the end of April 
1942, was an important milestone regarding the Caucasus, Turkestan and Turkey 
policies of Germany. Nicknamed as “Adloniade”, the conference was organized by 
Graf von der Schulenburg, the former German Ambassador to Moscow with 
participation of émigrés from the Soviet Union552 as well as from France, Romania 
and Turkey.
553
  
Here, the disagreement between the Ostministerium and the Auswärtiges 
Amt surfaced again. Rosenberg complained that the “Reich Minister for Foreign 
Affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories.”554 He said to Hitler 
on May 8, 1942 that the Foreign Ministry formed a large Eastern Committee and 
despite the protests of the Rosenberg‟s Ministry, they called various émigrés to take 
part in it. Rosenberg read to Hitler the list of the émigrés staying at the Adlon Hotel. 
He further stated that two of the participants were well-known espionage agents and 
                                                             
551 İkram Han, p. 135. 
552 Seidler, p. 278.  
553 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, p. 517. 
554 Document No. 1520-PS, “Notes about a discussion with the Führer at the Führer Headquarters,” 
May 8, 1942, the Avalon Project. 
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it was risky to convene all these men in Berlin. The Führer listened to him “in 
surprise.”555  
Participants of the Conference were of special importance. From Azerbaijan, 
Mehmet Emin Resulzade, leader of Musavat; Halil Has Mehmet, who was known to 
be an opponent to Resulzade and former Minister; Fuat Emircan, a friend of Halil 
Has Mehmet; Mir Yakup Mehtiyev, Northern Caucasus Correspondent of the 
Promété Journal and a member of the Musavat movement, were invited. Said Şamil 
and the members of the Kavkaz movement Haydar Bammat and Alihan Kantemir 
represented the Northern Caucasus region. Also Georgian émigré leaders were 
present at the Conference.   
Nobody from the Crimea was officially invited to the conference. But the 
German attack already aroused hopes of the émigrés in Turkey. Cafer Seyidahmet 
Kırımer, the leader of the Crimean independence movement at the time, encouraged 
his two friends Edige Kırımal and Müstecip Ülküsal to go to Berlin. They arrived in 
Berlin on December 2, 1941, and the next day visited İdris Alimcan Bey, who 
worked at the German Foreign Ministry.
556
 At their meeting with von Mende under 
a cool atmosphere, they were informed that the Crimea was not properly invaded at 
that time and therefore not included to any Reichskommissariat. But it was a strong 
possibility that it would be included to the Ukraine Reichskommissariat.
557
 
                                                             
555 Document No. 1520-PS, “Notes about a discussion with the Führer at the Führer Headquarters,” 
May 8, 1942, the Avalon Project. 
556 With the help of İdris Alimcan Bey, Müstecip Ülküsal and Edige Kırımal contacted to Werner 
Otto von Hentig, former head of the Orientabteilung (Branch for the Orient) of the Auswärtiges 
Amt (until 1939), and Major of the 11st Army (Krim). See, Bestand: ED 113 Hentig, Werner Otto 
von, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, München – Berlin for detailed information; Fritz Grobba, 
delegate of the Auswärtiges Amt for Arab Countries; Gerhard von Mende; Ahmet Temir; Mufti of 
Jerusalem Emin el Hüseyni; and Turkish Ambassador to Berlin Hüsrev Gerede. See Ülküsal,    
pp. 282-302. 
557 Despite their demands to go to the Crimea, Mende told them that the Tatars were regarded there 
as “wild like it had been in the thirteenth century” and the political situation was not in favor of 
them, therefore they could not go to the Crimea. Ülküsal, pp. 292-294. 
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 From Turkey, Zeki Velidi Togan was invited, but he could not get the 
permission to leave Turkey. Nuri Killigil, the brother of famous Enver Pasha, who 
was also in Berlin at the time, contacted personally to the émigré leaders 
participating at the Conference and gave them advices about the strategy to be 
followed.
558
The aim of the conference was to coordinate the separatist trends among 
the émigré communities. Representing the Turkestan nationalists, Veli Kayyum 
Han had the leading role in the speeches.
559
  
Here, Gerhard von Mende was sympathetic to the non-Russian elements of 
the Soviet Union. Like it had been about the Ostpolitik in general; disagreement 
about Turkey policies of the Germans became apparent in this conference.
560
    
 
7.6 Publications and Literature of Turkestanis 
First initiatives to publish a newspaper for the Turkestanis and Muslims in 
the Waffen-SS began early in March 1944. The first volume of the 
Ostmuselmanische-SS-Zeitung (Eastern Muslim SS-Newspaper) appeared in April 
1944 as an extra edition for the newspaper Jani [Yeni] Türkestan (New 
Turkestan).
561
 Herrmann wrote to the SS-Main Office that in accordance with the 
proposal of Veli Kayyum Han, the name of the newspaper should be “[The 
newspaper of the] Türkestanisches SS-Regiment,” instead of “Eastern Muslim SS-
Regiment” for the sake of the cooperation of Turkestanis.562 In July 1944, the 
Turkestani officers of the Eastern Muslim Waffen-SS Regiment demanded the 
                                                             
558 Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi , pp. 518-519.  
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560 Dallin, pp. 231-238. 
561 Document of the Reichsführer-SS, SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office).  “Ostmuselmanische-SS-
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newspaper to be extended and extra editions for Azerbaijanis and Crimean Tatars to 
be published nearby.
563
 Thus, works for the publication of an “Eastern Turkic 
newspaper” began in early September 1944.564   
By January 1945, two Turkic newspapers were published: Türk Birliği 
(Union of Turks) and Hücum (Attack). Türk Birliği, which was started to be 
published on November 25, 1944, was given off in two editions: Kırım (the Crimea) 
and Idel-Ural.
565
 The Edition Turkestan was added to these later.
566
 Hücum was an 
alternative for the Azerbaijani newspaper, which was published in association with 
the Caucasian newspapers.  
The Türk Birliği got a four-page general part in five dialects of the 
Turkestani language.
567
 These were: “Turkestanish” [i.e. Uzbek], Volga-Tatar, 
Azerbaijani, Crimean Tatar and Chuvash languages.
568
 The title of the newspaper 
                                                             
563 This demand was signed by Azeri SS-Lieutenant Alekberli, Turkestani SS-Lieutenant Alimov and 
Crimean Tatar SS-Second Lieutenant Dayırskiy. See, “Zeitung des 1. Ostmuselmanischen SS-
Rgt.,” July 30, 1944, NA, T-175/162/2695683. 
564 Document of the SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office), Amtsgruppe-D. “Herausgabe der Osttürkischen 
Zeitung,” October 5, 1944.  NA, T-175/162/2695685; Meeting between Dr. Husten, Wynands, 
Sonnenfeld and Rahs at the Deutscher Verlag. “Osttürkisch [sic.] Zeitung,” Berlin, September 20, 
1944, NA, T-175/162/2695687, T-175/162/2695688. 
565 By December 2, 1944, the newspaper was published in two editions. Document of the 
Reichsführer-SS, SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office), Amtsgruppe-D. “Zeitung für den Osttürkischen 
Waffenverband der SS.” December 2, 1944.  NA, T-175/162/2695603 and T-175/162/2695604. 
566 The newspaper Türk Birliği had German and Turkic redactors. General Editor of the Journal was 
Wynands. Turkic redactors of the Journal were: Tınışbek (redactor for the general part of the 
newspaper); Karabaş (Redactor for the Edition Krim); Nigmati (Redactor for the Edition Idel-
Ural); Umari (Redactor for the Edition Turkestan); Kasiyev (Redactor for Azeri language). 
Nigmati was described as the “politically most trustful men in the newspaper.”  Document of SS-
Hauptamt (SS-Main Office) “Betr. Gegenwärtigen Zustand der Osttürkischen Zeitungen,” Berlin, 
January 4, 1945.  NA, T-175/162/2695588; NA, T-175/162/2695589; NA, T-175/162/2695590. 
Umari was described as an “undisciplined men, who had antipathy towards Veli Kayyum Han 
and Turkestan Committee. ” See, “Usbekischer Mitarbeiter für die türkestanische Zeitung des SS-
Hauptamtes, Umari, Nachkam.” Berlin, November 21, 1944. NA, T-175/162/2695597 and          
T-175/162/2695598.  
567 In the first volume of the Türk Birliği, the “Kurban Ayt (Feast of Sacrifice)” of the Muslims was 
congratulated. The Grand Mufti calls all Muslims for fight “for the just thing.” The Eastern 
Turkic people were called for fight against Bolshevism until full independence of Turkestan by 
the Redactor. See, “Zeitung für den Osttürkischen Waffenverband der SS.”                               
NA, T-175/162/2695603 and T-175/162/2695604. 
568 Document of the Reichsführer-SS, SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office), Amtsgruppe D, “Herausgabe 
einer Zeitung für den Osttürkischen Verband,” Berlin, November 9, 1944,                                  
NA, T-175/162/2695671, T-175/162/2695673. 
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stood between a wolf-head and a crescent-and-star.
569
 The general part was 
followed by the enclosures in different dialects.
570
 The language of literature had 
been a problem, which could not be resolved.
571
 Germans, it is understood, 
proposed formation of a “language commission,” which was also accepted by Veli 
Kayyum Han.
572
 The head of the commission Urasay would be in connection with 
Dr. Johannes Benzing.
573
    
In two meetings held on October 31 and December 9, 1944, the commission 
discussed with German authorities the alphabet and language to be used in the 
Turkic-newspapers. National Turkestan Union Committee expressed its objections 
to the alphabet and language. At the meeting, the report of Dr. Benzing was 
discussed, according to which it was necessary to use the Latin alphabet in the 
journal Türk Birliği. The participants all accepted the use of the Latin alphabet and 
“Turkestanish” as the language.574 However, especially the non-Turkestani 
redactors of the Türk Birliği found this language hard to understand.575  
                                                             
569 Document of Amtsgruppe D – Oststelle, “Titelkopf der osttürkischen Zeitung,” Berlin, October 
20, 1944, NA, T-175/162/2695667 and T-175/162/2695668. 
570 The title of the general part proposed by Prof. von Mende was “Türk Birliğinin Mecmuası 
(Journal of Turkish Union).” See, “Rücksprache mit Professor von Mende,”                                 
NA, T-175/162/2695662.This was changed to “Türk Birliğinin Gazetası (Newspaper of Turkish 
Union).” Under the title, it was written (with smaller fonts): “Şark Türk Birliği Silahlı SS-nin 
cengâver gazetası (Battle newspaper of the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiment).” “Türk” was 
used instead of  “Turk,” since the latter was used by the Russians. See, “Titelkopf der 
osttürkischen Zeitungen,” Berlin, October 23, 1944. NA, T-175/162/2695665. 
571 “Betr. Gegenwärtigen Zustand der Osttürkischen Zeitungen,” NA, T-175/162/2695588; Document 
of Amtsgruppe D – Oststelle, “Osttürkische Zeitung – Literatursprache,” Berlin, November 3, 
1944, NA, T-175/162/2695660 and Document of Amtsgruppe D – Oststelle, “Osttürkische 
Zeitung – Literatursprache,” Berlin, November 2, 1944, NA, T-175/162/2695661.  
572 Kayyum Han suggested Tınışbek (Kazak), Şirmat (Uzbek) and Anayar (Turkmen) for the 
commission. Document of the Reichsführer-SS, SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office), Amtsgruppe D, 
“Sprachkommission,” Berlin, December 12, 1944, NA, T-175/162/2695674. 
573 Benzing was the director of the Abteilung für Linguistik an der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Turkestan 
(Department for Linguistics at the Turkestan Workshop). The members of the commission 
became, on the orders of the SS-Main Office: Tatar Urasay (also head of the commission), 
Turkmen Kurban, Crimean Tatar Karabaş, Azeri Mahmedov, Kazak Tınışbek, Uzbek Şirmatov. 
See the document of the Reichsführer-SS, SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office), Amtsgruppe D, 
“Besprechung mit Herrn Urasai betreffend Sprachkommission,” Berlin, September 9, 1944,        
NA, T-175/162/2695699.   
574 The alphabet was used, according to Benzig, in Turkestan between 1928 and 1935.               
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Since the military situation in the Eastern Front changed, newspapers of the 
Eastern Turkic peoples were re-organized in January 1945.
576
 The main objective of 
the publications was set as to “raise the morale of the Turkic volunteers” and “win 
further volunteers.” The union of the Eastern Turks could only be an instrument in 
reaching the ultimate aim.
577
 The redaction and management of the newspapers 
were tried to be set directly under Waffen-SS influence.
578
     
German commanders also paid attention to the-non-humiliation of the 
Turkic volunteers, especially in the Waffen-SS. Fritz Rudolf Arlt
579
 particularly 
stated in one of his requests, that the SS-publications of the Germans should not hurt 
the “eastern peoples” and their committees.580 It can be said, on the other hand, that 
Turkestani authors were influenced by German propaganda and ideology. Contrary 
to common practice of blaming Russians only, Baymirza Hayit blamed in his 
articles the Jews along with the Russians for the current situation in Turkestan.
581
   
     
                                                                                                                                                                          
Protokoll No. 1 and Protokoll No. 2, NA, T-175/162/2695543; NA, T-175/162/2695551;                                      
NA, T-175/162/2695552.  
575
 “Betr. Gegenwärtigen Zustand der Osttürkischen Zeitungen,” NA, T-175/162/2695588. 
576 The newspaper was published and financed by the SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office). Political and 
redaction courses were held by the SS-Main Office as well.   
577 Document of SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office), Berlin, January 22, 1945. NA, T-175/162/2695579; 
NA, T-175/162/2695580; NA, T-175/162/2695581; NA, T-175/162/2695582;                              
NA, T-175/162/2695583. 
578 From the SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office) to the Deutscher Verlag (German Publication), Berlin, 
January 22, 1945. NA, T-175/162/2695584; NA, T-175/162/2695585; NA, T-175/162/2695586; 
NA, T-175/162/2695587. 
579 Fritz Rudolf Arlt (1912-2004) joined NSDAP and SA in 1932. In 1937, he became Höhere SS- und 
Polizeiführer (High SS and Police Leader) in Oberschleisen. The head of the SS-Hauptamt (SS-
Main Office) commissioned him for the establishment of Freiwilligen Leitstelle Ost (Volunteer-
Administration East) in June 1941.   
580 From Fritz Arlt to von Grote, March 19, 1945. Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief 
of the German Police. Washington: NA, Microcopy, T-175/162/2695538. 
581 Hayit, “Türkistanda Bloşevizimnin Yırtqıç Propagandası,” Millij Türkistan (December 15, 1942, 
Vol. 11), pp. 1-9. 
135 
 
7.7 Legionnaires Switching to the Side of the Red Army and Allies Again 
As stated above, “volunteering” was an important question for the 
recruitment to the legions. Some legionnaires were recruited against their will or 
they decided to join the ranks of Wehrmacht under harsh conditions of POW camps. 
Also, as Neulen stated, the legionnaires were insulted by the German soldiers. They 
were not counted as their counterparts. There had been cases, in which the 
“volunteers” were even used as “shelters” against the air bombings.582  
As a consequence, some of the legionnaires switched to the side of the Red 
Army again, if they found a chance to do so. The number of these occasions should 
not be exaggerated, since the total ratio of deserters from the volunteers of the 
Soviet Union was eight to ten per cent in 1943. This ratio decreased to two to three 
per cent in 1945.
583
 For instance, from the 781
st
 Turkestan Battalion, 43 soldiers 
changed sides second time in their military careers and went back to Soviet 
Army.
584
 Colonel Heinz Danko Herre would find out later on that the volunteers, 
who changed side, were 1,300 men, equivalent to 1.5 per cent of the all volunteers 
on German side.
585
 Germans disbanded the unreliable units. Alternatively, the 
combat units were made “labor-battalions” and used in constructing works.586  
Sometimes, the defection of the legionnaires was more organized. Some 
loyal former Red Army soldiers clandestinely prepared for a transfer of a whole unit 
to the Soviet side again. The attempt of 825
th
 Volga-Tatar Battalion in Vitebsk
587
 to 
switch sides in February 1943 resulted in success. In another case, on September 13, 
                                                             
582 Neulen, p. 329.  
583 Neulen, p. 330.  
584 In a battalion there were 800 to 1000 men. Thus, the soldiers, who switched side, corresponded to 
four to five per cent of total strength of the battalion.  
585 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 280.  
586 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 57. 
587 Vitebsk is a city in located in the north of today‟s Belarus. 
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1943, a Turkestan Battalion in Obolon
588
 killed its German commanders and 
soldiers of three companies. With their weapons and ammunition, they went over to 
Soviet side.
589
  
On September 13, 1943, the operation of German forces in Kursk failed. 
Himmler reported to Hitler that some Russian volunteers in the front proved 
“politically unreliable.”590 Hitler ordered Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the OKW, 
disbanding of all Russian units. A total number of 80,000 men would be unarmed at 
first phase. The personnel would be transported to France to work in the coal 
mines
591
 and as guards of railroads, camps and roads.
592
  
As a result, the Legions in Poland were disorganized at the end of 1943. 
Some of them were re-organized, and some of them were sent to West Europe, to 
other fronts, where they could not meet with their countrymen.
593
 On March 1, 
1944, the Oberbefehlshaber West (Commander-in-Chief in the West) reported over 
sixty thousand foreigners and members of Osttruppen under his authority. The units 
were stationed as far as possible from each other.
594
    
By the beginning of 1944, seventy two battalions were transported to 
France. Major General von Wartenberg took over the command of the units
595
 in 
Paris. Even the officer school in Marijampolė, Lithuania was transported to 
Conflans, France. All battalions would be included into German regiments as third 
                                                             
588 Obolon is a district of Kiev, today‟s capital of the Ukraine.  
589 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 60. 
590 Thorwald, Die Illusion, pp. 273-274.  
591 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 274. Hitler reduced the number to 50,000 men later on. Thorwald, Die 
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592 Schedule B / Vol. 8, Case 160, The Harvard Project, p. 21. 
593 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
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594 The exact number was 61,439. See, Neulen, p. 331.  
595 Kommando der Freiwilligenverbände beim Oberbefehlshaber West. 
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or fourth battalions, in order to “minimize their riskiness.” Also, Niedermayer left 
his place to Wartenberg.
596
    
The mutinies continued after the above-mentioned orders of Hitler as well. 
In late summer 1944, a unit composed of Kazaks and Kirgizs rebelled in Albania. 
They switched to Allied side.
597
  
 
7.8 Turkestanis in the Waffen-SS 
After the Eastern Troops in the German Army and their commanders were 
discredited, some of these displaced officers sought a second chance in the    
Waffen-SS for the continuation of the adventure with the Soviet POWs. One of such 
officers was Andreas Mayer-Mader. At the end of 1943, he was allowed to establish 
a Turkestani regiment from the POWs for the second time, this time under auspices 
of the Waffen-SS.
598
  
The Reichsführer-SS, Feld-Kommandostelle (SS-High Command, Field-
Headquarters), sent a request signed by Himmler himself to General Kurt Zeitzler, 
Chief of the Staff of the OKH at the time in November 1943. It stated that using the 
“Eastern Muslims,” to create a big formation with the 450th Infantry Battalion of 
Mayer-Mader and to train them politically was possible, so that the unit would be 
trustful in action.
599
   
                                                             
596 Thorwald, Die Illusion, pp. 304-306. In August 1944, because of Niedermayer‟s criticism of 
Hitler‟s Eastern politics, he was arrested by the Germans and tried for treason. He was released in 
May 1945, but arrested this time by the Soviets on the way home. He was sent to a Soviet labor 
camp and died in Vladimir in September 1948. See, Mühlen, p. 231.   
597 Neulen, pp. 331-332. 
598 Littlejohn, p. 253.  
599 The document was sent to Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Main Office for Defence), SS-Hauptamt 
(SS-Mainoffice), SS-Führungshauptamt (SS-Leadership Main Office). NA, T-175/21/2526502;    
T-175/21/2526503; T-175/21/2526507. 
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Mayer-Mader met with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem to ensure the spiritual 
legitimacy of the fight against the Russia and Bolshevism once again. Then, on 
December 14, 1943, he met with three Turkestani officers of the former 480
th
 
Turkestan Battalion.
600
 Mayer-Mader got “grand” plans in mind: he wanted to 
transport his division into Turkestan with planes in order to trigger a rebellion 
there.
601
 
The regiment of Mayer-Mader rebelled in March 1944.
602
 A document from 
the Reichsführer-SS dated January 31, 1944 stated that only five hundred Turkic 
people from the 450
th
 Infantry Battalion of Mayer-Mader were to be preserved as 
replacement units.
603
  
The SS already gathered some volunteers in France early 1944. These 
volunteers established a unit, named Freiwilligen-Stamm Regiment (Volunteer 
Cadre Division), made up of a headquarters staff, a school and five “Volunteer 
Cadre Regiments” of different nationalities from the Soviet Union.604 The 
Volunteer Cadre Regiment No.1 was sent to Neuhammer training camp in Germany 
on January 1, 1945.
605
 In this unit, I/370
th
 Turkestan Battalion, II/4
th
 Georgian 
Battalion, I/9
th
 Georgian Battalion, II/4
th
 North Caucasian Battalion were included. 
These were disbanded in February 1944 and sent to Southern France, to Castres. 
This unit was then included into the newly created Kaukasischer Waffen-Verbände 
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602 Neulen, p. 332.  
603 From Der Reichsführer-SS, Feld-Kommandostelle, Persönlicher Stab to Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 
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der SS (Caucasian Armed SS Brigade), under establishment in Paluzza.
606
 The 
commander of the Caucasian SS Brigade was Arved Theurmann.
607
 
The Volunteer Cadre Regiment No.2 was consisted of 804
th
 and 806
th
 
Azerbaijani Battalions, which were sent to reinforce the 162
nd
 Infantry Division 
later, II/9
th
 Armenian Battalion, 832
nd
, 833
rd
 and 834
th
 Volga-Tatar Battalions. 
These battalions were disbanded in February 1944 and sent to Mende, France.
608
 
The personnel of the Volunteer Cadre Regiment No.3 came from 792
nd
, 794
th
, 839
th
, 
841
st 
and 842nd Turkestani Battalions. These battalions were also disbanded and 
sent to Southern France, to Macon in February 1944.
609
 
Since Germans were in a difficult position and withdrawing from the 
occupied territories in 1944, the political or propaganda motivation of the recruiting 
of the Soviet nationals in the German ranks became less meaningful. The urgent 
need for manpower in this situation made German authorities recruit men to their 
side. The political eligibility of the POWs for the Nazi ideology was no more 
questioned. An order from the SS Main Office dated January 19, 1944 reflects this 
policy of the German military and political authorities.
610
  
Systematic propaganda materials directed to the Turkic legionnaires were 
used to minimize the desertion of the Turkic personnel. In one of the propaganda 
notes, the German authorities claimed that the enemies of the Germans tried all 
                                                             
606 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 62. 
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cadre of the Kaukasischer Waffen-Verbände der SS.  
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possibilities to divide Muslims from Germans. The Muslims could only gain their 
independence in Asia, if Germany would be victorious in the war.
611
  
The Ostministerium was also supporting the recruitment of the Turkestani 
and other Muslim POWs into the SS ranks. A representative from this Ministry, 
Alfred Erdmann, went to Romania on May 25, 1944. He met with a representative 
of SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office) in Bucharest. The aim of the meeting was to 
ascertain the exact number of the volunteers for the Waffen-SS.
612
      
In July 1944, Schareck, an officer in General Staff,
613
 told Herre that the 
unarmed and disbanded Eastern Legions could be resurrected, if its personnel were 
assembled under SS organization.
614
 On July 10, 1944, Herre went to Köstring and 
disclosed his plans regarding the SS.
615
  
It would be Dr. Fritz Rudolf Arlt, a high-ranking officer of the Waffen-SS,
616
 
who took the initiative of reorganizing the Eastern Legions under the banner of the 
SS. He had an appointment with Berger in Berlin, in SS-Hauptamt (SS Main Office), 
where he made his plans open. In July 1944, Arlt was brought to the position 
Freiwilligen-Leitselle Ost (Volunteer-Administration East).”617  
The Amtsgruppe D (Department D) of the SS-Hauptamt (SS-Main Office) 
had already lost its “Germanic” character at that time. The first department (Amt I) 
was the “Europäische Mittelstelle (European Center).” The second was 
                                                             
611 NA, T-354/161/3806981; T-354/161/3806982 and T-354/161/3806983. 
612 NA, T-354/161/3806805. 
613 Schareck was Herre‟s Abwehroffizier (lit. defense officer; third-ranking officer in general staff in 
the German Army). 
614 Thorwald, Die Illusion, pp. 309-310. 
615 Thorwald, Die Illusion, pp. 313-314. 
616 Arlt was SS-Sturmbannführer (SS-Major). He was promoted to SS-Obersturmbannführer (SS-
Lieutenant Colonel) later on. 
617 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 318. 
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“Germanische Mittelstelle (Germanic Center).” What was new in the Waffen-SS 
was the Freiwilligen-Leitstelle Ost.
618
  
Arlt contacted the representatives of the national groups, including also Veli 
Kayyum Han. He discussed about the disbanded Turkestani units in the Wehrmacht 
and the creation of a Turkestani SS Division with Kayyum Han. Afterwards, 
Kayyum Han negotiated this issue with Köstring and Voelkel.619 He achieved 
nothing.
620
  
The 450
th
, 480
th
 and 94
th
 Turkestan Battalions were decided to be disbanded. 
At first, the 94
th
 Turkestan Battalion was disbanded on December 6, 1943. The 
450
th
 Battalion was mustered out on December 18, which was followed by the 480
th
 
Battalion. The personnel of these units were transferred to Waffen-SS ranks.  
At the same time, Mayer-Mader recruited men from the POWs and workers 
in the German camps. Consequently, enough men were assembled to raise three 
battalions for the 1. Ostmusselmanische SS-Regiment (1
st
 Eastern Muslim SS 
Regiment). The headquarters of the division in formation were in Lublin, Poland. 
The training camp was in Trawniki, Poland.
621
 
After the situation at the Eastern Front worsened for Germans, the authority 
of the SS grew. The sixth department
622
 of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA 
in short, (the Main Office for Reich Security) organized a “Turkestan work group,” 
led by SS-Hauptsturmführer (SS-Captain) Reiner Olzscha. This group was, along 
with other similar “work groups,” was commissioned for recruiting soldiers from 
                                                             
618 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 318. 
619 Voelkel was the successor of Herre.  
620 Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 324. 
621 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 76.  
622 The Amt VI – Ausland (Department Nr. VI – Abroad) was the foreign intelligence service of 
RSHA, led by Walter Schellenberg.  
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POWs. The opening of the above-mentioned religious seminar in Dresden on 
November 26, 1944 was in connection with these efforts.
623
 
 
7.8.1 The Eastern Muslim Waffen-SS Regiment 
The former Eastern Troops under command of the German Army were 
proposed to be transferred under Waffen-SS command by the establishment of the 
Muslim SS Division Neu Turkistan (New Turkestan). For this, Mayer-Mader was 
transferred to the Waffen-SS in January 1944 and promoted to                                
SS-Obersturmbannführer (SS-Lieutenant-Colonel).624 Personnel from the 782nd, 
786
th
, 790
th
, 791
st
 Turkestani, the 818
th
 Azerbaijani and 831
st
 Volga-Tatar Battalions 
were transferred to the Waffen-SS under the responsibility of Mayer-Mader.
625
 Also, 
the 450
th
, 480
th
 and I/94
th
 Turkestani Battalions were disbanded and some of their 
personnel joined to the newly established unit.
626
 The Turkic volunteers and 
workers in Germany were also included in this unit, based in Yuratishki, 
Belorussia.
627
 It was exclusively used against partisans beginning from February 
1944.
628
  
In early February 1944, the regiment was dispatched to Belorussia for 
training and anti-partisan fighting purposes.
629
 Mayer-Mader could not completely 
ensure discipline in the regiment. For instance, in this month, twenty three Turkic 
                                                             
623 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
pp. 78-79. 
624 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 76; Neulen, p. 332.   
625 Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” 
p. 81. 
626 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 76. 
627 The document regarding the transport of the Muslim volunteers from the working camp Strasshof 
was a clear evidence of this. Until May 15, 1944, the number of the applicants for volunteering 
reached to 520.  NA, T-354/161/3806817 and T-354/161/3806818.  
628 Bishop, p. 179; Rikmenspoel, pp. 192-193. 
629 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 77. 
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legionnaires in Mayer-Mader‟s unit deserted. The OKH requested the disbanding of 
the “illegally recruited personnel” from the OKH to the 790th Turkestani Infantry 
Battalion.
630
 As a result, some of the Turkestani officers went to trial and were 
punished.
631
  
After the death of Mayer-Mader, Captain Billig was brought to the 
commanding post of the regiment on March 28, 1944. The dissidents in the unit 
began to be more active from then on. The events turned to a “mutiny” in the 
regiment, resulting in the shooting of seventy eight men. This led to replacement of 
Billig by Captain Hermann on April 27, 1944.
632
  
In May 1944, Germans still endeavored to recruit Muslims to the Waffen-SS. 
On May 5, 1944, SS Major Karl Leib demanded propaganda material from the SS 
Main Office for the recruitment of Turkestanis from the POW camps in Norway.
633
  
Muñoz states that Herrmann could only remain in this post for a week. The 
regiment was sent back to first Łomża,634 then to Białystok.635 In his telegraph of 
July 11, 1944 from Białystok, SS-Rottenführer (Corporal) Eskender Dairski stated 
that he was searching the 1
st
 Eastern Muslim SS Regiment. He wrote that Herrmann 
was dead and his men were marching to Łomża.636 Thus it is arguable that 
Herrmann should have commanded the regiment until his death indeed. However, it 
                                                             
630 “Oberkommando des Heeres , Chef H. Rüst u BdE to SS-Führungshauptamt” on February 2, 
1944, NA, T-354/161/3806782. 
631 Mayer-Mader was reported to be “killed in action” against the partisans. Littlejohn and Neulen 
claimed that there is a strong suspicion that “he was shot on orders of the SS command.” See, 
Littlejohn, p. 253 and Neulen, p. 332. Muñoz, on the other hand, claims that he was shot by a 
partisan sniper in March 1944 near Minsk. Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 77.  
632 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 77. 
633 An SS-Hauptamt, Amtsgruppe D, Berlin – Grunewald. “Anwerbung von Turkestanern,”           
NA, T-354/161/3806827. 
634 Łomża is a town in the north-east of today‟s Poland.  
635 Białystok is a city in the north-east of today‟s Poland.  
636 NA, T-354/161/3806769. 
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is obvious that there was full uncertainty, when the regiment was marching towards 
Łomża.  
In July 1944, SS-Sturmbannführer (SS-Major) Harun - el - Raschid637 was 
brought to the commanding post of the regiment.
638
 With SS-Sturmbrigade 
Dirlewanger (SS Dirlewanger Penal Brigade)
639
 this division took part at the 
suppression of the “Warsaw Uprising” in August 1944. On October 12, 1944, the 
unit was sent to Slovakia, when the “Slovak National Uprising” occurred.640   
At the end of October 1944, the Eastern Muslim Waffen-SS Regiment was 
dispatched to Slovakia. Here, on December 24, 1944, with some of the personnel of 
the 1
st
 Turkestani Battalion of Waffen-Obersturmführer der SS (Waffen-SS 
Lieutenant) Gulam Alimov switched to the side of the partisans. Alimov brought 
four to five hundred men together with him. The partisans executed Alimov. 
Afterwards, many of his men returned to Waffen-SS side.
641
  
 
7.8.2 The Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiment 
Early in May 1944 attempts to establish the Waffen-Gebirgs-Brigade der SS 
(tatarische No. 1) began. This unit would be a collection of the Crimean Tatar 
                                                             
637 Harun - el - Raschid was born in Austria. His original name was Wilhelm Hintersatz. He was 
attached to Enver Pasha in the World War I. When he was in the Ottoman Empire, he was 
converted to Islam. The name Harun - el - Raschid was given him by the Ottoman Sultan. On 
October 1, 1944, he was promoted to SS-Standartenführer (Colonel). See, Muñoz, Hitler’s 
Muslims, p. 77. 
638 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 77. Though Romanko claims that the Regiment was headed by 
Uzbek SS-Obersturmführer (Lieutenant) Gualm Alimov, when it helped the suppression of 
Warsaw Uprising. See, Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in 
German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 81.   
639 The official name of this unit was “36th Armed Grenadier Division of the SS.” 
640 See appendix. Bishop, p. 180. 
641 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, pp. 80-81; Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu 
Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 81. According to National Turkestan Union 
Committee, Gulam Alim switched to the side of partisans because of the SS plans of setting the 
National Committees under the responsibility of Vlasov‟s ROA. See, Mühlen, p. 166.   
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Schuma (Schutzmannschaft – Security team) battalions.642 The regiment of the 
former officer Mayer-Mader was also included in this unit.
643
 The formation of the 
unit was cancelled at the end of 1944.
644
 Its personnel were transferred to the newly 
founded Osttürkischer Waffen-Verband der SS645 (The Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS 
Regiment) and Kaukasischer Waffen-Verband der SS (The Caucasian Waffen-SS 
Regiment) by February 1945.
646
 
On October 20, 1944, Himmler ordered the establishment of the 
Osttürkischer Waffen-Verband der SS (The Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiment).647 
It would bring together all available “Eastern Turks”648 and their “political and 
military formation and capacity.”649 Harun - el - Raschid was responsible for the 
establishment of the regiment.
650
  
The Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiment was organized as a group of 
regiment-size units. First unit was the “headquarters,” led by Harun - el - Raschid. 
At the headquarters, he got an adjutant, SS-Untersturmführer (SS-Second 
Lieutenant) Willy Bruckner, an SS-Hauptsturmführer (SS-Captain) Meyer-Hertig 
and an Uzbek assistant for propaganda, SS-Obersturmführer (SS-Lieutenant) 
                                                             
642 Bishop, p. 179; Rikmenspoel, p. 193. 
643 Littlejohn, p. 253. 
644
 Bishop, p. 179; Rikmenspoel, p. 193. 
645 In December 1944, the unit‟s strength was 3,518 men. Bishop, p. 179. 
646 Littlejohn, p. 253. 
647 This order would be valid from October 1, 1944. Der Reichsführer-SS, Feld-Kommandostelle, 
NA, T-175/70/folder 233/2586542; T-175/70/folder 233/2586543. 
648 Olzscha commissioned Abdul Gani Osman from the Tatarische Leitstelle (Tatar Management 
Centre) on October 24, 1944 for searching of Crimean Tatars in the working camps in the 
occupied lands. The aim of this order was the admittance of the Tatar workers to the newly-
founded Waffen-SS Regiment. NA, T-175/164/2697290. The document sent by OKH to the SS-
Main Office regarding the transfer of the Crimean Tatars to the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS 
Regiment dated October 27, 1944. NA, T-175/164/2697288. See also, NA, T-175/164/2697291; 
NA, T-175/164/2697292; NA, T-175/164/2697293; NA, T-175/164/2697294;                               
NA, T-175/164/2697295 for the orders and documents regarding the admission of the Crimean 
Tatars in the Wehrmacht and working camps to the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiment.  
649 NA, T-175/70/folder 233/2586542; T-175/70/folder 233/2586543. 
650 NA, T-175/70/folder 233/2586542; T-175/70/folder 233/2586543 and Document of Der 
Reichsführer-SS, Feld-Kommandostelle, October 20, 1944. NA, T-175/70/folder 233/2586545. 
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Nazarov. Second unit was the Waffengruppe Idel-Ural (this was assigned to 3
rd
 
Battalion) and the third group was the Waffengruppe “Turkestan” (assigned to 
headquarters and 1
st
, 2
nd
, 6
th
 and 10
th
 Battalions), led by an Uzbek SS-
Untersturmführer (SS-Second Lieutenant) Tursunov. Fourth unit was the 
Waffengruppe Krim which was assigned on December 31, 1944 and included 
personnel from the former Tataren-Gebirgsjäger-Regiment der SS (Tatar Mountain 
Hunter Regiment of SS)
651
 (assigned to headquarters 7
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 Battalions). The 
fifth and last unit was the Waffengruppe “Azerbaijan,” led by an Azerbaijani SS-
Obersturmführer (SS-Lieutenant) Alekberli, assigned in March 1945 (assigned to 
headquarters and the 4
th
 and 5
th
 Battalions).
652
  
Here, it is necessary to mention that the definition of “Turkestan” and 
“Turkestani” was slightly different in the Waffen-SS than in the Wehrmacht. An 
important reason for this was that the commanders of the Turkestani units in the 
German Army fell out of favor after the disbanding of the Turkestani units and they 
wanted to establish new and greater units during the retreat of the German Army 
from the Soviet Union. Thus, Tatar and Azerbaijani soldiers were also included in 
the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS troops.    
The Kaukasischer Waffen-Verband der SS and its training school was 
stationed in Lyonnais, France. This unit was composed of five Freiwilligen-Stamm 
Regiments (Volunteer Cadre Regiments), established by various nationalities.
653
 In 
                                                             
651 When Germans retreated from the Crimean Peninsula, the Tatar Schutzmannschafts (self-defense 
units) were assigned to the SS, to form the Tataren-Gebirgsjäger-Regiment der SS in June 1944. 
On July 8, 1944, these were re-organizded, as mentioned before, as Waffen-Gebirgsjäger-Brigade 
der SS (tatarische No.1). See, Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in 
German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 82. 
652 Littlejohn, p. 253; Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in German 
Service, 1941-1945,” p. 83. 
653 The Freiwilligen-Stamm Regiment Nr. 1 was stationed in Castres, while the Freiwilligen-Stamm 
Regiment Nr. 2 in Mende, Freiwilligen-Stamm Regiment Nr. 3 in Macon, Freiwilligen-Stamm 
Regiment Nr. 4 in Namur, Freiwilligen-Stamm Regiment Nr. 5 in Langres. Muñoz, Hitler’s 
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the first regiment, there were North Caucasians, along with Georgians and 
Turkestanis, in the second regiment, there were Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Volga 
Tatars.
654
 The third regiment‟s personnel were derived from the former              
162
nd
 Infantry Division. After June 1944, the soldiers of this regiment were sent to 
Ukrainian volunteer units to supply them. In the fourth and fifth regiments, 
Ukrainians and Russians served.
655
  
After the above-mentioned incident of Gulam Alim on December 24, 1944, 
Himmler ordered the reorganization of the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiment on 
December 30, 1944.
656
 Harun - el - Raschid was removed from the commanding 
post of the brigade and replaced by SS-Hauptsturmführer (SS-Captain) Fürst.657 
According to the instructions, each Waffengruppe of the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS 
Regiment would have “two infantry battalions with five infantry companies per 
battalion.”658 These units were to be formed near Mlava, Slovakia. The Eastern 
Muslim SS Regiment would be included in this newly founded unit and “thereby 
considered dissolved.”659 In January 1945, the Azerbaijani Regiment was 
transferred to the newly established Caucasian Waffen-SS Regiments in Italy. The 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 Battalions of the Eastern Muslim Waffen-SS Regiment were merged to 
form the SS-Waffengruppe Turkistan.
660
       
On January 24, 1945, the Reichsführer SS (Head of the SS) assigned the 
Turkestani SS-Untersturmführer (SS-Second Lieutenant) Çorman and the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Muslims, p. 57.  
654 After April 1944, Russians and Ukrainians were added to this unit as well.  
655 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 57. 
656 The order was valid by December 15, 1944.  
657 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, pp. 80-81; Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu 
Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 81. 
658 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 82. 
659 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 82.  
660 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 81. 
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Turkestani SS-Unterscharführer (SS-Sergeant) Yunupov for the assistance of 
transport of the Crimean Tatar Armed Group over Wien. For the assistance of Idel-
Ural Armed Group, the Tatar SS-Hauptsturmführer (SS-Captain) Kuteyev and the 
Tatar SS Rottenführer (SS-Corporal) Galimov were assigned.661        
 
7.9 The End of the World War II and the Fate of Turkestanis 
The end of the story was not necessarily the same for all the legions and 
legionnaires. Some legions were disbanded when the war had ended. The number of 
the personnel in some of the legions decreased to a significant degree that they must 
be dissolved completely.
662
 But most of them were left under the authority of the 
German Army.
663
  
Germans lost the battles for the Crimea in May 1944 against the attacking 
Red Army. The Wehrmacht was forced to evacuate the peninsula, which was then 
invaded by the Soviet troops. Some of the Crimean Tatars went to Germany and 
resided in camps. Emin el Hüseyni, the Grand Mufti, requested from SS-
Obergruppenführer (SS-Lieutenant-General) Berger, the Chief of the SS-Main 
Office, that all Crimean Tatars in Germany were to be gathered in a camp. They 
demanded avoidance from the eastern workers in the working camps.
664
    
Towards the end of the war, when the German defeat could clearly be 
foreseen by the representatives of the Turkestani and Muslim representatives, they 
                                                             
661 For the assistance of the Turkestanis, it is understood, nobody was available at the time being. For 
propaganda services, civilian Akçurin was assigned. Der Reichsführer SS, SS-Hauptamt, 
Amtsgruppe D – Oststelle “Leitstelle der Osttürkischen Waffenverband der SS,” January 24, 
1945. NA, T-175/162/2695376. 
662 An example for this kind of legions would be the Armenian Legion.  
663 Littlejohn, p. 254. 
664 From the Grand Mufti to Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, SS Obergruppenführer und General der 
Waffen-SS Berger, on October 20, 1944. NA, T-175/164/2697297; NA, T-175/164/2697298;       
NA, T-175/164/2697299; NA, T-175/164/2697300. 
149 
 
tried to find out ways for preventing their peoples to be handed over to the Soviet 
Union against their will. According to the Soviet point of view, the legionnaires 
committed “high treason” even by being captured by the enemy.665 This was the 
same reasoning behind Stalin‟s not signing of the Geneva Conventions, regulating 
the standards for treatment of the victims of the war.  
From the Caucasian special purpose units, who were sent into an 
“impossible mission” to Chechnya, only its Captain Lange was known to be 
reached to the German frontline again after three months in the mountains. The 
Caucasian fighters of the German Army, the commandos, were good allies of the 
Nazis, but had no unquestionable loyalty to them. After the Caucasus was freed of 
Germans, the survivors of the Unternehmen Schamil fled to the mountains.   
As stated above, towards the end of the war, most of the Turkestani and 
Caucasian Legions were transferred to the Western Front, where they had to engage 
with the Allied Forces. Until the end of the war, they fulfilled their duties. In France 
in June 1944 the Allies captured about thirty thousand legionnaires and volunteers 
after the D-Day landings from the Eastern Troops.
666
  
The World War II ended with German defeat. The Yalta Conference, held in 
February 1945, foresaw the delivery of all the Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union.
667
  
The 162
nd
 Infantry Division, which surrendered in Rimini to the Italian partisan 
forces, at the Eastern coast of Northern Italy, was delivered to the British Armed 
Forces.
668
 The commander of the Division, Heygendorff requested from the British 
                                                             
665 Mühlen, p. 230. 
666 Neulen, p. 331.  
667 Mühlen, p. 230. 
668 Littlejohn, p. 254.  
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authorities to treat his legionnaires as German soldiers and not to hand them over to 
the Soviet Union.
669
  
According to Neulen, the total number of Turkestani casualties fighting on 
the side of Germans during the World War II had been around 67,000 men. From 
the members of the Caucasian peoples in the German Army, nearly 50,000 people 
were lost during the battles.
670
   
The captured legionnaires in Italy were disarmed and interned by the Allies. 
They were gathered in Madena, Italy and were sorted by their nationalities in order 
to be handed over to the Soviet authorities in Tarent.
671
 Thereupon, some of the 
legionnaires committed suicide and some tried to escape. A Mullah and some 
soldiers burnt themselves. During the transport in the trains, some soldiers jumped 
from the wagons. In Odessa, some of the Turkestani legionnaires jumped into the 
sea from the transport ships.
672
   
A few legionnaires could find the chance to escape from being handed over 
to the Soviet Union. They managed to reside in Germany and in West Europe as 
émigrés by hiding or introducing themselves as members of different nations, i.e. 
Turkey. According to Patrick von zur Mühlen, about one thousand Turkestanis 
managed to escape from handovers. On the other hand, some decided to turn back 
to their homeland voluntarily.
673
 Most of the Soviet citizens were delivered to 
Soviet authorities in 1945. Though minor, some handovers also took place in 
1946.
674
    
                                                             
669 Thorwald, Wen Sie Verderben Wollen, p. 573.  
670 Neulen, p. 333. 
671 Mühlen, p. 230; Thorwald, Wen Sie Verderben Wollen, p. 574.  
672 Thorwald, Wen Sie Verderben Wollen, p. 574. 
673 Mühlen, p. 231.  
674 Mühlen, p. 232. 
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Ironically, the Turkestani representatives could only achieve their long-
desired independent status towards the end of the war. On March 17, 1945, with an 
order of Berlin, the Georgian National Committee and the Crimean Tatar National 
Committee were recognized by the Ostministerium as the independent 
representatives of their peoples. On the same day, Hitler decided to give the 
Azerbaijani people “their independence.”675 A week later, the National Turkestan 
Union Committee was recognized as the “National Provisional Government” of 
Turkestan and the Turkestan Legion as the “National Army.”676 After nearly 70,000 
Turkestanis were lost, it embraced about 110,000 Turkestanis, widespread in all 
fronts. Besides this, in April 1945, Kayyum Han met with four Turkestanis at the 
KONR and founded a “Turkestanische Rat (Turkestan Council)” there.677  
Those former Soviet citizens, who did not escape to Turkey or to USA, 
remained in Germany. They were gathered in camps like Limburg or Mittenwald in 
Germany. Then, these émigrés were settled in Munich. They established religious 
organizations first, like Islamische Rat für Deutschland (Islamic Council for 
Germany) with Alimcan İdris, Abdurrahman Avtorhanov and Edige Kırımal at the 
head. In the years 1948-1950, the political bodies of the non-Russian former Soviet 
citizens began to appear. Along with the Russian and Ukrainian organizations, one 
Kalmuk, two Georgian, two Azerbaijani, two Armenian, two Turkestani, two Tatar-
Bashkir and three North Caucasian councils were established.
678
  
The councils could not unify and remained separated because of many 
reasons like political differences, competition between “old” and “new” émigrés, 
                                                             
675 Neulen, p. 333.  
676 Neulen, p. 333. 
677 Seidler, p. 280.  
678 Mühlen, p. 232.  
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aims of political and financial supporters (USA and Britain).
679
 Veli Kayyum Han, 
who was arrested by the British after the war, re-established the Milli Türkistan 
Birlik Komitesi and published the Milli Türkistan again, even in many languages. 
The other political body of the Turkestanis, Türkistan Milli Kurtuluş Komitesi 
(Turkestan National Liberation Committee), was led by Haris Kanatbay.
680
 He 
remained as an opponent of Veli Kayyum Han and his Committee as well.
681
   
                                                             
679 Mühlen, p. 232. 
680 When Veli Kayyum Han established the National Turkestan Union Committee after the death of 
Mustafa Çokay, it included Uzbeks, Kazaks, Kirgizs POWs. After a while, fractions occured in 
the Committee based on ethnicities. Veli Kayyum Han, an Uzbek himself, brought Uzbeks to the 
important posts. Kirgizs and Kazaks wanted to establish their own commissions thereupon. Haris 
Kanatbay, a Kazakh, was the most active opponent of Veli Kayyum Han. There were other 
opponents of Kayyum Han, like Umari, who was the editor of the Journal Türk Birliği, Turkestan 
Edition. See, “Usbekischer Mitarbeiter für die türkestanische Zeitung des SS-Hauptamtes, Umari, 
Nachkam.” Berlin, November 21, 1944. NA, T-175/162/2695597 and NA, T-175/162/2695598. In 
1944, after long discussions, Haris Kanatbay was chosen to the post of General Secretary. 
However, after a short while, in March-February 1945, he founded his own committee. See, 
Ömer Özcan, “Mustafa Çokayoğlu Hakkında Bir Eser: Türkistan Ateşi” Türk Yurdu (Vol. 191, 
July 2003).    
681 Mühlen, p. 232. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
The Turkestani former Red Army Soldiers, who sided with Germans, passed 
through various stages during the World War II. In this regard, roughly four 
different stages could be distinguished. At the first stage, the Turkestanis were 
soldiers of Red Army fighting against Germany. With their equipment and training 
poorer than the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, they were aware that harshest 
punishments would be applied by the Soviet authorities on them, in case of being 
captured by the enemy. Turning back or escaping from the front was not easy. Thus, 
there was almost no possibility that they ever thought switching to German side and 
fighting against the Soviet Union, when they were under the ranks of the Red Army. 
Regardless of their political views on the Soviet government, the idea of “treason” 
was quite unthinkable. 
At the second stage, the luckier ones were not killed by the German Army‟s 
overwhelming attacks and fell into captivity. In spite of the presence of millions of 
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Soviet POWs, Stalin refused that the Red Army soldier could surrender to the 
enemy, instead of dying “heroically” in fight for the homeland. Thus, they could not 
receive any help, including from the international organizations and had to survive 
under the worst conditions like the Jews in the German concentration camps. After 
getting away from death, they had to suffer from diseases and hunger. Knowing that 
nobody would rescue them from these POW camps, they wanted to rescue 
themselves from captivity by working for Germans or “volunteering” in the local 
police forces. At this stage, it could not be claimed that the POWs were politically 
motivated and showed an open opposition to the Stalinist regime.          
The third stage for the Turkestani former Red Army soldiers was the ending 
of their POW status and recruitment to the Turkestan Legion Battalions under 
German ranks. They dressed and armed like the German soldiers with their 
insignias on their shoulders, emphasizing on their religious and national feelings. 
Under the propaganda of Germans, they were presented as the opponents to the 
Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union. More religious freedom and a “united 
Turkestan” were promised to them, while the Stalinist regime was attacked 
severely. This was the stage when politics involved into the issue. Most of the 
Turkestanis justified their presence under German ranks with their “learned” 
opposition to the Stalinist regime. They learned it from the dense German 
propaganda at the legion barracks and the publications of the Turkestanis.   
At the last (fourth) stage, Germans lost the war and most of the Turkestani 
former Red Army soldiers became POWs again, this time at the hands of the Allied 
Forces. They knew more or less the meaning of being handed over to the Soviet 
authorities. Again the lucky ones could escape from the POW camps to Germany, 
Turkey and the USA. They were the ones, who continued their opposition to the 
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Soviet regime. Under relatively more favorable political atmosphere in these 
countries and with the financial support from the USA and the Great Britain, they 
established or joined political bodies based on Turkestani nationalism and 
opposition to the Soviet Union.  
8.1.1 The Opposition of the Turkestanis and the USSR 
The Soviet Union and its regime witnessed the greatest, mass and armed 
opposition in its history during the times of the World War II. This occurred at a 
time, when the strongest and the most authoritarian leader of the USSR, Joseph 
Stalin was in power. The opposition of Turkestani peoples got a nationalist and 
separatist character, which was unthinkable to be permitted within the Soviet Union 
under the regime of Stalin.   
The motivations of the Turkestanis for fighting or collaborating with the 
Germans during the World War II against the Soviet Union depended on various 
factors. Here, the motivations of different groups of Turkestanis should be 
distinguished. First of all, the collaboration of the émigrés from the Soviet Union 
and former Turkestani officers in the Red Army had, among others, a great deal of 
political character. The Turkestani émigré leader Mustafa Çokay, who opposed the 
Bolshevik regime and had to flee to Europe after the Bolshevik takeover, joined the 
visits of the commissions to the POW camps.
682
 He died after two visits to the 
camps and Veli Kayyum Han took over the leadership of the National Turkestan 
Union Committee. Though there is no evidence that Çokay had a tendency to 
collaborate closely with Germans. However, Kayyum Han was eager to work 
closely with them and rather motivated politically.    
                                                             
682 Here, it should be remembered that Mustafa Çokay and Veli Kayyum Han were arrested by the 
German police and brought to Berlin. This meant that they did not voluntarily collaborate with 
the Germans.   
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Along with the political motivations, Çokay, Kayyum Han and others 
pursued humanitarian aims. The very presence of the POW camps was an important 
factor in the whole story. In earlier days of the German-Soviet battles, they saw the 
inhumane situation in the POW camps while working in the above-mentioned 
commissions and endeavored to rescue as much Turkestanis and Muslims as 
possible from being killed by the SD units or dying of malnutrition, diseases, cold, 
etc. For this reason, they demanded from German authorities, with whom they were 
in contact, to end their POW status and use them as workers or security units, at 
least.  
The majority of the former Red Army officers, who were captured by the 
Germans, also pursued political aims. It is important that there had been no 
documented incident, in which these officers switched to German side in the course 
of the battles between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. Their collaboration with 
the Germans began after being POWs. The unfavorable conditions in the POW 
camps were also valid for them. Without doubt, this factor contributed to their 
decision to fight on the German side against the Soviet Union. But after being 
legionnaires or, as Germans classified them, “volunteers,” with the impact of 
German propaganda and Turkestani émigré leaders, they put nationalism and/or 
religious faiths on the first place.  
It can also be added that the publications of the Turkestanis under the 
auspices of German authorities contributed to their understanding of nationalism. 
Instead of favoring separate states and nations in the Central Asia like the Bolshevik 
regime did, this kind of nationalism foresaw a unified Turkestan. Some German 
authorities took important steps to trigger a religious-nationalist uprising against the 
Soviet Regime, using the POWs and legionnaires. They established the Turkestan 
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Legion, financed publications, contacted religious and nationalist leaders. Though it 
could be claimed that these actions taken by Germans had propaganda purposes, a 
point should not be neglected: all these efforts contributed to the Turkestan 
nationalism, at least among the émigré Turkestanis, to a significant degree to the 
disfavor of Stalinist policy of nationalities.  
On the other side, though their numbers were small, there were also some 
Turkestani former Red Army officers affiliated with the Bolshevik ideology. 
Further, in the German POW camps, not only German propaganda prevailed. 
Though supervised closely by the Germans, Soviet propaganda could sometimes 
infiltrate into the camps and the headquarters of the legions. Also, Germans mostly 
did not regard the Turkestanis as their equal counterparts because of their racial 
attitude. Consequently, a number of Turkestani officers switched back to Soviet 
side. Again, political motivations contributed in their decisions, though in opposite 
way.  
The former Red Army soldiers on the German side could be classified 
roughly in two groups: the first group would be the above-mentioned officers. 
There was an important detail about these people. As stated before, Stalin had 
liquidated most of the officer cadres of the former Tsarist Army during the 1920s 
and formed Bolshevik Red Army soldiers just on the eve of the World War II. He 
needed newly graduated officers because of the German threat. The Turkestanis, 
who were studying at universities without military backgrounds conscripted into the 
Red Army before the war and rapidly graduated from the military schools in order 
to fulfill this need. Since the nationalist Turkestani intelligentsia had been wiped out 
by Stalin, these former Red Army officers, who got higher education, could be 
regarded as the most literate people among the Soviet POWs. Though they were 
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educated according to the Bolshevik ideology and Stalinist nationalities policies in 
the Soviet Union, most of them were more prone to the idea of Turkestan 
nationalism under the influence of the wartime publications and German policies.   
The second group of former Red Army soldiers would be those lower 
ranking privates, comprising the majority of the POWs and later legionnaires or 
“volunteers.” In the earlier days, they simply volunteered for working in the farms 
nearby, in the kitchens of the camps, etc. in order to rescue their lives. In some 
regions, some German commanders, on their own initiative, established small units 
from them for services like police, construction, driving, etc.  
After the commissions were founded and began visiting the POW camps, 
the lower-ranking Turkestani former Red Army soldiers were recruited to the 
legions in various ways. Some of the POWs were selected to the legions by the 
members of the commissions. They would not have much chance to object this 
recruitment after witnessing all the murders and deaths in the POW camps at the 
earlier stages. A smaller number of the POWs were asked, on the other hand, 
whether or not they wanted to fight in the battles against the Soviet Union or 
preferred to work for Germans instead. There were only a few Turkestanis, who 
were evaluated as “politically unreliable” by the commission members and 
continued their POW status. Germans did not leave anything to chance in this 
sensitive issue and, in theory, chose only the politically desirable POWs. Then, they 
indoctrinated them politically according to their ideology. 
Bearing all these in mind, it can be said that politics or the idea of Turkestan 
nationalism played a partial role in the motivations of these latter group of POWs. 
Yet, it would not be totally incorrect to predict that this group was influenced by the 
159 
 
publications of Turkestanis in the former group and speeches they listened in the 
legion barracks.  
Obviously, it is impossible to know or predict each and every former Red 
Army soldiers‟ motivation for siding with Germans in the battles against the Soviet 
Union. Yet, such a generalization is possible: among all the POWs, “survival” was 
the common and first ranking motivation for siding with the Germans. In the second 
place, there were, with their crucial importance, politics, religious beliefs, ideology 
and similar factors. These most important weaknesses of the Stalinist regime were 
used by the Germans considerably.  
The purges by the Stalinist regime of the national intelligentsia of the 
Turkestani peoples, who favored an idea of a single united Turkestan, had many 
reflections on the decisions of Turkestani former Red Army soldiers to join the 
German ranks. First of all, it had negative effects on the development of the 
Turkestani nationalism with the “reign of terror” it created among the intelligentsia 
and the ordinary people as well. Secondly, the policy of supporting the nationalisms 
of Uzbeks, Kazaks, etc. against the “single united Turkestan” idea, seemed to be 
successful. Even under the harsh conditions of the World War II, the movements, 
which led the opposition of the Central Asian peoples could not be integrated and 
divided as groups of Kazaks and Uzbeks.  
It can be predicted that the ordinary Turkestanis, who were the unranked 
former Red Army soldiers, had less political intentions to oppose the Stalinist 
regime because of a fear created by the “reign of terror” mentioned above. Since 
they were mostly from the generation, which was educated at the Soviet schools and 
possibly witnessed the purges of national intelligentsia, their sense of Turkestan 
nationalism and opposition, if any, was removed by the educational and cultural 
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policies of the regime. Stalin wiped out the political movements, which were 
matured in the Central Asia until the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 and after the end 
of the Civil War in Turkestan. Their leaders were liquidated.   
Still, the harshest measures and pressure applied on the national movements 
and religious practices by the Stalinist regime should have created dissidence 
among all the Turkestanis, which justified their opposition. The members of the 
Turkestani intelligentsia at the front, at least, saw the chance of a kind of “revenge” 
from the regime with the help of Germans. They had done this, even though they 
saw that the Germans clearly humiliated them in any occasion.  
 
8.1.2 The Recruitment of the Turkestanis and Germany 
On the other side of the coin, there were Germany and the Nazi ideology. 
Hitler, the leader of the NSDAP or Nazi Party, was the “democratically” elected 
dictator of Germany. According to his point of view, German race was superior to 
other races. The Asiatic people ranked, along with the Jews, at the lowest rank of 
Nazi ideology‟s “hierarchy of races.” Also, the non-German peoples should not be 
armed under any conditions. 
According to the German constitution at that time, the officers in the 
Wehrmacht were forbidden to be members of political parties.
683
 In contrast with 
this, some high-ranking officers in the German Army were brought to their posts 
with the influence of the Nazi Party. Further, the Waffen-SS, an institution of the 
Party, became the de facto fourth force of the German Army and set under the 
                                                             
683 On August 2, 1934, after the death of President Paul von Hindenburg, all officcers and soldiers of 
the German Armed Forces swore an oath of loyalty to Hitler. It was short after that date,       
March 16, 1935, when the conscription law to the army decreed, which was an open flouting of 
the military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. The law got the name Wehrmacht, like the new 
German Army did.  
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responsibility of the OKW and the OKH. The foreign “volunteer” formations in the 
Waffen-SS began before the outbreak of the World War II and this established the 
main base for justification of the recruitment of the Turkestanis and other lower-
ranking nationalities into the Waffen-SS ranks, under the difficult conditions of the 
war. 
At such a time, when all the state apparatus was affiliated with politics in 
Germany, which was based on the superiority of the German race and humiliation 
of the others, and when the German Army kept on winning battles at the Eastern 
Front, it was remarkable that the German authorities permitted those “sub-humans” 
to join the Wehrmacht. Hitler had intentions to use the POWs as “forced labor” in 
the camps in Germany, but not as equal soldiers in the German Army. At the later 
days of the German attacks on the Soviet Union, the Turkestani POWs were made a 
subject of the realpolitik and a tool for propaganda in favor of Germans. An 
important reason for this was that the policy of Hitler “expand to the East” had no 
intentions to reach to the Central Asia, where the Turkestani peoples lived.  
Though Germans did not regard the Eastern peoples in the army as equal 
counterparts and humiliated them on every occasion, some German authorities saw 
the bigger picture and took the initiative to use them for political and propaganda 
purposes rather than military ones at the earlier days of the World War II. One of 
the reasons behind the difference between the Nazi racist theory and practice was 
the disagreement on the Ostpolitik in the governmental cycles. German politicians 
and authorities like Rosenberg, Göbbels, Bräutigam were important people, who did 
not put the strict rules of the Nazi racist ideology in the focal point of their policies 
and suggested a special treatment for the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union.   
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The pre-war activities and serious studies of some German experts on the 
Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union also contributed to these efforts. Later, when the 
situation deteriorated for the German Army at the Eastern and Western Fronts, the 
use of the legionnaires and the “volunteers” became a pragmatic character, a 
necessity of the war conditions. The Turkestani and other legionnaires and the 
Waffen-SS formations began to be treated as equals by Germans towards the end of 
the war.  
Germans did not pursue a policy, which would result with independent 
Turkestan in case of a total German victory. At the utmost, they should have 
foreseen a “Turkestani Republic” under German protectorate. The most obvious 
evidence for this was the hesitation of the German authorities to recognize the 
independent status of the National Turkestan Union Committee up until the very 
end of the war. However, the German propaganda, along with the nationalistic 
articles in the Turkestani publications created an atmosphere that Germans were 
perceived as “liberators.”  
The role of Turkey and its relations with Germany and the Soviet Union in 
the process of the establishment and development of the Turkestani units and 
“volunteer” formations should not be undermined. First of all, at least the neutrality 
of Turkey during the World War II was of crucial importance for Hitler. Thus, 
Germany paid attention not to damage good diplomatic relations with Turkey. 
Secondly, the visit of the Turkish Generals Erkilet and Erden to Germany and their 
meeting with Hitler had an important impact on the situation of the POWs at the 
hands of Germans, in favor of them.    
Whether or not the status of the Turkestani POWs at the hands of the 
Germans, and later on, their collaboration with the Germans against the USSR 
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contributed to the idea of Turkestani nationalism in the Soviet Central Asia 
remained a doubtful issue. The Soviet citizens, handed over by the Allies to the 
Soviet authorities were accused of “high treason” and severely punished. They were 
either sent to exile or executed. Even after the independence of the Central Asian 
republics, the four years of the captured Red Army soldiers (1941-1945) were 
omitted in the official history books of these republics. Also, as von zur Mühlen 
puts, the victory of the Soviet Union became the “defeat of the all separatist 
movements.”684 The national oppositions of the non-Russians to the Bolshevik 
regime were in serious disappointment after the war. On the contrary, the World 
War II, as named by the Soviet historians Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina (Great 
Patriotic War), had contributions to the “union” of the peoples of the USSR, with 
the support of the Soviet propaganda and nationalities policies and the more 
strengthened Stalinist regime.
685
  
On the other hand, this phenomenon became an important item on the 
agenda of the Turkestanis in the emigration, especially for those in Turkey, USA 
and Germany. The people, who survived the catastrophic years of the World War II, 
inhumane conditions of the German POW camps and finally the end of the war, 
wrote their memoirs to be recorded by history.     
                                                             
684 Mühlen, p. 238. 
685 Mühlen, p. 238. 
164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
1. Unpublished Documents and Archival Materials 
 
National Archives. 1958. Miscellaneous SS Records: The Einwandererzentralstelle, 
Waffen-SS, and SS-Oberabschnitte. Washington. Microcopy. 
National Archives. 1958. Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the 
German Police. Washington. Microcopy. 
 
 
2. Published Sources 
Abdurrakhimova, Nadira A. 2002. “The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 34(2): pp. 239-262. 
Abramian, Eduard. 2007. Forgotten Legion: Sonderverbände Bergmann in World 
War II, 1941-1945. New York: Europa Books. 
Anders, Wladyslaw. 1996. Russian Volunteers in Hitler’s Army 1941-1945. Europa 
Books.  
Andican, A. Ahat. 2003. Cedidizm’den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi. 
İstanbul: Emre. 
-----. 2007. Turkestan Struggle Abroad: From Jadidism to Independence. Haarlem: 
Sota. 
-----. 2009. Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye ve Orta Asya. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap. 
-----. January 25, 2010. Interview with the author. İstanbul. 
165 
 
Andreyev, Catherine. 1989. Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet 
Reality and Emigre Theories. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Aster, Sidney. 2004. “Sir William Seeds: The Diplomat as Scapegoat.” in Brian P. 
Farrell, ed., Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War. Quebec: 
McGill-Queen‟s University Press. 
Avalon Project. http://avalon.law.yale.edu. 
Baldauf, Ingeborg. 2001. “Jadidism in Central Asia within Reformism and 
Modernism in the Muslim World,” Die Welt des Islams 41(1): pp. 72-88. 
Benzing, Johannes. 1937. “Das turkestanische Volk im Kampf um seine 
Selbständigkeit,” Die Welt des Islams 19: pp. 94-137. 
Berleb, Stefan. 2005. “For China‟s Benefit: The Evolution and Devolution of 
German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919-1938.” Unpublished 
PhD. Dissertation. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane. 
Bilge, A. Suat. 1992. Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye - Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-
1964. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları. 
Bishop Chris. 2005. Hitler’s Foreign Divisions: Foreign Volunteers in the Waffen-SS 
1940-1945. London: Amber Books. 
Blood-Ryan, H. W. 1939. Franz von Papen: His Life and Times. London: Rich and 
Cowan Ltd. 
Bräutigam, Otto. 1968. So Hat Es Sich Zugetragen: Ein Leben als Soldat und 
Diplomat. Würzburg: Holzner Verlag. 
Brockdorff, Werner. 1968. Kollaboration oder Widerstand in den Besetzten Ländern. 
Munich: Verlag Welsermühl. 
Buttino, Marco. 1990. “Study of the Economic Crisis and Depopulation in 
Turkestan, 1917-1920,” Central Asian Survey 9(4): pp. 59-74. 
Chisholm, Geo. G. 1920. “The Free City of Danzig,” The Geographical Journal. 
55(4): pp. 305-309. 
Çokayeva, Maria J. 2000. Mustafa Çokay’ın Hatıraları. İstanbul: Turan Kültür 
Vakfı. 
Crane, Stephen L. 1999. Survivor from an Unknown War. Upland: Diane Publishing. 
166 
 
Dallin, Alexander. 1981. German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation 
Policies. New York: Palgrave.  
Davis, W. M. 1904. “A Summer in Turkestan,” Bulletin of the American 
Geographical Society 36(4): pp. 217-228. 
Der Untermensch. 1942. SS-Hauptamt, Schlungsamt, Nordland Verlag. 
Domarus, Max. 1997 (Vol. 3) Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations: 1932-1945. 
Wauconda: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers. 
Drobyazko, Sergei and Karaschuk, Andrei. 1999. Vostochnie Legioni i Kazachi 
Chasti v Vermakhte. Moscow: Ast.  
Encausse, Hèléne Carrère. 1994. (3th ed.) “The Fall of the Czarist Empire.” in 
Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview. 
Durham and London: Duke University Pres. 
Erkilet, H. Emir. 1943. Şark Cebhesinde Gördüklerim. İstanbul: Hilmi. 
Erkin, Feridun Cemal. 1968. Türk – Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi. Ankara: 
Başnur Matbaası. 
Ertürk, Cebbar. 1956. Anayurtta Unutulan Türklük. (2nd ed.) Kayseri: Zafer. 
Ertürk, ?. 1950. “Mustafa Coqaj,” Millij Türkistan 65. 
Fischer, George. 1952. Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Pres.  
Gamalı Haç ile Kızıl Yıldız Arasında. 2006. İstanbul: TRT İstanbul Televizyonu. 
Gerede, Hüsrev. 1994. Sığınakta Kaleme Alınan Belgesel: Harb İçinde Almanya. 
İstanbul, ABC Ajansı Yayınları. 
Haferkorn, Reinhard. 1933. “Danzig and the Polish Corridor,” International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939) 12(2): pp. 224-239.  
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, 
http://hcl.harvard.edu/collections/hpsss/index.html. Schedule B / Vol. 8, Case 
252, Interview with an Uzbek from Ferghana Valley. 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 1, Case 77, 
Interview with a Kazantatar from Kazan.  
167 
 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 8, Case 221, 
Interview with an Uzbek from Ferghana Valley. 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 8, Case 160, 
Interview with an Azerbaijani from Baku. 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 7, 
Interview with a Crimean Tatar. 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 15, 
Interview with a Kalmuk. 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 20, 
Interview with a Soviet peasant.  
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 27, 
Interview with a Soviet citizen. 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B / Vol. 10, Case 30, 
Interview with a Soviet citizen. 
Hayit, Baymirza. 1942. “Biznin Istıqlal,” Millij Türkistan. 9: pp. 7-12. 
-----. 1943. “Başlığımız Legionçılar Arasıda: Milliy Legion – Milliy häräkätdä,” 
Millij Türkistan (19-20): pp. 9-29. 
-----. 1980. Turkestan im Herzen Euroasiens. Köln: Studienverlag. 
-----. 2004. “Türkistan Legionında Milliy Propağandamız” In Milli Türkistan 
Hürriyet Davası: “Milli Türkistan” Mecmuasında Bildirilgan Fikirler. 
Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları. 
Henderson, Sir Nevile. 1939. Final Report by the Right Honourable Sir Nevile 
Henderson G.C.M.G. on the Circumstances Leading to the Termination of His 
Mission to Berlin, September 20, 1939. London: His Majesty‟s Stationery 
Office. 
Henderson, Sir Nevile. 1940. Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939. New York: 
G.P. Puntam‟s Sons. 
Hitler, Adolf (trans.) 1941. Mein Kampf. London, New York, Melbourne: Hurst and 
Blackett Ltd. 
Hoffmann, Joachim. 1986. Die Ostlegionen 1941-1943. Freiburg: Verlag Rombach 
Freiburg.      
168 
 
-----. 2003. Die Tragödie der “Russischen Befreiungsarmee” 1944/45: Wlassow 
gegen Stalin. Munich: Herbich Verlag. 
Howard, Harry N. 1948. “Germany, The Soviet Union and Turkey during World War 
II,” The Department of State Bulletin 19(472): pp. 63-78.  
İkram Han, Hüseyin. 1999. Bir Türkistanlının İkinci Dünya Savaşı Hatıraları. 
İstanbul: Bedir. 
Insdorf, Annette. 1987. “Rosa Luxemburg: More than a Revolutionary,” New York 
Times. May 31. 
İskenderi, Luiza. 2007. Türkistan Legionları: Tarihing Ukilmagan Varakları. 
Vagant-Profit Neşrieti. 
Jurado, Carlos Caballero and Lyles, Kevin. 2005. Inostrannie Dobrovoltsy v 
Vermahte 1941-1945. Moscow : Ast. 
Jurado, Carlos Caballero. 1985. Foreign Volunteers of the Wehrmacht 1941-45. 
London: Osprey Publishing. 
Kara, Abdulvahap. 2002. “Mustafa Çokay‟ın Hayatı ve Orta Asya Türk 
Cumhuriyetlerinin Bağımsızlığı Yolundaki Mücadelesi.” Unpublished PhD. 
Dissertation. Mimar Sinan University, İstanbul. 
Karasar, Hasan Ali. 2008. “The Partition of Khorezm and the Positions of 
Turkestanis on Razmezhevanie,” Europe-Asia Studies 60(7): pp. 1247-1260. 
Kayyum Han, Veli. 1951. “Mustafa Caqajni Eslas (Hatira Daftardan),” Millij 
Türkistan (70/71). 
-----. 1951. “Ruslar Blan Birga İslamaq Mumkinmi?” Millij Türkistan 70/71(A): pp. 
3-7. 
Khalid, Adeeb. 1996. “Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan,” 
Slavic Review 55(2): pp. 270-296. 
-----. 2001. “Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia: The Transformation of 
Jadidism 1917-1920.” in Roland Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State 
of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin. New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 145-162. 
-----. 2007. Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. 1964. Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
169 
 
Littlejohn, David. 1987 (Vol. 4) Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. California: R. 
James Bender Publishing. 
Luxemburg, Rosa. 1976. “The Nationalities Question in the Russian Revolution.” in 
The National Question - Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg.” H.B. Davis, 
ed., New York: Monthly Review Pres.  
MacKenzie, S.P. 2009. The Second World War in Europe. (2nd ed.) Harlow: Pearson 
Education. 
Martin, Terry.  2001. “An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the 
Highest Form of Imperialism.” in Roland Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, 
eds., A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and 
Stalin. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-90. 
Mende, Gerhard von. 1936. Der Nationale Kampf der Russlandtürken. Berlin: 
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 
-----. 1962. Komünist Blokta Milliyet ve Mefkure. Ankara: AÜ Yayınevi. 
-----. 1962. Nationalität und Ideologie. Bonn.  
-----. 1952. “Erfahrungen mit Ostfreiwilligen in der deutschen Wehrmacht während 
des zweiten Weltkrieges.” in Vielvölkerheere und Koalitionskriege. 
Darmstadt: C.W. Leske Verlag, pp. 24-33.   
Michaelis, Meir. 1972. “World Power Status or World Dominion? A Survey of the 
Literature on Hitler‟s „Plan of World Dominion‟ (1937-1970),” The 
Historical Journal 15(2): pp. 331-360.   
Muñoz, Antinio J. 1997 (Vol. 2) Hitler’s Eastern Legions: The Osttruppen. (2nd ed.) 
Bayside: Axis Europa Books. 
Mühlen, Patrick von zur. 1984. Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında: İkinci Dünya 
Savaşı’nda Sovyet Doğu Halklarının Milliyetçiliği. Ankara: Mavi Yayınlar. 
Neulen, Hans Werner. 1992. An Deutscher Seite: Internationale Freiwillige von 
Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS. Munich: Universitas. 
Newland, Samuel J. 1991. Cossacks in the German Army 1941-1945. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Northrop, Douglas. 2001. “Nationalizing Backwardness: Gender, Empire, and 
Uzbek Identity.” in Roland Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of 
Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin. New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 191-220. 
170 
 
Olcott, Martha B. 1981. “The Basmachi or Freemen‟s Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24,” 
Soviet Studies 33(3): pp. 352-369. 
Oran, Baskın (ed.) 2001 (Vol. 1) Türk Dış Politikası. İstanbul: İletişim. 
Park, Alexander G. 1957. Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917 – 1921. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Perrett, Bryan and Hogg, Ian. 1989. Encyclopedia of the Second World War. Essex: 
Longman. 
Picker, Henry. 1951. Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-42. 
Bonn: Athenäum Verlag. 
Pipes, Richard. 1964. (Revised edition) The Formation of the Soviet Union: 
Communism and Nationalism 1917 – 1923. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
-----. 1990. The Russian Revolution. New York: Knopf. 
Rabenau, Friedrich von. 1940 (Vol. 2) Seeckt: Aus Seinem Leben 1918-1936. 
Leipzig: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag. 
Ramazan, Musa. 2001. Bir Kafkas Göçmeninin Anıları. Ankara: Kafkas Derneği. 
Rikmenspoel, Marc J. 2004. Waffen-SS Encyclopedia. Bedford: The Aberjona Press. 
Romanko, Oleg Valentinovich. 2001. “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu 
Volunteers in German Service, 1941-1945.” in Antonio Munoz, ed., The East 
Came West. New York: Axis Europa Books.  
-----. 2003. “Musulmanskie Formirovaniia v Vermahte i Voiskah SS (1941-1945): K 
Voprosu o Voenno-Politicheskom Statuse Inostrannikh Dobrovoltsev v 
Germanskih Voorujennyh Silah,” Kultura Narodov Prichernomorya 38. 
Rosenberg , Alfred. 1949. Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg. Chicago: Ziff-Davis 
Publication. 
Rostovsky, Lobanov. 1928. “The Soviet Muslim Republics in Central Asia,” Journal 
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 7(4). 
Schramm, Percy E. 1996. (vol. 2) Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der 
Wehrmacht 1940-1941, Eine Dokumentation. Augsburg: Weltbild 
Seidler, Franz W. 1995. Die Kollaboration 1939-1945. Munich and Berlin: Herbig.  
171 
 
Smith, Bradley F. and Peterson, Agnes F. (eds.) 1974. Heinrich Himmler: 
Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und Andere Ansprachen. Frankfurt/Main: 
Propyläen Verlag. 
Sontag, Raymond James and Beddie, James Stuart (eds.). 1948. Nazi-Soviet 
Relations 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign 
Office. Department of State Publications. 
Soucek, Svat. 2000. A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Stein, George H. 1986. The Waffen-SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War 1939-1945. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Pres. 
Streit, Christian. 1978. Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen 
Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 
Suny, Roland Grigor. 2001. “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, „National‟ 
Identity, and Theories of Empire.” in Roland Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, 
eds., A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and 
Stalin. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 23-66. 
Thorwald, Jürgen. 1952. Wen Sie Verderben Wollen: Bericht des grossen Verrats. 
Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag. 
-----. 1995. Die Illusion: Rotarmisten gegen Stalin – Die Tragödie der Wlassow-
Armee. Munich: Knaur. 
Togan, A. Zeki Velidi. 1981. (Vol. 1) Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi: 
Batı ve Kuzey Türkistan, 2nd edition. İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi. 
Traichel, Stephanie. 2003. Der Röhm-Putsch. Norderstedt: Grin Verlag. 
Trigg, Johnatan. 2008. Hitler’s Jihadis: Muslim Volunteers of the SS. 
Gloucestershire: The History Press. 
Tucker, Robert C. 1977. “The Emergence of Stalin‟s Foreign Policy,” Slavic 
Review: 36(4), pp. 563-589.   
Tüzün, Süleyman. 2005. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye’de Dış Türkler 
Tartışmaları (1939-1945). Isparta: Fakülte Kitapevi. 
Uğurlu, Ö. Andaç (ed.) 2003. 2. Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye Üzerine Gizli 
Pazarlıklar (1939-1944). İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi. 
172 
 
Ülküsal, Müstecib. 1999. Kırım Yolunda Bir Ömür. Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür 
ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi Yayınları. 
Uzbekistan Respublikasi Prezidenti Huzurudagi Devlet ve Cemiyet Kurilişi 
Akademiyasi, Uzbekistaning Yangi Tarihi Merkezi. 2000. Uzbekistaning 
Yangi Tarihi, İkinci Kitab: Uzbekistan Sovyet Mustamlakaçiligi Davrida. 
Tashkent: Şark Neşriet. 
Vzvarova, G. N. 1995. “Turkestanskie Legionery,” Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 2: 
pp. 39-46. 
Wall, Donald D. 2003. Nazi Germany and World War II. (2nd ed.) Belmont: 
Wadsworth/Thomson. 
Wheal, Elizabeth-Anne, Stephen Pope and James Taylor. 1992. The Meridian 
Encyclopedia of the Second World War. New York: Meridian. 
Williamson, Gordon. 2005. Waffen-SS Handbook 1933-1945. Gloucestershire: 
Sutton Publishing. 
173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I: The Srength of the Waffen-SS at the Beginning of the Operation 
Barbarossa 
The strength of the Waffen-SS at the beginning of the Operation Barbarossa:
686
 
SS Division Leibstandarte SS “Adolf Hitler” 10,796 
SS Division “Viking”     19,377 
SS Totenkopf Division    18,754 
SS Division “Nord”     10,573 
SS Division “Reich”     19,021 
SS Polizei Division     17,347 
Kommandostab Reichsführer SS   18,438 
Administrative Department    4,007 
Reserve Units      29,809 
Inspectorate of Concentration Camps   7,200 
SS Guard Battalions     2,159 
SS Garrison Posts     992 
SS Officer and NCO Schools   1,028 
SS Volunteer Battalion “Nordost”   904 
 
Appendix II: The Anthem of National Turkestan Union Committee   
GÖZEL TÜRKİSTAN687 
Gözel Türkistan senge ne boldi,  
Sebeb vaqtsız güllerin soldi, 
 Ej güllerin soldi. 
Cemenler berbad, quşlar hem ferjad, 
Hemmesi mezlüm, bolmasmidir şad, 
 Ej bolmasmidir şad. 
Bilmen ne ücün quşlar ucmaz baqcalarında, 
 Ej baqcalarında.  
                                                             
686 Report by Inspekteur für Statistik to Reichsführer SS, “Stärkemeldung der Schutzstaffel vom 30 
Juni 1941,” August 27, 1941, quoted in Stein, p. 120.  
687 Adopted version of Gözel Fergana poem by Turkestani Çolpan. See İkram Han, pp. 133-134. 
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Bilmen ne ücün quşlar ucmaz baqcalarında, 
 Ej baqcalarında.  
Birliğimizin tebrenmes taqi, 
Umidimizin sonmas ciraqı, 
 Ej sonmas ciraqı. 
Birleş ey xalqım kelgandir caqi, 
Bezelsin endi Türkistan baqi, 
 Ej Türkistan baqi. 
Qozqal xalqım jeter şunça çebru-çafalar, 
 Ej çebru-çafalar. 
Qozqal xalqım jeter şunça çebru-çafalar, 
 Ej çebru-çafalar. 
Al bajraqinni qalbim ojqansin, 
Qulliq esaret barcasi jansin, 
Qur jeni devlet javlar örtensin, 
Ösib Türkistan qaddin kötersin, 
 Ej qaddin kötersin! 
Jajrab, jaşnab öz vetenin gül baqları da, 
 Ej gül baqları da. 
Jajrab, jaşnab öz vetenin gül baqları da, 
 Ej gül baqları da. 
 
 
Appendix III: Oath of the Legionnaires in the German Army   
Oath of the foreign legionnaires:
688
 
Ich schwöre bei Gott diesen heiligen Eid, dass ich im Kampf gegen den 
Bolschewismus dem Obersten Befehlshaber der deutschen Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, 
unbedingten Gehorsam leisten und als tapferer Soldat bereit sein will, jederzeit für 
diesen Eid mein Leben einzusetzen. 
(I swear by God, this sacred oath, that in the struggle against Bolshevism, I will 
unconditionally obey the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Adolf Hitler, 
and as a faithful soldier am ready, at any time he may desire, to lay down my life 
for this oath.)   
                                                             
688 Original German and its English translation, see Williamson, p. 59.  
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Appendix IV: Commanders of the Turkestani Units 
The commanders and strength of the Turkestani or Muslim units in the Waffen-SS 
were as follows:
689
 
Title of the Commander  Name    Date 
SS-Obersturmbannführer   Andreas Mayer-Mader  January 1944 
SS- Hauptsturmführer   Billig    March 28, 1944 
SS-Hauptsturmführer   Hermann690   April 27, 1944 
SS-Sturmbannführer der Reserve Franz Liebermann691  June 1944 
SS-Hauptsturmführer   Reiner Olzscha692  September 1944 
SS-Standartenführer   Harun – el – Raschid   October 1944 
SS-Hauptsturmführer   Fürst    January 1945 
Unit strength 
February 1944   3,000 
September 1944   4,000 
April 1945    8,500 
Appendix V: Number of the Eastern Volunteers in the German Army 
Number of Eastern “volunteers” as of October 1944:693 
Armed Lithuanian Units    27,000 
Armed Latvian Units     2 SS Divisions 
Armed Estonian Units    1 SS Division 
Turkestani Volunteers    110,000 
Tatar Volunteers     35,000 
Cossack Units      82,000 
Caucasians  
  (Armenian, Azeri, Georgian, North Caucasus)  110,000 
Kalmuk Cavalry Corps    29 Squadrons 
Byelorussian Military Units    1 SS Division 
Ukrainian Military Units    220,000 
                                                             
689 From Bishop, p. 180 and Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in 
German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 81.  
690 Afther the death of Hermann in a battle near Grodno [in the westernmost region of today‟s 
Belarus] the Eastern Muslim Waffen-SS Regiment was headed by an Uzbek, SS-Obersturmführer 
(Lieutenant) Gulam Alimov. The Regiment was attached to SS-Oberführer (Brigadier) 
Dirlewanger‟s SS Brigade. Romanko, “The East Came West: Muslim and Hindu Volunteers in 
German Service, 1941-1945,” p. 81.  
691 In 1944 until June, there was an uncertainty about the commanding post of the Turkestani or 
Muslim units in the Waffen-SS. The unit was attached to SS-Dirlewanger Penal Brigade to 
suppress the uprising in Warsaw. Thus, Dirlewanger should be assumed as the commander of 
these units until July 1944, when Harun - el - Raschid was brought to the post. Muñoz, Hitler’s 
Muslims, p. 78.   
692 When Harun - el - Raschid became the commander of the Ostmusselmanische SS-Regiment in 
July 1944, he was SS-Sturmbannführer (SS-Major), while Olzscha was SS-Hauptsturmführer (SS-
Captain). Harun - el - Raschid was ranking lower than Olzscha, until he was promoted to SS-
Standartenführer (SS-Colonel) in October 1944. Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, p. 78. 
693 A document dated January 24, 1945, from the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories. 
Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 5. 
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Military and semi-military formations served in the German Army and Waffen-SS 
until January 24, 1945:
694
 
Armed Lithuanian Units    36,800 
Armed Latvian Units     104,000 
Armed Estonian Units    10,000 
Estimated Reserves of Turks and Idel-Ural Tatars 45,000 (incl. 20,000 POWs) 
SS-Waffengruppe “Krim”695    10,000  
Armed Armenian Units    7,000 
Armed Azerbaijani Units    31,000 
Armed Georgian Units    19,000 
Kalmuk Cavalry Corps    5,000 
Armed North Caucasian Units   7,000 
Russian Military Units    10,000 
Byelorussian Military Units    19,000 
Ukrainian Military Units    75,000 
Total Eastern Volunteers 
  (in the Army, Waffen-SS, Luftwaffe, Police) 373,800 
Russian Liberation Army of Vlasov   300,000 
 
Appendix VI: Commanders of the Caucasian Waffen-SS Brigade 
Commanding cadre and organization of the Caucasian Armed SS Brigade 
(Kaukasischer Waffen Verband der SS) was as follows:
696
 
 Standartenführer der Reserve (Colonel of the Reserve Army): Arved 
Theuermann 
 Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel): Hubert Ritter von Aichinger 
 Hauptsturmführer der Reserve (Captain of the Reserve Army): Emanuel von 
Jaskiewicz  
 SS Waffengruppe “Armenien” (Armed SS Group Armenia): Waffen-SS 
Colonel V. Sarkisjan 
 SS Waffengruppe “Aserbeidschan” (Armed SS Group Azerbaijan): Waffen-
SS Colonel Muhammed İsrafil Bey 
 SS Waffengruppe “Georgien” (Armed SS Group Georgia): Waffen-SS 
Colonel Pridon Zulukidze 
 SS Waffengruppe “Nordkaukasien” (Armed SS Group North Caucasus): 
Waffen-SS Colonel Küçük Ulagay. 
Other officers in the unit were: Waffen-SS Captain Akaki Barkalaja; Waffen-SS 
Lieutenants Abdul Ebubekirov, Misost Dzhido, Ramazan Duyakulov, Chaibulla 
                                                             
694 A document dated January 24, 1945, from the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories. 
Muñoz, Hitler’s Eastern Legions, p. 5.  
695 This unit was first in the Osttürkischer-Waffenverband der SS, then in the Kaukasischer-
Waffenverband der SS. 
696 Muñoz, Hitler’s Muslims, pp. 67-68 
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Magomayev, Anatolie Schakmann, Tscherim Soobzokov, Magomed Uschano; 
Waffen-SS Second Lieutenants Ahmed Diakyev, İsmail Dscharimov, Georg 
Kordsachia, Harun-Reşit Magomayev.    
      
Appendix VII: Turkestani Workers of Publication 
List of the Muslim authors and workers in the Journal Türk Birliği (Union of Turks) 
in Germany during the World War II:
697
 
 
Name    Job 
Hakim Tınıbek  Redactor   
Cingis Amitov  Secretary 
Aman Annayar  Worker 
Alsa Musuralen  Corrector 
Tulep Canisak   Translator 
 
Idel-Ural edition: 
 
Name    Job 
Şihap Nigmati   Chief Redactor 
Minigul Garipov  Typist 
Bari Fatçullin   Translator 
Konstantin Çartşenko  Worker 
Asfald Şınbayev  Corrector 
Fatih Azizbayev  Worker 
 
Krim (the Crimea) edition: 
 
Name    Job 
Abdullah Karabaş  Chief Redactor 
Suleyman Mangıtlı  Literature Worker 
Osman Saitov   Responsible Secretary 
Talib Seyitaliyev  Worker 
Ahmet Mefayev  Journalist 
Edhem Hatip-Zade  Corrector 
Zehra Karabaş  Typist 
 
                                                             
697 NA, T-354/161/3807063; T-354/161/3807064; T-354/161/3807065; T-354/161/3807066. 
According to the report of Deutscher Verlag (German Publishing), in October, November and 
December 1944, half of the publising costs belonged to the Turkic-Newspapers. See,               
NA, T-175/162/ 2695541 and NA, T-175/162/ 2695541.  NA, T-354/161/3807063;                        
T-354/161/3807064; T-354/161/3807065; T-354/161/3807066.  
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Türkistan edition: 
 
Name    Job 
Makam Umari  - 
Kurre Bedrimurat  Writer 
Gabdil Kuvandikov  Translator 
Aziz Abişov   Last Redactor 
  
Appendix VIII: A List of some of the Turkestani Officers 
A list of the some of the Turkestani officers in German POW camps in the World 
War II:
698
 
 
Name    Rank       Address           
Aliev Batir   Oberstleutnant (Lieu.Col.) Stalag IX, Badorf 
M. Ahmedşamov  Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund 
Kasi Kasbekov  Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund 
E. Muhammedcanov  Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund 
T. Tilebaldinov  Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund 
A. Şuturli   Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund 
J. Usmanov   Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund 
K. Eyüpov   Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Stalag VI, Dortmund  
 
A list of the some of the Turkestani soldiers and NCOs in the German Army in the 
World War II:
699
 
 
Name    Rank       Address 
Oras Taşov   Doctor    Ausbildungslager Z.B.W 
Saken Abişev   Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Berlin, Neuköln 
T. Toktanazarov  Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Türkleitstelle, Berlin 
Ashum Sakkalov  Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Neuhammer, Türklegion 
Anuer Suiendikow  Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Feldpost  
Anoyev   Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Feldpost 
Ahmedov   Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Feldpost  
Sarıbay Arıkov  Leutnant (Second Lieu.) Feldpost 
K. Ütgenov   Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Feldpost 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
698 NA, T-354/161/3807060. Original handwriting. Writer and date unknown. 
699 NA, T-354/161/3807060. Original handwriting. Writer and date unknown. 
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A list of the some of the Turkestani civilians working with Germans in the World 
War II:
700
 
 
Name    Rank       Address 
Cumabek Akbergenov Hauptmann (Captain)  Türkleitstelle 
Ergali Düşündübayev  Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Türkleitstelle 
Bilmenov   Oberleutnant (First Lieu.) Türkleitstelle 
 
Appendix IX: Drawings of Insignias for the Legions 
Some of the preliminary sketches found in the German archives for the badges and 
flags of Turkestani and Muslim units. The drawer is unknown.
701
  
 
Drawing 1 
 
In the Drawing 2, the drawer divided his figures into three: The first four drawings 
on the top were classified as Stamm des Osttürkischen Verbände (alles 
Mohamedaner, alles Türkstämmige) (Cadre of the Eastern Turkic Regiments (all 
Muslim, all Turkic-origin)). Under these drawings it is read “Turkistaner, 
Azerbeidjaner, Krimtürken, Tataren-Baschkiren” (from left to right, respectively). 
The second-from-the-top drawing on the right-hand side of the page was classified 
as 1. Sondertruppe (Türkstämmige Christen) (First Special troops (Turkic-origin 
Christians). Under this drawing it is read “Tschuwaschen (Chuvashs).” The last 
drawing was for the non-Turkic origin Christians, classified as 2. Sondertruppe 
(nicht Türkstämmige, Christen) (Second Special Troops (non-Turkic-origin, 
Christians).  
 
                                                             
700 NA, T-354/161/3807060. Original handwriting. Writer and date unknown. 
701 These drawings are copies of NA, T-175/162/2695369; NA, T-175/162/2695249;                        
NA, T-175/162/2695393, and NA, T-354/161/3807078, respectively.  
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Drawing 2 
 
In the Drawing 3, there are preliminary sketches for badges and flags of Turkestani 
and Bashkir troops in the Waffen-SS. The SS insignia can be seen on the badge-
drawings. Thus, these drawings should be dated after the establishment of the 
Osttürkisches Waffenverband der SS (Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS Regiments), 
namely after October, 1944.  
In the first drawing on the top it is read: “Türk einig, Türk frei, Türk groβ (Turk 
united, Turk free, Turk great).” On the bottom, it is read: “Türkistan” and “Alla biz 
bilen (God with us).” In the second drawing, on the top it is read: “Osttürkisches 
Korps (Eastern Turkic Corps), while on the bottom: “Baschkirten (Bashkirs)” and 
Alla biz bilen (God with us).”  
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Drawing 3 
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Drawing 4 
 
The Drawing 4 was another preliminary sketch found in the German archives. The 
drawer is unknown. However, it is clear that this drawing of a flag was planned by 
the drawer to be a part of the wartime German propaganda. It is emphasizing the 
unification of the Muslims of the world, making most probably a reference to the 
famous slogan of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The Communist Manifesto 
(1848) “Workers of the world, unite!” At the bottom of the flag wrote: “Muslims of 
the world, unite!” 
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Appendix X: A List of some of the Turkic Officers in the Waffen-SS  
List of the classified Muslim and Turkic officers in the Waffen-SS in the document 
dated January 25, 1945:
702
 
 
1. Turkestanis: 
 
Name    Classified as SS-    Date 
Açmusa Kuvatov   Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   22.01.45 
Kurre Berdimurat  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   22.01.45 
Seit-Umer Çorman  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   19.01.45 
Adil Muhtar   Führer (?)     19.01.45 
Arsibay Cumabayev  Sturmbannführer (Major)   09.01.45 
Alşa Musuralin  Oberscharführer (Sergeant 1st Class)  09.01.45 
Ergali Düşündübayev  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   14.12.44 
Cumabek Ahbergenov Hauptsturmführer (Captain)   14.12.44 
Jakow Delmanow  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   19.12.44 
Galimcan Sarsengaliyev Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   19.12.44 
Şaviole Kabducan  Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   19.12.44 
 
2. Volga Tatar: 
 
Name    Classified as SS-    Date 
Akim Tagirov   Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   ? 
 
3. Crimean Tatars: 
 
Name    Classified as SS-    Date 
Ahmet Nuretdinov  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   16.01.45 
Salih Şamsutdinov  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   16.01.45 
Enver Yerfanov  Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   16.01.45 
Ahmet Şayhutdinov  Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   16.01.45 
Vassiliy Antonov  Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   16.01.45 
Ahmat Galin   Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   16.01.45 
Gilmat Husnutdinov  Standarten-Oberjunker (-)   16.01.45 
Herman Düşugunsov  Standarten-Oberjunker (-)   16.01.45 
Grigori Şurkin  Standarten-Oberjunker (-)   16.01.45 
Imam Şerafetdinov  Oberscharführer (Sergeant 1st Class)  16.01.45 
Bekir Adamoviç  Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   04.01.45 
Sekirja Arabskij  (?)      04.01.45 
Kemal Ortaylı   Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   14.12.44 
                                                             
702 Names as written in the original document. See, NA, T-175/162/2695420;                                  
NA, T-175/162/2695419. 
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Abdullah Karabaş  Hauptsturmführer (Captain)   14.12.44 
Suleiman Mangıtlı  Oberscharführer (Sergeant 1st Class)  14.12.44 
Şihab Nigmati   Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   14.12.44 
Bari Façulin   Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   14.12.44 
Cingis Amitov  Untersturmführer (2nd Lieu.)   14.12.44 
Eskender Dairski  Obersturmführer (1st Lieu.)   14.12.44 
Gaisa Kateyev  Hauptsturmführer (Captain)   (?) 
 
4. North Caucasian: 
 
Name    Classified as SS-    Date 
Bidanorov Şamil  (?)      (?) 
 
Appendix XI: A List of some of the Battalions of Eastern Legions  
Infantry Battalions of the Eastern Legions in the Caucasus in years 1942-1943:
703
 
 
 
Battalion Commander(s) Strength Higher 
Command 
Area of 
Operations 
450
th
 Turkestani  Major Mayer-
Mader; Major 
Bergen; Captain 
Kob 
934 Turkestanis 
27 Germans 
16
th
 Motorized Div.,    
4
th
 Panzer Army of 
Army Group B. 
Later: 3
rd
 Panzer Corps, 
1
st
 Panzer Army of 
Army Group A.  
On Astrakhan 
direction  
(Kalmuk Steppe) 
782
nd
 Turkestani 1
st Lieu. (later 
Captain) Heise 
900 Turkestanis 
20 Germans 
16
th
 Motorized Division On Astrakhan 
direction  
(Kalmuk Steppe) 
811
th
 
Turkestani
704
 
Major Kurth 820 Turkestanis 
30 Germans 
16
th
 Motorized Division On Astrakhan 
direction  
(Kalmuk Steppe) 
452
nd
 Turkestani Captain Baumann 938 Turkestanis 
12 Germans 
97
th
 Hunter Division, 
44
th
 Army Corps,         
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Tuapse 
781
st
 Turkestani  Captain Niegsch 902 Turkestanis 
28 Germans 
101
st
 Hunter Division, 
44
th
 Army Corps,         
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Tuapse 
I/370
th
 Turkestani First Lieu. Richter 928 Turkestanis 
41 Germans 
370
th
 Infantry Division, 
52
nd
 Army Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
801
st
 North 
Caucasian 
Captain Everling, 
later: Captain 
Burkhardt 
920 N.Caucasians 
27 Germans 
370
th
 Infantry Division, 
52
nd
 Army Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
802
nd
 North 
Caucasian 
Captain Cap 900 N.Caucasians 
37 Germans 
370
th
 Infantry Division 
(later: 3
rd
 Panzer Div.), 
40
th
 Panzer Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
                                                             
703 From Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Oberkommando der 17. Armee, Oberkommando der 1. 
Panzerarmee. See, Muñoz (ed.), The East Came West, p. 306. 
704 On October 1942, this unit was named as 444th Turkestani Infantry Battalion and attached to the 
444th German Security Division.   
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800
th
 North 
Caucasian 
First Lieu. 
Kurpanek 
900 N.Caucasians 
40 Germans 
125
th
 Infantry Division, 
5
th
 Army Corps,            
17
th
 Panzer Army 
Tuapse 
804
th
 Azerbaijani 
“Aslan”705 
Major Gloger 963 Azerbaijanis 
40 Germans 
4
th
 Mountain Division, 
49
th
 Mountain Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
On Sukhumi 
direction 
805
th
 Azerbaijani  Captain Hoch 919 Azerbaijanis 
37 Germans 
111
th
 Infantry Division, 
52
nd
 Army Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
I/111
th
 
Azerbaijani 
“Dönmec”  
Captain 
Scharrenberg 
929 Azerbaijanis 
33 Germans 
111
th
 Infantry Division, 
52
nd
 Army Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
806
th
 Azerbaijani  Captain Ottendorf 911 Azerbaijanis 
44 Germans 
50
th
 Infantry Division, 
52
nd
 Army Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
I/73
th
 Azerbaijani  Captain Franke 917 Azerbaijanis 
42 Germans 
73
rd
 Infantry Division, 
5
th
 Army Corps,            
17
th
 Army 
Anapa and 
Novorossiysk 
795
th
 Georgian  First Lieu. Schirr 934 Georgians 
41 Germans 
23
rd
 Infantry Division, 
3
rd
 Panzer Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
796
th
 Georgian  Captain Eismann 912 Georgians 
37 Germans 
1
st
 Mountain Division, 
49
th
 Panzer Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Tuapse 
I/9
th
 Georgian  First Lieu. Strack 927 Georgians 
38 Germans 
9
th
 Infantry Division,   
5
th
 Army Corps,            
17
th
 Army 
Anapa and 
Novorossiysk 
II/4
th
 Georgian  Captain Bartscht 929 Georgians and 
Ossetians 
36 Germans 
4
th
 Mountain Division,   
49
th
 Mountain Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Temryuk and 
Anapa  
808
th
 Armenian  Major Kucera 916 Armenians 
41 Germans 
1
st
 Mountain Division, 
49
th
 Panzer Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Tuapse 
809
th
 Armenian  Captain Becker 913 Armenians 
45 Germans 
13
th
 Panzer Division,   
3
rd
 Panzer Corps,            
1
st
 Panzer Army 
Nalchik and 
Mozdok 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
705 By the summer of 1943, this became a part of 314th Azerbaijani Infantry Regiment of the       
162nd Infantry Division.  
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Maps  
Map 1: Legions in the Ukraine and Caucasus 
List and map of the Eastern Legions and the Cossack units in the Ukraine and 
Caucasus (November-December 1942):
706
  
 
 450, 452, 782, 811, I/370 : Turkestani Battalions,  
 795, 796, I/9, II/4 : Georgian Battalions, 
 808, 809 : Armenian Battalions, 
 804, 806, I/73, I/111 : Azerbaijani Battalions, 
 800, 802: North Caucasian Battalions, 
 I/444, II/444, I/454, II/454 : Cossack Divisions (444th and 454th security 
divisions), 
 Kaz./97 : 97th Cossack Division,  
 I/82, II/82 : Cossack Squadrons of 40th Panzer Corps,  
 Pl., Jung., I/Don., I/Moun., I/Kub., I/Volga. : Cossack Cavalry Regiment 
“Plateau”, Cossack Regiment of Jung Schultz, 1st Don, 1st Kuban, 1st 
Mountaineer, 1
st
  Volga Tatar Units, 
 Berg. : Sonderverband Bergmann,  
 156, 945 : Turkestani Construction Battalions,  
 Lf. : Caucasian Field Battalion of Luftwaffe. 
                                                             
706 Drobyazko and Karaschuk, p. 10; Muñoz (ed.), The East Came West, p. 306.  
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Map 2: German POW Camps in the Ukraine and the Crimea Mentioned in the 
Text 
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Map 3: German POW Camps in Poland Mentioned in the Text  
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Map 4: German Administration and Planned Boundaries of the Eastern 
Territories
707
 
 
 
 
                                                             
707 Dallin, p. 90. 
191 
 
Map 5: Eastern Legions and Volunteer Formations in France (May-June 1944) 
 
 781, 787 : Turkestani Battalions, 
 795, 797, 798, 799, 822, 823, I/9, II/4 : Georgian Battalions, 
 808, 809, 812, 813, I/125, I/198, II/9 : Armenian Battalions, 
 807 : Azerbaijani Battalion, 
 800, 803 : North Caucasian Battalions, 
 826, 827, 829 : Volga Tatar Battalions, 
 403, 454, 570, 622, 623, 624, 625 : Cossack Battalions,   
 1, 2, 5 : self defense volunteer divisions (Schutzmannschafts). 
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Pictures and Illustrations 
Picture 1: A Volga Tatar in the German Army  
Year: 1942-1944.
708
 
 
                                                             
708 Bild 146-2008-0337, Bundesarchiv, Bundesarchiv Picture Database. See, 
http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de, accessed on June 15, 2010.  
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Picture 2: Turkestanis in the German Army in Tionville  
North of France, 1943.
709
 
 
Picture 3: Turkestanis in the German Army in Tionville  
North of France, 1943.
710
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
709 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-295-1560-21. 
710 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-295-1560-22. 
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Picture 4: Turkestanis in the German Army in Tionville 
North of France, 1943.
711
 
 
Picture 5: Turkestanis in the German Army in Normandy, France, 1943
712
 
 
                                                             
711 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-295-1560-02A. 
712 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-295-1561-04. 
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Picture 6: Turkestanis in the German Army in Normandy, France, 1943
713
 
 
Picture 7: Turkestanis in the German Army, October-November 1943
714
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
713 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-295-1561-09. 
714 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-295-1558-36A. 
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Picture 8: Turkestani Officers with German Commanders  
Barneville, France, on the Atlantic coast, January 16, 1944. From right to left in the 
picture are: Oberstleutnant von Tempelhoff, Oberstleutnant Rueissner, 
Generalmajor Zeltmann, Rommel, on the left is an officer of 698
th
 Turkestani 
Bataillon.
715
  
 
Picture 9: Turkish Generals Erkilet and Erden with Hitler
716
 
 
                                                             
715 Bundesarchiv, Bild 1011-296-1982-04A. 
716 See, http://forum.axishistory.com, accessed on January 15, 2010.  
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Picture 10: Soldbuch of a Kirgiz Legionnaire from the 719th Turkestani 
Battalion
717
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
717 See, http://www.turan.info/forum, accessed on January 15, 2010. 
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Picture 11: Soldbuch of an Azerbaijani Legionnaire Named Agabala 
Agabalayev
718
 
 
 
                                                             
718 See, http://www.turan.info/forum, accessed on January 15, 2010. 
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Picture 12: A Turkestani NCO in the German Army
719
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
719 See, Littlejohn for the picture.  
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Picture 13: Insignias of the Turkestan Legion
720
 
(i) The first design in 1942. 100 x 68 mm. Dome of the mosque blue and white, 
background color of the mosque dark green, Turkistan script blue. 
(ii) The second design in 1943. Arrow and bow white, background pink (top) and 
blue (bottom), Turkistan script blue.   
(iii) The third design in 1944. 80 x 60 mm. Dome of the mosque blue and white, 
background color of the mosque dark green, Turkistan script blue. 
 
 
 
(iii) 
 
 
                                                             
720 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
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Picture 14: Insignias of the Azerbaijani Legion
721
 
(i) The version used in 1942-1943. 
(ii) The version used in 1943-1945. 
 
 
 
Picture 15: Insignias of the Caucasian Legion (first and second designs)
722
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
721 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
722 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
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Picture 16: Insignias of the Volga Tatar Legion (first, second and third 
designs)
723
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
723 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
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Picture 17: Flag of the Turkestan Legion (first version bottom, second version 
above)
724
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
724 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
206 
 
Picture 18: Cap Cockade and Shoulder Strap of the Turkestan Legion
725
 
 
The veichle sign of the 162
nd
 Infantry Division. 
 
 
Picture 19: Collar Patch and cuff Title of the Eastern Turkic Waffen-SS 
Division
726
 
 
                                                             
725 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
726 See, Littlejohn for the pictures. 
207 
 
Picture 20: Veli Kayyum Han in 1942
727
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
727 See, Andican, Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, p. 528. 
